

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

STATE OF WASHINGTON et al.,  
  
Plaintiffs,  
  
v.  
  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  
TRANSPORTATION et al.,  
  
Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00848-TL  
  
ORDER ON MOTION FOR  
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 5). Having reviewed the motion, Defendants’ response (Dkt. No. 93), Plaintiffs’ reply (Dkt. No. 99), and the relevant record, and having heard oral argument from the Parties on June 17, 2025, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion.

**I. INTRODUCTION**

In a 1995 episode of *The Simpsons*, Homer must cut short a tearful goodbye with his long-lost mother after her traveling companions protest that their “electric van only has 20 minutes of juice left!” *The Simpsons*: “Mother Simpson” (Fox television broadcast, aired Nov.

1 19, 1995). Some 26 years later, Congress sought to address the phenomenon that has come to be  
2 known as “range anxiety”: the unease experienced by electric vehicle (“EV”) drivers when they  
3 are unsure where the next charging station might be, and whether their car’s battery has  
4 sufficient charge to get them there. *See* Alexandra B. Klass, *Public Utilities and Transportation*  
5 *Electrification*, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 545, 561 (2019) (defining “range anxiety”). In the 2021  
6 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (“IIJA”), Pub. L. 117–58, 135 Stat. 429, 1421, Congress  
7 appropriated \$5 billion to fund a National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (“NEVI”) Formula  
8 Program, the purpose of which was—and still is—“to strategically deploy electric vehicle  
9 charging infrastructure and to establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection,  
10 access, and reliability.” Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation (“the Secretary”) to  
11 distribute this money to the states and the District of Columbia between 2022 and 2026. 135 Stat.  
12 at 1421. Congress established three specific uses for the money:

13 (1) the acquisition and installation of electric vehicle charging  
14 infrastructure to serve as a catalyst for the deployment of such  
15 infrastructure and to connect it to a network to facilitate data  
16 collection, access, and reliability; (2) proper operation and  
17 maintenance of electric vehicle charging infrastructure; and  
18 (3) data sharing about electric vehicle charging infrastructure to  
19 ensure the long-term success of investments made [in the NEVI  
20 Formula Program].

18 *Id.* at 1421–22.

19 Plaintiff States, relying on the IIJA, made plans to utilize their share of the NEVI  
20 Formula funds. States dedicated resources to EV infrastructure. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 23 (Pietz  
21 Decl.) ¶ 17; Dkt. No. 28 (Meredith Decl.) ¶ 23. They lined up private-sector partnerships,  
22 solicited bids on construction projects, and identified and secured sites where EV infrastructure  
23 would be built. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 28 ¶ 28. They prepared to put Congress’s new multibillion-  
24 dollar program to work for their residents.

1 But in 2025, the new Presidential administration determined that its Secretary of  
 2 Transportation would disregard Congress’s mandate. Rather than distribute the Program funds as  
 3 Congress commanded, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) would “immediately pause  
 4 the disbursement of funds appropriated through . . . the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act  
 5 (Public Law 117–58), including but not limited to funds for electric vehicle charging stations  
 6 made available through the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Formula Program . . . .”  
 7 Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353, 8357 (Jan. 29, 2025). On February 6, 2025, the  
 8 Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”), the agency within the Department of  
 9 Transportation that had been administering the NEVI Formula Program, rescinded its  
 10 administrative guidance on the program, revoked the state deployment plans for constructing EV  
 11 infrastructure that had been created, implemented, and previously approved under that guidance,  
 12 and, effectively, stopped distributing the Congressionally appropriated funds. *See* Dkt. No. 1-9  
 13 (“Biondi Letter”) at 2–3. The NEVI Formula Program, in essence, was frozen.

14 Sixteen states, plus the District of Columbia (“Plaintiff States” or “Plaintiffs”), sued  
 15 DOT, FHWA, and the highest-ranking official from each of the two agencies (“Defendants”),  
 16 asserting that the agencies’ action represented an unlawful seizure of legislative authority under  
 17 the separation-of-powers doctrine enshrined in the United States Constitution and an  
 18 overextension of executive authority beyond what is permitted by law. *See generally* Dkt. No. 1  
 19 (Complaint). Congress had directed the Secretary to distribute billions of dollars in NEVI  
 20 Formula funds to the states, but now, under the President’s direction and for impermissible  
 21 reasons (as explained below), he was (and is) refusing to do so. Presently before the Court is the  
 22 Plaintiff States’ motion for a preliminary injunction that enjoins Defendants from three actions:

- 23 (a) Categorically ‘suspending’ or revoking approvals of  
 24 Plaintiff States’ State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure  
 Deployment Plans;

- (b) Withholding or withdrawing NEVI Formula Program Funds for any reason not set forth in the IIJA or applicable FHWA regulations, and without following the IIJA’s requirements . . . [; and]
- (c) Effectuating a categorical suspension or termination of the NEVI Formula Program for Plaintiff States through any other means.

Dkt. No. 5-2 (proposed order) at 2. Because the Court finds that, in effectively suspending the NEVI Formula Program, Defendants have overstepped their Constitutional and statutory authority and have attempted to override the express will of Congress, and for further reasons explained herein, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion.

As will be explained below, the Court’s decision is guided by the United States Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), Pub. L. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). “Separation of powers and checks and balances are fundamental to the structure of the government established by our Constitution. ‘To preserve those checks [on each Branch], and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded.’” *Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Trump*, No. 25-3293, 2025 WL 1541714, at \*7 (9th Cir. May 30, 2025) (quoting *I.N.S. v. Chadha*, 462 U.S. 919, 957–58 (1983)). Specifically, the Constitution “exclusively grants the power of the purse to Congress, not the President.” *City & County of San Francisco v. Trump*, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2018) (first citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (Appropriations Clause), then citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (Spending Clause)). Under the APA, “[a]dministrative agencies are creatures of statute. They accordingly possess only the authority that Congress has provided.” *Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin.*, 595 U.S. 109, 117 (2022).

Although range anxiety, EV charging stations, and current DOT leadership’s policy preferences lurk in the background of this case, the bedrock doctrines of separation of powers

and agency accountability, as enshrined in Constitution and statute, are indifferent to subject matter and blind to personality. When the Executive Branch treads upon the will of the Legislative Branch, and when an administrative agency acts contrary to law, it is the Court’s responsibility to remediate the situation and restore the balance of power. Such remediation and restoration are what the Court undertakes herein.

## II. BACKGROUND

### A. Parties<sup>1</sup>

Plaintiffs are 16 sovereign states of the United States of America, as well as the District of Columbia. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 14, 20. Plaintiff States include: Washington, Colorado, California, Arizona, Delaware, Hawai‘i, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. *Id.* ¶¶ 15–31. Plaintiffs “bring this action in their sovereign and proprietary capacities.” *Id.* ¶ 14. Defendants are two federal agencies—the United States Department of Transportation, a cabinet-level agency within the Executive Branch of the federal government (*id.* ¶ 32), and the Federal Highway Administration, an agency within DOT (*id.* ¶ 34)—and their respective highest ranking officials—Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy (*id.* ¶ 33) and FHWA Executive Director and Acting Administrator Gloria M. Shepherd (*id.* ¶ 35). Plaintiffs sue Defendants Duffy and Shepherd in their respective official capacities. *Id.* ¶¶ 33, 35.

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<sup>1</sup> For clarity and simplicity, the Court will use a state’s name to refer to the relevant agencies in that state. For example, California’s electric vehicle program is administered by two state agencies, the California Energy Commission (“CEC”) and California Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”); this Order refers to the State of California, CEC, and Caltrans as “California.” New York’s program includes the New York State Department of Transportation (“NYSDOT”), the Power Authority of New York (“NYPA”), and New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (“NYSERDA”); this Order refers to all of these entities, as well as the state itself, as “New York.”

