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OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
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**STATE OF NEW YORK
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April 7, 2021

Via E-Mail and U.S. Mail

The Honorable Charles Schumer
Senate Majority Leader
U.S. Senate
S-221, The Capitol
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Minority Leader
U.S. Senate
S-230, The Capitol
Washington, DC 20510

Re: Support for the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021

Dear Congressional Leaders:

We, the undersigned Attorneys General, urge the Senate to move forward with quickly passing and enacting the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280 (the Act), in its entirety. In 2020, our nation learned of the tragic deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and so many others as we were called to reckon with police brutality against Black people and the systemic failures that cause and allow this misconduct to continue. Unfortunately, their stories and untimely deaths are not isolated; they reflect larger systemic issues of egregious law enforcement misconduct, including the disparate use of force against Black individuals quickly escalating to deadly force, even during routine police interactions.¹

The Act seeks to address and remove the root causes of policing practices that too often result in police misconduct. In order to quickly and effectively implement changes in law enforcement agencies across the country, the Act focuses on three key areas for nationwide reform: (1) police accountability; (2) transparency in policing practices; and (3) improved police training and policies. To achieve these goals, the Act implements robust data collection and reporting

¹ U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Police Use of Force: An Examination of Modern Policing Practices* 35 (Nov. 15, 2018).

requirements to ensure public accountability from our police departments and law enforcement officers.

As State Attorneys General, we have a profound interest in protecting the health, safety, and well-being of our residents,² and in ensuring that our residents are not subjected to unlawful police conduct. It is thus critical that Congress enact these reforms in order to protect the safety and well-being of our communities and the officers who serve them.

I. Stronger Law Enforcement Accountability

For far too long, we have seen countless examples of officers who act in ways that endanger the communities they serve, but are nevertheless allowed to continue policing. The former Minneapolis police officer who killed George Floyd had 18 prior complaints filed against him with the Minneapolis Police Department’s Internal Affairs, according to the police department.³ Similarly, a former Chicago police officer had received more than 20 complaints of official misconduct against him – including 10 complaints about excessive use of force – in the years before he shot and killed Laquan McDonald, an unarmed Black man.⁴ It is clear that we need more robust systems of review and oversight for law enforcement agencies in order to prevent yet another tragedy.

The first section of the Act, Title I, outlines a robust set of necessary reforms of the ways in which we hold law enforcement officers accountable. Under this section, both law enforcement institutions and the public can hold liable officers who engage in misconduct or wrongdoing by granting State Attorneys General authority to investigate patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing and creating uniform accreditation standards for law enforcement. Each of these comprehensive proposals is pivotal to ensuring meaningful reform in law enforcement accountability systems.

A. Holding Law Enforcement Officers Accountable in the Courts

Arcane legal doctrines have made it increasingly difficult for prosecutors and private individuals to hold officers who use excessive force or engage in misconduct accountable in our courts.⁵ Section 101 of the Act proposes an important change to remove these barriers by amending 18 U.S.C. § 242 to hold officers criminally liable if they knowingly or recklessly engage in misconduct that substantially contributes to a person’s death. This change from the “willfulness standard” to a “recklessness standard” will make it easier to prosecute and hold accountable officers who have engaged in misconduct.

² See *Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Baretz*, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).

³ Dakin Andone, Hollie Silverman, and Melissa Alonso, *The Minneapolis police officer who knelt on George Floyd’s neck had 18 previous complaints against him, police department says*, CNN (May 29, 2020), <https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/us/minneapolis-officer-complaints-george-floyd/index.html>.

⁴ Elliot C. McLaughlin, *Chicago Officer Had History of Complaints Before Laquan McDonald Shooting*, CNN (Nov. 26, 2015, 5:45 PM), <http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/25/us/jason-van-dyke-previous-complaints-lawsuits>.

⁵ See Chung *et al.*, *For cops who kill, special Supreme Court protection*, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (May 8, 2020), <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus/>.