**B. Legal Framework: Statute, Executive Order, and Agency Action**

**1. Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act**

***a. National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Formula Program***

In 2021, Congress passed, and President Biden signed into law, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (“IIJA”), Pub. L. 117–58, 135 Stat. 429. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 36. In the law, Congress established the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (“NEVI”) Formula Program, which appropriated \$5 billion to “provide funding to States to strategically deploy electric vehicle charging infrastructure and to establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability.” *Id.* ¶¶ 37, 39 (quoting 135 Stat. at 1421). Congress established three prescribed uses for the NEVI funds:

(1) the acquisition and installation of electric vehicle charging infrastructure to serve as a catalyst for the deployment of such infrastructure and to connect it to a network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability; (2) proper operation and maintenance of electric vehicle charging infrastructure; and (3) data sharing about electric vehicle charging infrastructure to ensure the long-term success of investments made under [the NEVI Formula Program provisions of the IIJA].

Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 40 (alteration in original) (quoting 135 Stat. at 1421–22).<sup>2</sup> Per the statute, the funds must “remain available until expended.” *Id.* ¶ 37 (quoting 135 Stat. at 1421).

Importantly, the appropriated NEVI funds are “formula” funds, which means that they were “appropriated by Congress for a specific purpose and must be distributed on the basis of a statutory formula.” *Id.* ¶ 38 (citing *City of Los Angeles v. Barr*, 941 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2019)). That is, NEVI funds cannot be used for any purpose other than those that Congress established in the NEVI Formula Program, and the apportionment of the funds among the

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<sup>2</sup> Part of the appropriated funding is reserved to pay for the administration of the program itself and to fund “an additional grant program.” *See* Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 47; Dkt. No. 1-6 (FHWA Apportionment Notice) at 2–3.

1 recipient states cannot deviate from the prescribed statutory formula. *Id.* ¶ 42. Under the IIJA,  
 2 the formula used to distribute NEVI funds is “the same federal formula as that which is used to  
 3 distribute highway funds.” *Id.* (citing 135 Stat. at 1422); *see* 23 U.S.C. § 104 (formula for  
 4 apportionment of federal-aid highway funds).

5 Under the IIJA, distribution of NEVI Formula funds is the responsibility of the Secretary  
 6 of Transportation, as delegated to FHWA: The Secretary “‘shall distribute among the States the  
 7 [NEVI Formula Program funds] so that each State receives’ the amount determined by the  
 8 formula.” *Id.* ¶ 42 (quoting 135 Stat. at 1422) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). The  
 9 IIJA includes two planning prerequisites that must be fulfilled before the appropriated money  
 10 can flow from the federal government to the recipient states. First, the IIJA obligated DOT to  
 11 develop “‘guidance for States and localities to strategically deploy electric vehicle charging  
 12 infrastructure’ consistent with the NEVI Formula Program provisions of the IIJA.” *Id.* ¶ 44  
 13 (quoting 135 Stat. at 1423). On February 10, 2022, FHWA duly issued its NEVI Formula  
 14 Program Guidance. *Id.* ¶ 45; *see* Dkt. No. 93-1 (2022 NEVI Formula Program Guidance) at 9–  
 15 39. FHWA has updated the guidance annually, most recently on June 11, 2024. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 45.  
 16 Second, to become eligible to receive NEVI funds each year, the IIJA requires each recipient  
 17 state to submit to DOT a State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plan that “describes  
 18 how it ‘intends to use funds distributed to the State . . . to carry out the [NEVI Formula] Program  
 19 for each fiscal year in which funds are made available.’” *Id.* ¶ 43 (quoting 135 Stat. at 1422).

20 ***b. Distributing NEVI Funds***

21 There is a “well-defined” process for distributing NEVI funds. *Id.* ¶ 46. The first step is  
 22 Congressional *appropriation*. *Id.* An appropriation is, in essence, a command from Congress to  
 23 the Treasury to get out its checkbook; it authorizes the federal government “to incur financial  
 24 obligations that will result in immediate or future disbursements of funds from the U.S.

1 Treasury.” *Id.* (citing 2 U.S.C. § 622(2)(A)(i)). In the IIJA, Congress appropriated \$5 billion to  
2 FHWA “to carry out the NEVI Formula Program in accordance with specific directives and  
3 subject to express constraints.” *Id.*

4 The next step is *apportionment*. *Id.* ¶ 47. This is the determination of who gets how much  
5 of the appropriated funds, and when. The United States Office of Management and Budget  
6 (“OMB”) “apportioned the funds appropriated by Congress by dividing the \$5 billion  
7 appropriation across five fiscal years and distributed the funds to the FHWA.” *Id.* Next, FHWA  
8 further apportions the money by first setting aside administrative and other earmarked funds, *see*  
9 *supra* note 2, then “divid[ing] the remaining funds for that fiscal year among the States according  
10 to the non-discretionary statutory formula.” *Id.* ¶ 47. The NEVI formula is derived from the  
11 statutory formula that FHWA uses to apportion federal highway aid. *Id.* ¶ 48; *see* 23 U.S.C.  
12 §§ 104(c), 165. Put another way, the size of a state’s slice of the \$5 billion NEVI pie is directly  
13 proportional to the size of its slice of the federal highway aid pie. A given state’s federal  
14 highway aid apportionment is “fixed in statute based on historical apportionments and  
15 congressionally determined shares.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 48; *see* 23 U.S.C. § 104(b)–(c). Just as DOT  
16 cannot meddle with the Congressionally determined federal highway aid apportionments,  
17 “[n]either the Secretary nor the FHWA, nor any other part of the Executive Branch has discretion  
18 to determine the amount of funding apportioned to any State under the NEVI Formula Program.”  
19 Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 48; 23 U.S.C. § 104.

20 After the funds are apportioned, they are made available for obligation. In the NEVI  
21 Formula Program, FHWA made “available for obligation” each state’s apportioned funds each  
22 fiscal year and advised the states by way of a letter. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 1-7 (Shepherd Letter) at 1  
23 (advising Washington that “Fiscal Year 2022 funds [were] now available . . . for obligation”).  
24

1 When funds became available for obligation, FHWA sent each state the same letter. *See* Dkt. No.  
2 109 (Hr’g Tr.) at 9:10–12.

3 The next step is *obligation*. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 49–52. An obligation is a legal duty that makes  
4 the federal government liable for payment for “goods and services ordered or received,” or a  
5 legal duty that could mature into such a liability. *See id.* ¶ 50 (citing U.S. Gov’t Accountability  
6 Off. Pub. No. GAO-05-734SP (*A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process*), at 12–  
7 13 (Sept. 2005) (“GAO Glossary”). It is “a ‘definite commitment’ from the government to pay  
8 for something. *Id.* (citing GAO Glossary); *see also* Dkt. 93-1 (Biondi Decl.) ¶ 10  
9 (acknowledging that an obligation creates a “contractual[] commit[ment]” between FHWA and  
10 states). “States obligate their share of apportioned NEVI Formula Program funds by submitting  
11 to the FHWA an authorization request for specific activities.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 51. If the activities for  
12 which a state requests authorization “meet the minimum standards and requirements” given in 23  
13 C.F.R. § 680 (“National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Standards and Requirements”), FHWA  
14 must approve the request. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 51; 23 C.F.R. § 680. Upon FHWA’s authorization of a  
15 request, the funds are obligated, and the promise is made. *Id.*

16 The fourth step is *disbursement*. Disbursement, simply put, is the actual transfer of funds  
17 from the Treasury to the states.

18 ***c. Withdrawing or Withholding NEVI Funds***

19 Under the IIJA, DOT has little discretion to withhold or withdraw NEVI funds from the  
20 states. *Id.* ¶ 53. The Department “must distribute to each State its share of NEVI Formula  
21 Program funds unless [(1)] the state fails to timely submit its State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure  
22 Deployment Plan or [(2)] the Secretary ‘determines a State has not taken action to carry out its  
23 State Plan.’” *Id.* (cleaned up) (quoting 135 Stat. at 1422). The option to withhold or withdraw  
24 funds on the latter basis is unavailable unless DOT complies with substantial procedural

requirements. Before DOT determines that a State has not taken sufficient action on its plan, it must first “notify the State, consult with the State, and identify actions that can be taken to rectify concerns, and provide at least 90 days for the State to rectify concerns and take action to carry out its State Plan.” *Id.* ¶ 54 (cleaned up) (quoting 135 Stat. at 1422). And even if such a determination is made, DOT cannot do anything about it—that is, it cannot withhold or withdraw NEVI Formula funding—without first complying with *further* procedural requirements: “The Secretary shall provide notice to a State on the intent to withhold or withdraw funds not less than 60 days before withholding or withdrawing any funds, during which time the State shall have an opportunity to appeal a decision to withhold or withdraw funds directly to the Secretary.” *Id.* (cleaned up) (quoting 135 Stat. at 1422).

Further, even if DOT successfully clears these procedural requirements, the IIJA redirects the withheld or withdrawn funds only to certain alternate recipients. Funds withheld or withdrawn from a state may be awarded “on a competitive basis to local jurisdictions within the State for use on projects that meet the eligibility requirements.” *Id.* ¶ 55 (quoting 135 Stat. at 1422). If the funds are not awarded to local jurisdictions within the state from which they were originally withheld or withdrawn, the IIJA requires that they be distributed among other states “in the same manner as funds distributed for that fiscal year”—that is, by the NEVI apportionment formula described above. *Id.* (quoting 135 Stat. at 1422–23). In short, the statute requires that NEVI Formula funds will be spent by someone, somewhere, on EV infrastructure.

## **2. “Unleashing American Energy” Executive Order and DOT Order 2100.7**

On January 20, 2025, the first day of his presidency, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,154, entitled “Unleashing American Energy.” 90 Fed. Reg. 8353 (Jan. 29, 2025). Section 7(a) of the Order directed “[a]ll agencies [to] immediately pause the disbursement of funds appropriated through . . . the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Public Law 117-58),

1 including but not limited to funds for electric vehicle charging stations made available through  
2 the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Formula Program . . . .” *Id.* at 8357. The Order  
3 further directed all agencies to “review their processes, policies, and programs for issuing grants,  
4 loans, or any other financial disbursements of such appropriated funds for consistency with the  
5 law and [the President’s energy policy priorities].” *Id.*

6 On January 29, 2025, his first full day as Secretary of Transportation, *see* 171 Cong. Rec.  
7 S408 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2025) (vote on Duffy nomination), Defendant Duffy issued DOT Order  
8 No. 2100.7, “Ensuring Reliance Upon Sound Economic Analysis in Department of  
9 Transportation Policies, Programs, and Activities,” Dkt. No. 1-10 (DOT Order No. 2100.7 (Jan.  
10 29, 2025)). This Order purports to “reset[] the principles and standards underpinning U.S.  
11 Department of Transportation . . . policies, programs, and activities to mandate reliance on  
12 rigorous economic analysis and positive cost-benefit calculations and ensure that all DOT grants,  
13 loans, contracts, and DOT-supported or -assisted State contracts bolster the American economy  
14 and benefit the American people.” *Id.* at 2. The Department’s new priorities purport to base  
15 “grantmaking, lending, policymaking, and rulemaking activities” on “sound economic principles  
16 and analysis supported by rigorous cost-benefit requirements and date-driven decisions.” At the  
17 same time, however, they include the prioritization of “projects and goals” that, among other  
18 things, “give preference to communities with marriage and birth rates higher than the national  
19 average; prohibit recipients of DOT support or assistance from imposing vaccine and mask  
20 mandates; and require local compliance or cooperation with Federal immigration enforcement.”

1 *Id.* at 2, 4 (cleaned up). Order No. 2100.7 became effective immediately, upon its execution by  
2 the new Secretary. *Id.* at 2.<sup>3</sup>

### 3           **3.       Biondi Letter**

4           On February 6, 2025, one week after the DOT’s installation of Defendant Duffy and his  
5 issuance of Order No. 2100.7, Emily Biondi, Associate Administrator in FHWA’s Office of  
6 Planning, Environment, and Realty, addressed a letter to “State Department of Transportation  
7 Directors” (Dkt. No. 1-9 (“Biondi Letter”)). The Biondi Letter stated that “[t]he new leadership  
8 of the Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) has decided to review the policies underlying  
9 the implementation of the NEVI Formula Program.” *Id.* at 2. The Biondi Letter rescinded “the  
10 current NEVI Formula Program Guidance dated June 11, 2024, and all prior versions of this  
11 guidance,” and “immediately suspend[ed] the approval of all State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure  
12 Deployment plans for all fiscal years.” *Id.* at 2–3. The Biondi Letter mandated that, “effective  
13 immediately, no new obligations may occur under the NEVI Formula Program until the updated  
14 final NEVI Formula Program Guidance is issued and new State plans are submitted and  
15 approved.” *Id.* at 3. The Biondi Letter did not provide a date when updated NEVI Formula  
16 Program guidance would be issued but stated that “FHWA aims to have updated draft NEVI  
17 Formula Guidance published for public comment in the spring.” *Id.* As of the date of this order,  
18 no new guidance has been issued, nor has any draft been published for public comment. With no  
19 guidance in effect, states cannot submit the deployment plans that the IIJA requires for them to  
20 be eligible to receive NEVI Formula funds. In revoking all State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure  
21 Deployment Plans, Defendants are, according to Plaintiffs, “withholding approximately \$2.74  
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23 <sup>3</sup> The Court notes, as a district court recently found, that “Congress did not authorize or grant authority to the  
24 Secretary of Transportation to impose immigration enforcement conditions on federal dollars specifically  
appropriated for transportation purposes.” *California v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.*, No. C25-208, 2025 WL 1711531, at  
\*2 (D.R.I. June 19, 2025).

1 billion of the \$3.27 [b]illion in NEVI Formula Program funds available to the States for  
2 obligation for fiscal years 2022 through 2025.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 115. Plaintiffs allege that they have  
3 been “deprived of access to approximately \$1 billion in available NEVI Formula Program funds  
4 for those four fiscal years.” *Id.*

### 5 **C. Factual Background**

6 After President Biden signed the IIJA into law on November 15, 2021, FHWA had 90  
7 days to issue the first version of NEVI Formula Program guidance. *See* 135 Stat. at 1423. FHWA  
8 complied with the law and issued guidance on February 10, 2022. *See* Dkt. No. 93-1 at 9–39.  
9 Plaintiff States then began preparing State Electric Infrastructure Deployment Plans. *See, e.g.,*  
10 Dkt. No. 7-1 (California Plan) at 2–65; Dkt. No. 17-1 (New Jersey Plan) at 2–76; Dkt. No. 28-1  
11 (Washington Plan) at 2–59. The State Electric Infrastructure Deployment Plans are detailed and  
12 dense planning documents that are not easily summarized. In short, however, the plans detail the  
13 *who, what, when, where, why, and how* of new, statewide electric vehicle infrastructure for each  
14 Plaintiff State. They include, among other things, timelines, discussions concerning public  
15 engagement, and analyses of commercial and technological trends in EV infrastructure. Plans  
16 detail demographic, ecological, geographical, and economic realities within a state, and the  
17 “alternative fuel corridors” that have been designated to address them. They identify funding  
18 sources, both state and federal, as well as the processes for resolving conflicts and hashing out  
19 ambiguities. Plans report the results of public-interest surveys in which state residents have  
20 voiced their opinions about desired amenities at EV charging stations, and they explain how  
21 contracts for construction will be awarded.