B. Pattern or Practice Investigatory Authority for State Attorneys General

The Act empowers State Attorneys General with new tools to investigate and protect our communities from unconstitutional policing. Section 103 of the Act expands the law enforcement misconduct section of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (§ 12601) to give State Attorneys General clear statutory authority under federal law to investigate and resolve patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing by local law enforcement agencies in our respective states.⁶ This Act gives us, as State Attorneys General, explicit authority under federal law to conduct pattern-or-practice investigations, to obtain data regarding excessive uses of force by law enforcement officers to support those investigations, and to bring appropriate enforcement actions in federal court to ensure constitutional policing in our states.

Currently, the United States Department of Justice (US DOJ) has sole authority under § 12601 to conduct pattern-or-practice investigations.⁷ In some instances, however, State Attorneys General may be better suited than the US DOJ to conduct pattern-or-practice investigations. State Attorneys General have increased proximity to and familiarity with incidents of unconstitutional policing occurring within our states, knowledge about the particular historical context in which these incidents occur, and access to and relationships with the relevant stakeholders necessary to successfully implement reforms. State Attorneys General also typically have experience recognizing and investigating civil rights violations, with more resources than private litigants and an ability to bring technical expertise. In fact, our offices already engage in these investigations, under both federal and state law, and we therefore already have expertise in this work.⁸ These considerations, coupled with the US DOJ's finite resources and limited staff to pursue pattern-or-practice investigations,⁹ make State Attorneys General uniquely situated to investigate and seek remedies to address systemic violations of our residents' civil rights. Section 103 grants State Attorneys General this critical authority and will allow our offices to protect our

⁶ This section was previously codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141.

⁷ 34 U.S.C. § 12601. Until January 2017, investigations into law enforcement agencies had no correlation to party leadership or law enforcement agency location. For example, in May 2001 the Bush administration opened an investigation into the Detroit, Michigan Police Department (DPD) that led to the establishment of a consent decree in 2003. After over a decade of work, the US DOJ found DPD in full compliance with the consent decree in March 2016. Between 2001 and 2009, the US DOJ opened at least ten investigations into law enforcement agencies. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Division, *The Civil Rights Division's Pattern and Practice Police Reform Work: 1994-Present* 44-46 (Jan. 2017), <https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download> (including Cincinnati (OH) Police Department, Villa Rica (GA) Police Department, Orange County (FL) Sheriff's Department, Virgin Island Police Department, Easton (PA) Police Department, Beacon (NY) Police Department, Warren (OH) Police Department, Puerto Rico Police Department, Yonkers (NY) Police Department).

⁸ For example, the City of Chicago agreed to a consent decree to implement comprehensive reforms of the Chicago Police Department and other City agencies after the Illinois Attorney General filed a federal suit asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the U.S. Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, and state civil rights laws for engaging in a pattern of excessive force and other misconduct that disproportionately harmed Black and Latinx residents. The Illinois Attorney General's Office continues to enforce the terms of the consent decree. Additionally, in 1999 and 2013, the New York Attorney General's Office (NYAG) investigated and issued reports regarding NYPD's stop and frisk practices. A court later determined these practices were unconstitutional. In 2001, NYAG filed a federal lawsuit against the Town of Wallkill for discriminatory practices by its police department. The case was later resolved by a consent decree. This year, NYAG has opened investigations into several policies and practices of the NYPD.

⁹ US DOJ generally has the resources to pursue only a few pattern-or-practice investigations at a time, even under administrations that played a strong enforcement role. See Steven Rushin, *Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments*, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 1343, 1408 (2015) (“[T]he federal government only has the resources to pursue [systemic reform litigation] in a small fraction of the municipalities where there appears to be a pattern or practice of misconduct.”)

communities from unconstitutional policing either in collaboration with, or in lieu of, US DOJ's involvement.

In addition to granting pattern-or-practice enforcement authority, Section 103 of the Act also empowers State Attorneys General with the same authority granted to the U.S. Attorney General by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to “acquire data about the use of excessive force by law enforcement officers.”¹⁰ This authority, which Congress enacted to accompany the pattern-or-practice enforcement authority in § 12601, provides State Attorneys General with access under federal law to regular and uniform annual data on those local law enforcement agencies offices that have higher-than-typical rates of excessive force complaints. This data is important to help identify at-risk law enforcement agencies *before*—rather than after—another devastating incident occurs.