22 Plaintiff States submitted their respective plans in 2022, as well as annual updates in  
23 2023 and 2024, to FHWA for approval, and the agency approved them for fiscal years 2022,  
24

2023, 2024, and 2025.<sup>4</sup> Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 69–70 (District of Columbia), ¶¶ 79–80 (Minnesota),  
 ¶¶ 91–92 (Vermont); Dkt. No. 7 (de Alba Decl.) ¶ 8 (California); Dkt. No. 9 (Toor Decl.) ¶ 9  
 (Colorado); Dkt. No. 11 (Ward Decl.) ¶ 10 (Arizona); Dkt. No. 12 (Hastings Decl.) ¶ 10  
 (Delaware); Dkt. No. 13 (Shishido Decl.) ¶ 10 (Hawai‘i); Dkt. No. 15 (Irvin Decl.) ¶ 10  
 (Illinois); Dkt. No. 16 (Pines Decl.) ¶ 12 (Maryland); Dkt. No. 17 (Patel Decl.) ¶ 9 (New Jersey);  
 Dkt. No. 18 (Valdez Decl.) ¶ 9 (New Mexico); Dkt. No. 20 (Nelson Decl.) ¶ 15 (New York);  
 Dkt. No. 23 (Pietz Decl.) ¶ 11 (Oregon); Dkt. No. 24 (Kearns Decl.) ¶ 14 (Rhode Island); Dkt.  
 No. 26 (Collins-Worachek Decl.) ¶ 10 (Wisconsin); Dkt. No. 28 (Meredith Decl.) ¶ 24  
 (Washington); *see also* Dkt. No. 1-8 (NEVI Formula Program Status of Funds) at 2.<sup>5</sup> Upon  
 FHWA’s approval (and re-approval) of a state’s EV deployment plan, NEVI Formula funds  
 became available to that state for obligation. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 1-7 (Washington approval letter)  
 at 2; Dkt. No. 1-8 at 2. With FHWA-approved deployment plans in hand, states could submit  
 requests to FHWA for approval of individual projects. Upon approval of a project, FHWA would  
 obligate NEVI Formula funds to the state for that project. Requests for approval were handled by  
 FHWA’s regional divisions. *See* Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 11. In California, for example,

FHWA’s California division instructed [the state] to use a project-  
 by-project, and project-phase by project-phase, approach to seek  
 funding obligations. Under this approach, in order for funding to  
 become obligated, a State must submit an authorization request to  
 FHWA via the online federal portal for each particular phase (e.g.,  
 preliminary engineering, right-of-way, construction) of each

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<sup>4</sup> Unlike other Plaintiff States, Plaintiffs District of Columbia, Minnesota, and Vermont did not submit declarations that attested to FHWA’s approval and re-approval of their state deployment plans. Under Local Civil Rule 7(b)(1), because Plaintiffs’ “motion requires consideration of facts not appearing of record,” Plaintiffs should have “also serve[d] and file[d] copies of all affidavits, declarations, photographic or other evidence presented in support of the motion.”

<sup>5</sup> Docket No. 1-8, “NEVI Formula Program Status of Funds,” is a table that lists, among other data from FHWA’s Fiscal Management Information System, the total amount of NEVI Formula funds made available to each state as of February 6, 2025. Dkt. No. 1-8 at 2. The fact that all 50 states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, have had funds made available to them indicates that FHWA approved every state’s NEVI deployment plan. *See* IJJA, 135 Stat. at 1422 (conditioning availability of NEVI Formula funds on FHWA’s approval of a state deployment plan).

1 particular NEVI-funded project carried out by the responsible  
2 NEVI awardee.

3 *Id.*; *see also* Dkt. No. 10 (Kelly Decl.) ¶ 13 (“The timing of fund obligation . . . varies by state  
4 based on the guidance of the local FHWA Division Office.”). Where non-Plaintiff-state  
5 Massachusetts has been able to obligate its entire apportionment of 2022–25 NEVI Formula  
6 funds (*see* Dkt. No. 1-8 at 2), such an approach would have been impossible in Colorado, where  
7 “[t]he FHWA Colorado Division Office discourages early obligation of funds or the full  
8 obligation of an entire program beyond what is expected to be spent and reimbursed within the  
9 next 12-month period in order to avoid inactivity on a given project” (Dkt. No. 10 ¶ 13).

10 On February 6, 2025, FHWA issued the Biondi Letter, rescinding FHWA’s NEVI  
11 Formula Program guidance and revoking all state deployment plans that had been approved  
12 pursuant to that guidance. Dkt. 1-9. States were no longer able to submit requests and receive  
13 approvals to draw down NEVI Formula funds that had been authorized and apportioned. In  
14 California, for example, on March 28, 2025, a state employee attempted to submit the state’s  
15 “first authorization request for construction incurred for a NEVI-funded project in California.”  
16 Dkt. No. 8 (Lam Decl.) ¶ 10. But the request—for \$310,302 owed on construction of a Tesla  
17 charging station in San Diego that was already underway—was met with an error message:  
18 “Request cannot be processed. One or more Program Code balances has been exceeded.” *Id.*; *see*  
19 *also* Dkt. No. 8-1 at 3; Dkt. No. 100 (O’Dea Decl.) ¶ 7. “All of California’s NEVI Formula  
20 Program apportioned funds were listed as ‘expired,’ and [California] was unable to obligate  
21 additional dollars for NEVI projects.” Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 10. Three days later, on March 31, 2025, the  
22 Director of Financial Services for FHWA’s California Division advised the state that, pursuant to  
23 the Biondi Letter, “the NEVI formula program codes have been placed in ‘expired’ status. Thus,  
24 no funds are available for obligation.” *Id.*; *see* Dkt. No. 8-1 at 2. As another example, Delaware

1 is short “\$49,875 of deferred advance construction funding for an FHWA approved NEVI  
 2 project.” Dkt. No. 12 ¶ 18. Delaware now needs to divert that money “from another FHWA, non-  
 3 NEVI program or [from] state funding” to cover the shortfall, because “FHWA has removed all  
 4 access to the FY25 NEVI apportionment as well as the planned FY26 NEVI apportionment.” *Id.*  
 5 ¶ 19.

6 On May 7, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a civil action and the instant motion for a preliminary  
 7 injunction. Dkt. Nos. 1, 5.

### 8 III. LEGAL STANDARD

9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) authorizes district courts to issue preliminary  
 10 injunctions. Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that is “never awarded as of  
 11 right.” *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).

12 To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish that  
 13 (1) it is likely to prevail on the merits of its substantive claims,  
 14 (2) it is likely to suffer imminent, irreparable harm absent an  
 injunction, (3) the balance of equities favors an injunction, and  
 (4) an injunction is in the public interest.”

15 *All. for the Wild Rockies v. Petrick*, 68 F.4th 475, 490 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing *Winter*, 555 U.S. at  
 16 20, 22–23). Ninth Circuit courts evaluate these factors on a “sliding scale”—that is, “serious  
 17 questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff  
 18 can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a  
 19 likelihood of irreparable injury and the injunction is in the public interest.” *Arc of Cal. v.*  
 20 *Douglas*, 757 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2014). “Where the government is a party to a case in which  
 21 a preliminary injunction is sought, the balance of the equities and public interest factors merge.”  
 22 *Roman v. Wolf*, 977 F.3d 935, 940–41 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting *Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell*,  
 23 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)).