We urge you to pass this Act to give State Attorneys General authority under § 12601 to conduct pattern-or-practice investigations and bring actions in federal court, in addition to the authority they may already have. Recognizing the important role that states can play, Congress has given authority to state officials to enforce many other federal laws.¹¹ Congress should give similar authority under federal law to all State Attorneys General to enforce our nation's most fundamental law, the United States Constitution, by initiating investigations and enforcement actions against unconstitutional police practices.

C. Establishment of a Uniform Set of Accreditation Standards for Law Enforcement

Finally, Subtitle B of Title I of the Act facilitates the creation of a much-needed uniform set of standards for accreditation of law enforcement agencies. Without a national set of standards for accreditation, states and local governments had no choice but to establish their own. This causes inconsistencies across jurisdictions and, at times, has enabled law enforcement officers who have run afoul of one's jurisdictions standards to continue working in law enforcement in another jurisdiction. We strongly support the establishment of a uniform, evidence-based set of standards governing the law enforcement agency accreditation process.

Each reform detailed in Title I is imperative to respond to the calls we are hearing in communities across the country: our systems must be reformed to hold law enforcement officers accountable for misconduct, and to prevent such misconduct from occurring in the future. We urge you to pass Title I of the George Floyd in Policing Act of 2021 in its entirety.

II. Increased Public Transparency Through Data Collection

Title II of the Act establishes foundational data collection systems to identify both officers who engage in repeated instances of misconduct and the law enforcement agencies that allow practices of misconduct or unconstitutional policing to persist. We need these tools to begin remedying practices of unconstitutional policing in departments across the country. By and large, law enforcement departments have failed to hold officers accountable for using excessive force,

¹⁰ 34 U.S.C. § 12602.

¹¹ *See, e.g.*, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(d) (enforcement of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act); 15 U.S.C. § 15c (a) (enforcement of antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (enforcement of consumer product safety rules); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362, 1365 (enforcement of the Clean Water Act); 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(3) (enforcement of access to reproductive health services).

even in instances in which the department has found wrongdoing on the part of the officers.¹² All too often, law enforcement officers who use excessive force receive reduced or no discipline or are rehired after being terminated for misconduct.¹³ Our offices have long advocated for a law enforcement credentialing process and inter-agency sharing of misconduct records to alleviate the systemic failures that have left officers with a history of misconduct on the streets.¹⁴

Sections 201 and 202 of Title II of the Act establish a National Police Misconduct Registry and certification requirements for law enforcement officers. These systems will allow both law enforcement and oversight agencies to identify and swiftly respond to repeated instances of police misconduct. Collection, regular review, and responsiveness to this data is critical: research has shown, for example, that a record of prior civilian complaints is a significant factor in predicting serious misconduct.¹⁵ In order to prevent officers with a history of misconduct from simply changing jurisdictions or departments when issues arise, law enforcement agencies need the tools to identify such officers during the hiring and performance review process.

Research over the last 50 years has consistently called for improved data collection on law enforcement use of force at the local and national level.¹⁶ Responding to this need, Subtitle B of Title II of the Act creates the Police Reporting Information, Data, and Evidence Act of 2021 (PRIDE). The PRIDE Act requires states to submit to the U.S. Attorney General on a quarterly basis data related to every instance of use of force in every law enforcement agency within their jurisdiction. The PRIDE Act requires every law enforcement agency in the country to collect data on incidents involving police use of force, and will result in the creation of a robust, publicly available database of information at the federal level. This will create profound opportunities for identifying systemic patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing in individual agencies or jurisdictions. The PRIDE Act is revolutionary in its use of data-driven approaches to root out systemic issues in policing. We, as State Attorneys General, look forward to collaborating with the US DOJ to respond to the information generated through the PRIDE Act.

III. Improved Law Enforcement Training and Requirement for Bias-Free Policing

While people of color make up fewer than 38% of the United States' population, they make up almost 63% of unarmed people killed by police.¹⁷ Research shows that law enforcement uses excessive force disproportionately on people of color, even after controlling for racial disparities in crime rates,¹⁸ and that both racial stereotyping and racial prejudices may influence police

¹² Shaila Dewan and Serge F. Kovaleski, *Thousands of Complaints Do Little to Change Police Ways*, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2020).

¹³ Stephen Rushin, *Police Disciplinary Appeals*, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 545, 581 (2019) (“Just under a quarter (twenty-four percent) of all officers terminated for misconduct in large American police departments are eventually rehired because of the disciplinary appeals process. [B]etween 2010 and 2017, the City of Chicago has reduced or reversed sanctions against eighty-five percent of all police officers during the grievance appeals process.”).

¹⁴ See Press Release, Illinois Attorney General, *Attorney General Raoul Announces Police Reform Bill* (Jan. 8, 2021), https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2021_01/20210108b.html.

¹⁵ Kyle Rozema & Max Schanzenbach, *Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Civilian Allegations to Predict Police Misconduct*, 11 AM. ECON. J. 225, 227 (2019).

¹⁶ Tom McEwen, *National Data Collection on Police Use of Force*, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Apr. 1996) <https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndcopuof.pdf>.

¹⁷ See *supra* note 1 at 23–24 (“Thirty-two percent of black people killed by police in 2015 were unarmed, as were 25 percent of Latino people, compared to 15 percent of white people.”).

¹⁸ *Id.*

behavior.¹⁹ Furthermore, Black Americans have historically been subjected to disparate treatment and violence by law enforcement agencies.²⁰ Title III of the Act seeks to combat this history and establishes the End Racial and Religious Profiling Act of 2021 (ERRPA), in addition to several additional reforms intended to decrease the use of force by police in interactions with civilians.

A. End Racial and Religious Profiling Act of 2021 (ERRPA)

ERRPA prohibits any law enforcement agent or law enforcement agency from engaging in profiling based on race, religion, or other protected characteristics (collectively defined by the Act as “racial profiling”). ERRPA also contains an important deterrent: the United States, or an individual injured by racial profiling, may file a civil action for declaratory or injunctive relief in state or federal court. It also requires law enforcement training on racial profiling issues and mandates data collection by the U.S. Attorney General.

We emphatically support ERRPA’s effort to dismantle bias in policing by explicitly prohibiting profiling based on race and other protected characteristics. Our support is not controversial: “Democratic and Republican administrations have acknowledged that racial profiling is unconstitutional, socially corrupting, and counter-productive.”²¹ Data and anecdotal accounts routinely show that law enforcement officers disproportionately victimize people of color, particularly Black people, based upon assumptions and implicit bias, rather than evidence of illegal activity.²² We need only to turn to the namesake of the Act – George Floyd – for an example of the deadly harm caused by racial profiling. Mr. Floyd, a 46 year-old father, mentor, hip-hop artist, and Black man, died as a result of an officer’s use of force.²³ ERRPA is a necessary and important step toward improving the safety of policing for communities of color.

B. Policy Reform to Reduce Use of Force by Officers

The Act extends its impact beyond profiling with an important package of reforms to increase safer policing practices and decrease excessive use of force by officers. These reforms and new statutory provisions include the following:

- (1) requiring law enforcement officers to undergo training on racial profiling, implicit bias, and procedural justice;
- (2) creating a new duty to intervene for federal law enforcement in instances of police use of excessive force;
- (3) limitations on no-knock warrants;
- (4) establishing incentives for states to ban chokeholds and carotid holds, and a ban on these practices for federal law enforcement officers (codified as the Eric Garner Excessive Use of Force Prevention Act);

¹⁹ See generally Joscha Legewie, *Racial Profiling and Use of Force in Police Stops: How Local Events Trigger Periods of Increased Discrimination*, 122 AM. J. SOC. 379 (2016).

²⁰ See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, *THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS* (The New Press rev. ed. 2012).

²¹ *The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination*, ACLU 9-12 (Aug. 2009), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf.

²² *Id.*

²³ Jon Lewis *et al.*, *Houston’s Hip-Hop Scene Remembers George Floyd*, NPR (June 10, 2020), <https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/874334270/houstons-hip-hop-scene-remembers-george-floyd>.