#### IV. DISCUSSION

This case is one of several where plaintiffs have sought to enjoin the Executive Branch of the federal government from implementing a “categorical freeze” on congressionally appropriated funds. *See, e.g., Maryland v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv. (AmeriCorps)*, No. C25-1363, 2025 WL 1585051 (June 6, 2025); *New York v. Trump*, No. C25-39, 2025 WL 715621 (D.R.I. Mar. 6, 2025); *Washington v. Trump*, 768 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). Plaintiffs here, like the plaintiffs in these other cases, bring statutory claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), constitutional claims, and an *ultra vires* claim.

Defendants raise two threshold issues that must be addressed before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion: (1) whether Plaintiffs’ claims are ripe (Dkt. No. 93 at 12–15) and (2) whether Defendants have taken final agency action (*id.* at 15–17).

#### A. Threshold Issues

##### 1. Ripeness

Article III requires that Plaintiffs’ claim(s) be ripe for adjudication. *See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus*, 573 U.S. 149, 157 n.5 (2014). Ripeness is a “jurisdictional prerequisite” in the Ninth Circuit. *Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n*, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000). “The ripeness doctrine, which aims to avoid premature and potentially unnecessary adjudication, ‘is drawn from both Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’” *Ass’n of Irrigated Residents v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency*, 10 F.4th 937, 944 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting *Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior*, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)). There are thus two components of ripeness: constitutional and prudential.

##### a. Constitutional Ripeness

“‘The constitutional component of ripeness overlaps with the “injury in fact” analysis for Article III standing,’ and therefore ‘the inquiry is largely the same: whether the issues presented

1 are ‘definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.’” *Id.* (quoting *Wolfson v. Brammer*, 616  
2 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010)); see *Thomas*, 220 F.3d at 1139 (“[I]n ‘measuring whether the  
3 litigant has asserted an injury that is real and concrete rather than speculative and hypothetical,  
4 the ripeness inquiry merges almost completely with standing.’” (quoting Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,  
5 *Ripeness and the Constitution*, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 172 (1987))).

6 Here, Defendants argue that, as alleged, Plaintiffs’ injuries are merely hypothetical and  
7 speculative: “Plaintiffs’ alleged potential future injuries stemming from the possibility that  
8 FHWA’s future guidance will negatively impact their projects cannot form the basis for the  
9 Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Dkt. No. 93 at 13. “Injury can only accrue,” Defendants  
10 assert, “after the obligation phase because it is only at that point that a State is entitled to receive  
11 reimbursement for its expenditure of NEVI funds—before then, all actions are contingent upon  
12 FHWA approvals.” *Id.* For their part, Plaintiffs assert that the Court “should ‘consider the  
13 practical effects’” of what Defendants have done. Dkt. No. 99 at 7 (quoting *Washington v.*  
14 *DeVos*, 466 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1162 (E.D. Wash. 2020)). “Plaintiffs cannot move forward with  
15 previously approved State Plans because . . . Defendants . . . have revoked those Plans and refuse  
16 to obligate any additional funds under them.” *Id.* This, Plaintiffs argue, is an “immediate,  
17 concrete, and irreparable” injury. *Id.*

18 Here, constitutional ripeness is satisfied because Plaintiffs adequately allege injury in  
19 fact. “A ‘loss of funds promised under federal law satisfies Article III’s standing requirement,’”  
20 especially where a plaintiff “rel[ies] heavily on federal funding.” *City & County of San*  
21 *Francisco*, 897 F.3d at 1235 (quoting *Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.*, 795 F.3d  
22 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2015)). Ninth Circuit courts have routinely found that a plaintiff’s allegation  
23 that it “ha[s] lost or will likely lose federal funding” is a cognizable injury-in-fact. See *San*  
24 *Francisco A.I.D.S. Found. v. Trump*, No. C25-1824, 2025 WL 1621636, at \*9 (N.D. Cal. June 9,

2025); *Washington v. Trump*, 766 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1149 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“The fact that the loss of funds may have not yet materialized . . . does not mean that there is no imminent injury or that Plaintiffs lack standing on this ground.”); *see also E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump*, 932 F.3d 742, 766–67 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that plaintiffs demonstrated standing by “showing that [agency action] will cause them to lose a substantial amount of funding”). Even an alleged loss of “potential future recoupment of federal funds” represents sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing, *Arizona v. Yellen*, 34 F.4th 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2022), as does a “diver[sion] of scarce resources” from one part of a “limited budget” to another, *Serv. Women’s Action Network v. Mattis*, 352 F. Supp. 3d 977, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2018).

Further, “economic injury is generally a legally protected interest.” *Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency*, 990 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1993). Where a plaintiff has “established business relationships and contracts with others based on [defendant’s] program,” and “these business deals have not and cannot be realized because of [agency action, t]his loss of business is ‘concrete, particularized, and actual . . . ’ given its dollar value.” *Stenson Tamaddon, LLC v. U.S. Internal Rev. Serv.*, 742 F. Supp. 3d 966, 982 (D. Ariz. 2024) (quoting *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

Here, Defendants’ actions have deprived Plaintiffs of expected and relied-upon funding. Moreover, Defendants’ refusal to obligate IJA’s congressionally appropriated funds has disrupted business expectancies that the respective Plaintiff States have made pursuant to their State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plans. To various degrees, Plaintiffs describe scenarios where Defendants’ freeze of expected funding has pulled the rug out from under them, leaving them with partially completed, partially funded infrastructure projects.

**Arizona** submitted deployment plans in 2022, 2023, and 2024, which FHWA approved. Dkt. No. 11 ¶¶ 9–10. In approving Arizona’s plans, FHWA “ma[de] funds available for

1 obligation for fiscal years 2022 through 2025.” *Id.* ¶ 10. FHWA advised Arizona that, “[w]ith  
2 this approval . . . funds are now available to Arizona for obligation.” *Id.* These funds totaled  
3 \$11.3 million for fiscal year 2022 and \$16.3 million each year for fiscal years 2023, 2024, and  
4 2025. *Id.* ¶ 11. Based on FHWA’s assertion that such funds were available for obligation,  
5 Arizona “relied and acted upon the FHWA’s statutory obligation to provide NEVI formula  
6 funding consistent with the IIJA’s requirements.” *Id.* ¶ 19. Prior to the issuance of the Biondi  
7 Letter, FHWA had obligated to Arizona \$12,090,426 in NEVI Formula funding. *See id.* ¶ 12. But  
8 the Biondi Letter “made clear that Arizona would not have access to the approximately \$48.1  
9 million of unobligated funds which had been made available to Arizona through its State Plan  
10 Approvals.” *Id.* ¶ 18. Following Defendants’ suspension of Arizona’s State Plan, Arizona  
11 canceled a “solicitation for 35 prospective EV charging station locations identified in State  
12 Plans.” *Id.* Arizona “spent a significant amount of funds and staff time preparing this solicitation,  
13 which had to be canceled after the State Plans were suspended.” *Id.* ¶ 19.

14 **California** submitted deployment plans in 2022, 2023, and 2024, which FHWA  
15 approved. Dkt. No. 7 ¶¶ 7–9. FHWA’s approval of California’s plans made a total of  
16 \$301,952,392 in NEVI Formula funds available to California for obligation for fiscal years 2022  
17 through 2025. *Id.* ¶ 9 Congress’s appropriation of NEVI funds, combined with FHWA’s  
18 subsequent approval of California’s State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plan, led  
19 California to enter into business arrangements with contractors who would “construct the electric  
20 vehicle charging infrastructure . . . .” *Id.* ¶ 10. Between October 2023 and September 2024,  
21 California awarded projects worth \$36.6 million through a solicitation process. *Id.* But “[d]ue to  
22 the uncertainty about the availability of federal funding, one [contractor] asked to withdraw one  
23 of its two charging station sites from the NEVI program so that it [could] continue with other  
24 funding after its construction authorization request was denied.” *Id.* ¶ 19. “The longer

1 [California] is prevented from making new obligations of apportioned funds, the more certain it  
2 is that awarded projects will lose critical financing, permits and rights-of-way, subcontractors,  
3 and/or other project partners, and not be able to proceed.” *Id.* ¶ 21. California has identified 21  
4 project sites that “are otherwise ready to move forward with development of the charging  
5 stations,” but cannot because “site hosts . . . are holding off from signing agreements with  
6 awardees until federal funding is available for obligation.” Dkt. No. 100 ¶ 6.

7 **Colorado** submitted deployment plans in 2022, 2023, and 2024, which FHWA approved.  
8 Dkt. No. 9 ¶¶ 8–9. FHWA’s approval of Colorado’s plans made NEVI Formula funds “available  
9 to Colorado for obligation” for fiscal years 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025. Dkt. No. 10-1 (FHWA  
10 approval letters) at 2, 5, 8. These funds totaled \$8,368,277 for fiscal year 2022, \$12,042,045 for  
11 fiscal year 2023, \$12,042,129 for fiscal year 2024, and \$12,042,139 for fiscal year 2025—in the  
12 aggregate, \$44,494,590. *See* Dkt. No. 10 (Kelly Decl.) ¶ 10. Colorado “relied on the FHWA’s  
13 approval of its first three State Plans and the formulaic allocation of the NEVI program to begin  
14 awarding grants and contracting with grantees.” Dkt. No. 9 ¶ 10. Colorado “has contracted with  
15 grantees for approximately \$18 million in work to implement Colorado’s State Plan.” *Id.* ¶ 11.  
16 But “only \$8 million has been obligated . . . , meaning that only \$8 million has been requested  
17 and approved . . . . This leaves a gap of \$10 million that has been contracted to grantees but not  
18 obligated by FHWA.” *Id.* As a consequence, although there are projects in Colorado “that are  
19 currently in the design phase or actively under construction,” Colorado “will not have access to  
20 sufficient FHWA obligations to allow all of these projects to proceed to completion.” Dkt.  
21 No. 10 ¶ 21. Given Defendants’ funding freeze, “Colorado will have insufficient funds to  
22 reimburse expenses for more than half of the currently executed contracts between [Colorado]  
23 and grantees.” *Id.*

1           **Delaware** submitted deployment plans in 2022, 2023, and 2024, which FHWA approved.  
2 Dkt. No. 12 ¶¶ 9–10. FHWA’s approval of Delaware’s plans made NEVI Formula funds  
3 “available to Delaware for obligation” for fiscal years 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025—\$2,617,339  
4 for fiscal year 2022, \$3,766,380 for fiscal year 2023, \$3,766,406 for fiscal year 2024, and  
5 \$3,766,409 for fiscal year 2025. *Id.* ¶¶ 10–11. But the Biondi Letter “made clear that Delaware  
6 would not have access to the \$7,532,826 of FY25 NEVI program allocation previously provided  
7 and the anticipated FY26 NEVI program allocation to be provided” in the future. *Id.* ¶ 18.  
8 Delaware “has obligated \$10,150,125 for NEVI Program eligible expenses” and has begun  
9 construction on two projects. *Id.* ¶ 12. Delaware “relied and acted upon the FHWA’s statutory  
10 obligation to provide NEVI formula funding consistent with the IIJA’s requirements.” *Id.* ¶ 19.  
11 Delaware’s “NEVI Program roll out requirements . . . are all reliant on the receipt and ability to  
12 utilize the NEVI funding authorized.” *Id.* Further, the state has “finalized two NEVI contracts for  
13 three sites across the state. . . . Several other contracts are in the final stages of wrapping up the  
14 contract language.” *Id.* ¶ 12. But Delaware is short \$49,875 for deferred advance construction  
15 funding for an FHWA approved NEVI project,” and Defendants’ actions have rendered NEVI  
16 funds unavailable. *Id.* ¶ 18. Consequently, Delaware will need to locate and re-budget “\$49,875  
17 of funding from another FHWA, non-NEVI program or state funding” to cover the shortfall. *Id.*  
18 ¶ 19.

19           The **District of Columbia** submitted deployment plans “representing fiscal years 2022  
20 through 2025,” which FHWA approved. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 69–70. FHWA’s approval of the District’s  
21 plans made approximately \$13 million in NEVI Formula Program funds “available to the District  
22 of Columbia for obligation” for fiscal years 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025. *Id.* ¶¶ 70, 145; Dkt.  
23 No. 1-8 at 2. The District “acted in reliance on the FHWA complying with the IIJA to obligate  
24 and disburse the District’s share of NEVI Formula Program funds to build a robust, reliable, and

1 interconnected charging network across all eight District Wards to promote EV adoption.” Dkt.  
2 No. 1 ¶ 146.

3 **Hawai‘i** “prepared and provided to FHWA its State Plans for fiscal years 2022–2025,”  
4 which FHWA approved. Dkt. No. 13 ¶¶ 9–10. FHWA’s approval of Hawai‘i’s plans made  
5 \$13,914,498 in NEVI Formula funds “available to Hawai‘i for obligation” for fiscal years 2022  
6 through 2025. *Id.* ¶¶ 10–11. Hawai‘i “relied and acted upon the FHWA’s statutory obligation to  
7 provide NEVI formula funding consistent with the IIJA’s requirements.” *Id.* ¶ 19. In reliance on  
8 NEVI funds, Hawai‘i “proceeded with purchasing chargers for eight of its NEVI sites . . . and  
9 finalizing design for seven additional sites with the assumption the funds would be available for  
10 construction, operations, and maintenance. But the Biondi Letter “made clear that Hawai‘i would  
11 not have access to the remainder of funds not previously obligated of \$2,068,482.48 which had  
12 been made available to it through its State Plan Approvals.” *Id.* ¶ 18. “Without the NEVI  
13 Formula Funds, [Hawai‘i] will need to utilize local funds intended for other projects to complete  
14 the remaining NEVI sites or stop all activities that cannot be funded.” *Id.* ¶ 19.

15 **Illinois** submitted state deployment plans to FHWA in 2022, 2023, and 2024, which  
16 FHWA respectively approved. Dkt. No. 15 ¶¶ 9–10. FHWA’s approval of Illinois’s plans made  
17 approximately \$117 million in NEVI Formula funds “available to Illinois for obligation” for  
18 fiscal years 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025. *Id.* ¶¶ 10–11. Illinois has “awarded \$25.4 million to  
19 grantees for approved projects and has contractual obligations with grantees totaling \$25.4  
20 million.” *Id.* ¶ 12. But the Biondi Letter “made clear that [FHWA] is withholding access to the  
21 \$117 million which had been made available to Illinois through the FHWA’s State Plan  
22 Approvals.” *Id.* ¶ 18. Illinois “relied and acted upon the FHWA’s statutory obligation to provide  
23 [Illinois] with its dedicated share of NEVI Formula Program funding consistent with the IIJA’s  
24 requirements. NEVI Formula Program funding was intended to cover [Illinois’s] contractual

obligations.” *Id.* ¶ 19. Illinois “is in final negotiations with a consultant to assist with construction oversight of awarded and obligated NEVI Formula Program funded projects, and [Illinois] will need to obligate additional NEVI Formula Program funds to pay for these consulting services.” *Id.* ¶ 12.