- (5) the Police Exercising Absolute Care with Everyone Act of 2021 (PEACE Act of 2021) which limits the justification an officer can use for use of force and requires officers to engage in de-escalation tactics and techniques, limit the use of force in an interaction, give verbal warnings, and receive additional training on these tactics;
- (6) the Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act, which limits transfer of military-grade equipment to state and local law enforcement agencies; and
- (7) establishing Public Safety Innovation Grants to incentivize work at the local level to enhance public safety, including non-law enforcement strategies.

These reforms will decrease the use of practices that have led to disproportionate harm against communities of color, and will add training requirements to law enforcement agencies to better prepare officers to respond in a variety of situations. By de-militarizing our law enforcement agencies and providing tools to respond in non-violent ways, we can begin to establish a different set of expectations for the ways in which officers respond to emergencies in our communities.

C. Body and In-Car Camera Requirements

The final major improvement in Title III of this Act is the Federal Police Camera and Accountability Act. It requires all federal law enforcement officers to activate both the video and audio recording functions of a body-worn camera and an in-car camera when responding to a call for service and at the initiation of any other law enforcement or investigative stop (except in instances of immediate threat to an officer's life or safety). Officers with body-worn cameras generate fewer use-of-force reports and complaints from citizens than officers without body-worn cameras.²⁴ The existence of video evidence of interactions between officers and civilians also increases transparency in policing practices and can improve the quality of investigations.

Our role as State Attorneys General is to ensure the safety and well-being of *all* of the individuals in our jurisdictions. ERRPA and the other reforms to existing law enforcement practices enumerated in this Act are an enormous first step toward protecting our communities from unjustified use of force based on race or ethnicity. The changes outlined in Title III of the Act respond to the public's call to hold officers accountable and reform unconstitutional policing practices, and should be enacted immediately.

IV. Clear Prohibition Against Police Sexual Misconduct Under Color of Law

Title IV of the Act codifies a prohibition against officers engaging in sexual acts while acting under the color of law. The most robust study of sexual misconduct by law enforcement officers found that over a five-year period, 990 officers lost their law enforcement licenses because of sexual assault or other sex-related allegations.²⁵ Of those, 310 officers hurt victims younger than 18 years old, and 154 hurt victims who were jail or prison inmates.²⁶ The full scope of law

²⁴ Anthony Braga *et al.*, *The Benefits of Body-Worn Cameras: New Findings from a Randomized Controlled Trial at the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department*, NAT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV. (Dec. 2017), <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251416.pdf>.

²⁵ *AP Investigation into Officer Sex Misconduct, by the Numbers*, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 31, 2015), <https://apnews.com/article/f61d495bb41d47968679c5b89a9907fc> (noting that “[w]hile the AP’s review is the most comprehensive available, the numbers are an undercount because some states did not provide information, and even among those that did, some reported no officers removed for sexual misdeeds even though cases were identified via official records and news stories.”).

²⁶ *Id.*

enforcement sexual misconduct is unknown, as many sexual assaults perpetrated by law enforcement officers go unreported. Title IV's clear prohibition against sexual misconduct by law enforcement officers is a critical step to prevent abuses of power that harm vulnerable individuals. This provision emphasizes the seriousness with which our offices take police misconduct in every circumstance, and our duty to protect those most vulnerable to abuses of power.

V. Conclusion

As State Attorneys General entrusted with protecting public safety and welfare, we respect the officers who serve their communities lawfully, respectfully, and with regard for the sanctity of human life. We recognize the tremendous risk that officers may face to ensure our safety. However, failure to hold law enforcement officers and agencies accountable when misconduct occurs further deepens mistrust and threatens the legitimacy of law enforcement. Indeed, the anger, disappointment, and frustration over systemic failures to prevent and respond to unconstitutional policing is palpable. We write to you urgently and ask that you respond swiftly. The George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021 begins the work of gaining our communities' confidence in policing and enacts the systemic change needed to ensure constitutional, bias-free policing. Our country cannot move ahead unless we ensure constitutional policing throughout our nation and accountability for police officers who fail to follow our most fundamental law.


Respectfully,



KWAME RAOUL
Illinois Attorney General




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
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
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