**Maryland** submitted state deployment plans to FHWA in 2022, 2023, and 2024, which FHWA respectively approved. Dkt. No. 16 ¶¶ 10, 12. FHWA’s approval of Maryland’s plans made \$49,438,402 in NEVI Formula funds “available to Maryland for obligation”—\$9,298,080 for fiscal year 2022, \$13,380,042 for fiscal year 2023, \$13,380,134 for fiscal year 2024, and \$13,380,146 for fiscal year 2025. *Id.* ¶ 13. Maryland obligated \$14,668,456 of these funds in a first round of “design-build procurement.” *Id.* ¶ 14. But the Biondi Letter “made clear that Maryland would not have access to the unobligated total of \$34,769,945 in Fiscal Year[s] 22–25 funds which had been made available to Maryland through its State Plan Approvals.” *Id.* ¶ 21. Maryland has “relied and acted upon the FHWA’s statutory obligation to provide NEVI formula funding consistent with the IIJA’s requirements” to continue implementing its deployment plans. *Id.* ¶ 22. The state advertised “NEVI Round 2 procurement” on December 17, 2024, and “submitted an authorization request [to FHWA] for \$475,000 to support design work for Round 2 projects” but “is unable to continue with its NEVI Round 2 procurement process,” in part due to “the lack of obligated NEVI funds to administer the procurement process . . . .” Dkt. No. 16 ¶¶ 15, 23. “The delay in Round 2 procurement is . . . expected to increase costs for the twenty-nine public electric vehicle charging stations” advertised in the Round 2 procurement. *Id.* ¶ 26; *see id.* ¶ 15.

**Minnesota** submitted state deployment plans to FHWA in 2022, 2023, and 2024, which FHWA approved. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 79–80. FHWA’s approval of Minnesota’s plans made approximately \$54 million in NEVI Formula Program funds “available to Minnesota for

1 obligation” for fiscal years 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025. *Id.* ¶ 80; Dkt. No. 1-8 at 2. Minnesota,  
2 acting “[i]n reliance on the FHWA’s compliance with the IIJA . . . included NEVI Formula  
3 Program funds as a set-aside in its State Transportation Improvement Program . . . .” *Id.* ¶ 167.  
4 Based on the availability of NEVI Formula funds, Minnesota “is taking steps towards executing  
5 contracts for [NEVI] projects, which will result in a total of 24 fully executed contracts in  
6 summer 2025.” *Id.* ¶ 169. But although such funds were “made available,” FHWA “has only  
7 obligated funds for 19 of these 24 projects.” *Id.* ¶ 170. To fulfill conditional awards granted to  
8 contractors prior to Defendants’ rescission of its State Plan, Minnesota has “identified” state  
9 funds in lieu of the expected federal funds. *Id.* ¶ 171.

10 **New Jersey** submitted state deployment plans to FHWA in 2022, 2023, and 2024, which  
11 FHWA approved. Dkt. No. 17 ¶¶ 8–9. FHWA’s approval of New Jersey’s plans made  
12 approximately \$82 million in NEVI Formula funds “available to New Jersey for obligation” for  
13 fiscal years 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025. *Id.* ¶¶ 9–10. The Biondi Letter “made clear that [New  
14 Jersey] would not have access to approximately \$73 million in funds which had been made  
15 available . . . for obligation through its State Plan approvals.” *Id.* ¶ 18. New Jersey has “relied  
16 and acted upon the FHWA’s statutory obligation to provide NEVI formula funding consistent  
17 with the IIJA’s requirements.” *Id.* ¶ 19. The state “awarded a publicly advertised contract for the  
18 development, planning, design, installation, five-year operation and maintenance of 76 NEVI-  
19 compliant electric vehicle charging ports at 19 locations throughout New Jersey to the lowest  
20 bidder for \$20.96 million.” *Id.* “[W]ithout NEVI Formula Program funding, [New Jersey] is  
21 unable to execute the contract because there are no alternative funding sources available.” *Id.*

22 **New Mexico** “prepared and provided to the FHWA its State Plans for fiscal years 2022–  
23 2025,” which FHWA respectively approved for fiscal years 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025. Dkt.  
24 No. 18 ¶¶ 8–9. FHWA’s approval of New Mexico’s plans made \$30,211,385 in NEVI Formula

1 funds “available to [New Mexico] for obligation”—\$5,681,977 for fiscal year 2022, \$8,176,429  
2 for fiscal year 2023, \$8,176,486 for fiscal year 2024, and \$8,176,493 for fiscal year 2025. *Id.* ¶¶  
3 9–10. New Mexico had obligated and contracted \$11.6 million of its available funds prior to  
4 Defendants’ actions. *Id.* ¶ 11. But the Biondi Letter “made clear that [New Mexico] would not  
5 have access to the remaining \$18.611 million in funds which had been made available to [New  
6 Mexico] through its State Plan approvals.” *Id.* ¶ 17. New Mexico “relied and acted upon the  
7 FHWA’s statutory obligation to provide NEVI Formula Funding consistent with the IIJA’s  
8 requirements.” *Id.* ¶ 18. The state “was relying on the federal funding to build out electric vehicle  
9 charging stations to advance the adoption of electric vehicles in order to have a positive impact”  
10 on the state’s greenhouse gas reduction goals. *Id.* A New Mexico state official avers that  
11 “projects in the middle of contract negotiations have been forced to abruptly halt, with no clear  
12 timeline for when they might resume or whether they will be reimbursed at all.” *Id.* Further,  
13 “[c]ompanies have hired staff as millions of dollars of investment were anticipated to be made.”  
14 *Id.* ¶ 19.

15 **New York** “prepared and provided to FHWA its State Plans for fiscal years 2022–2025,”  
16 which FHWA approved. Dkt. No. 20 ¶¶ 13, 15. FHWA’s approval of New York’s State Plans  
17 made \$138,092,735 in NEVI Formula funds “available to New York for obligation”—  
18 \$25,971,644 for fiscal year 2022, \$37,373,438 for fiscal year 2023, \$37,373,747 for fiscal year  
19 2024, and \$37,373,779 for fiscal year 2025. *Id.* ¶¶ 14–15. But the Biondi Letter “made clear that  
20 New York would not have access to New York’s estimated remaining balance eligible for  
21 obligation of approximately \$120,000,000 which had been made available to New York through  
22 its State Plan Approvals.” *Id.* ¶ 22. New York “relied and acted upon the FHWA’s statutory  
23 obligation to provide NEVI formula funding consistent with the IIJA’s requirements.” *Id.* ¶ 23.  
24 The state “entered into an agreement for Power Authority of New York to administer a portion of

1 the NEVI Formula Program that had already been approved by FHWA to [New York].” *Id.* ¶ 6.  
2 New York also entered into an agreement with the New York Energy Research and Development  
3 Authority “to administer a portion of the NEVI Formula Program that had already been approved  
4 by FHWA to [New York].” *Id.* ¶ 7. This agreement presupposed New York’s receipt of some  
5 \$56 million in expected NEVI funds for charging stations and workforce development activities.  
6 *Id.* New York is now unable to “move forward on over \$50,000,000 in [charging station] projects  
7 along New York’s highway corridors.” *Id.* ¶ 23.

8 **Oregon** “submitted [to FHWA] and received approval of three NEVI State Plans for  
9 fiscal years 2022–2025 . . . .” Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 9. FHWA’s approval of Oregon’s State Plans made  
10 \$41,120,395 in NEVI Formula funds “available to Oregon for obligation”—\$7,733,679 for fiscal  
11 year 2022, \$11,128,851 for fiscal year 2023, \$11,128,928 for fiscal year 2024, and \$11,128,937  
12 for fiscal year 2025. *Id.* ¶¶ 11, 13. But “FHWA is currently restricting [Oregon’s] ability to  
13 obligate [\$15,061,485] that the [state] should have access [to] as a result of FHWA’s approval of  
14 the NEVI State Plans for fiscal years 2022–2025.” *Id.* ¶ 29. Oregon “relied and acted upon the  
15 FHWA’s statutory obligation to provide NEVI Program Formula funding consistent with the  
16 IIJA’s requirements.” *Id.* ¶ 25. The state “planned to use NEVI funding to develop a total of  
17 eleven electric vehicle [alternative fuel corridors].” *Id.* ¶ 10. “In December 2024, [Oregon]  
18 issued Notices of Intent to Award [grants] to three private entities . . . , and negotiations between  
19 [Oregon] and the grantees regarding the grant terms are ongoing.” *Id.* But due to the freeze on  
20 NEVI funding, Oregon “either cannot enter into agreements with grantees or it must re-negotiate  
21 with grantees to reduce the overall project costs, limiting the additional benefits Oregon would  
22 otherwise receive.” *Id.* ¶ 26.

23 **Rhode Island** “prepared and provided to the FHWA its State Plans for fiscal years 2022–  
24 2025,” which FHWA approved. Dkt. No. 24 ¶¶ 13–14. “Each plan was sequentially structured to

1 build upon prior progress, moving from corridor compliance to equitable and sustainable  
2 statewide EV infrastructure expansion.” *Id.* ¶ 15. FHWA’s approval of Rhode Island’s State  
3 Plans made “available to Rhode Island for obligation” NEVI Formula funds of \$3,383,835 for  
4 fiscal year 2022, \$4,869,376 for fiscal year 2023, \$4,869,410 for fiscal year 2024, and  
5 \$4,869,414 for fiscal year 2025. *Id.* ¶¶ 16–17. But the Biondi Letter “made clear that Rhode  
6 Island would not have access to the net outstanding \$16,150,711.84 which had been made  
7 available to Rhode Island through its State Plan approvals.” *Id.* ¶ 24. Rhode Island “relied and  
8 acted upon the FHWA’s statutory obligation to provide NEVI formula funding consistent with  
9 the IJA’s requirements.” *Id.* ¶ 25. The state “structured its EV infrastructure planning and  
10 program delivery model around the multi-year receipt of NEVI Formula Program funding.” *Id.*  
11 “The suspension of the NEVI Program . . . prevent[ed] Rhode Island from awarding funds to  
12 communities and public entities that had already invested time and resources preparing  
13 proposals. It forced the closure of an active grant opportunity that many applicants had already  
14 initiated or completed internal reviews for . . .” *Id.* Moreover, “reopening or redesigning paused  
15 solicitations will require additional State resources and will extend project delivery timelines.”  
16 *Id.* ¶ 26. “Rhode Island . . . structured its EV infrastructure planning and program delivery model  
17 around the multi-year receipt of NEVI Formula Program funding.” *Id.* ¶ 25.

18 **Vermont** submitted state deployment plans to FHWA in 2022, 2023, and 2024, which  
19 FHWA approved. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 91–92. FHWA’s approval of Vermont’s plans made  
20 approximately \$16.7 million NEVI Formula Program funds “available to Vermont for  
21 obligation” for fiscal years 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025. *Id.* ¶¶ 92, 204; Dkt. No. 1-8 at 2. “[I]n  
22 reliance on the FHWA’s approval of its State Plans,” Vermont “awarded EV fast charging port  
23 projects totaling approximately \$9.3 million.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 206. “Without its NEVI Formula  
24 Program funds, Vermont cannot fund all of the projects the State has awarded.” *Id.*

1           **Washington** “submitted its initial State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plan  
2 and subsequent updates to the FHWA” in 2022, 2023, and 2024. Dkt. No. 28 ¶ 22. FHWA  
3 approved Washington’s State Plans and advised that with each approval, “funds are now  
4 available to Washington State for obligation.” *Id.* ¶ 25. Washington “knew when the NEVI  
5 Formula Program was first established in 2021 that it would receive \$71.5 million in total, so  
6 long as it submitted its State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plan(s) on time and took  
7 actions to carry them out”—\$10.5 million for fiscal year 2022, \$15 million for fiscal year 2023,  
8 \$15 million for fiscal year 2024, \$15 million for fiscal year 2025, and \$15 million for fiscal year  
9 2026. *Id.* ¶¶ 20–21. But the Biondi Letter “made abundantly clear that Washington no longer had  
10 access to the \$56.5 million that had been made available with FHWA’s approvals of the  
11 Washington State Plans.” *Id.* ¶ 35. Washington “planned to invest the \$71.5 million in NEVI  
12 formula funds along with \$18 million in private match for the deployment of [direct-current] fast  
13 charging . . . to ensure charging availability every 50 miles.” *Id.* ¶ 28. The state “expect[ed] it  
14 would receive all \$71.5 million of its dedicated and non-discretionary NEVI Formula Program  
15 funds . . . .” *Id.* ¶ 22. “The Washington State Legislature has authorized . . . a total of \$56.5  
16 million in NEVI funding based on the FHWA’s annual NEVI authorizations for electric vehicle  
17 charging infrastructure along interstates and US highways.” *Id.* ¶ 23. Such authorizations “were  
18 made under the expectation that the State would receive its NEVI Formula Program funds as  
19 mandated by the IIJA . . . .” *Id.* ¶ 24. Further, “[b]ecause Washington does not have funds to  
20 cover the projects for which it sought proposals in the absence of its NEVI Formula Program  
21 funding, the State has had to halt all NEVI Formula Program funded work; it cannot award a  
22 single grant, enter a single contract, or make any progress toward . . . fulfil[ling] the purpose of  
23 the IIJA . . . .” *Id.* 36.

1           **Wisconsin** “prepared and provided to the FHWA its State Plans for fiscal years 2022–  
2 2025,” which FHWA approved. Dkt. No. 26 ¶¶ 9–10. FHWA’s approval of Wisconsin’s plans  
3 made \$61,901,479 in NEVI Formula Program funds “available to Wisconsin for obligation”—  
4 \$11,642,061 for fiscal year 2022, \$16,753,057 for fiscal year 2023, \$16,753,173 for fiscal year  
5 2024, and \$16,753,188 for fiscal year 2025. *Id.* ¶¶ 10–11. But the Biondi Letter “made clear that  
6 Wisconsin . . . would not have access to the total in FY 22–25 funds which had been made  
7 available to [the state] through its State Plan Approvals.” *Id.* ¶ 18. Wisconsin “relied and acted  
8 upon the FHWA’s statutory obligation to provide NEVI formula funding consistent with the  
9 IIA’s requirements.” Dkt. No. 26 ¶ 19. The state receives approximately 29 percent of its  
10 transportation budget from federal funding. *Id.* ¶ 4. Between January 2024 and April 1, 2024,  
11 Wisconsin issued 53 grant awards for electric vehicle charging infrastructure. *Id.* ¶ 12. “As of  
12 February 6, 2025, 15 grant awards . . . , representing \$7.3 million, remain unobligated.  
13 Wisconsin is unable to continue work implementing these grant awards.” *Id.* ¶ 19. Including its  
14 funding for fiscal year 2026, “Wisconsin does not have access to approximately \$62.65 million  
15 of its remaining apportionment of NEVI Formula Program funding and cannot issue awards  
16 under the current [request for proposal].” *Id.*

17           Defendants attempt to characterize Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries as “potential future injuries  
18 stemming from the possibility that FHWA’s future guidance will negatively impact their  
19 projects.” Dkt. No. 93 at 13. “These allegations,” Defendants argue, “are dependent on  
20 contingencies and speculation regarding the content of FHWA’s updated guidance that may not  
21 materialize.” *Id.* But this misrepresents the agency action that Plaintiffs have challenged.  
22 Plaintiffs’ case is predicated not on what Defendants might do in the future, but on what  
23 Defendants have already done—namely the “revocation of State Plans and categorical  
24

1 withholding of NEVI funds from obligation.”<sup>6</sup> Dkt. No. 99 at 8. As Plaintiffs assert, “Plaintiffs  
2 cannot move forward with *previously* approved State Plans because, as Defendants admit, they  
3 have revoked those plans and refuse to obligate any additional funds under them.” *Id.* at 7  
4 (emphasis added); *see supra* Section IV.A.1.a.

5 An admittedly twentieth-century hypothetical helps to illustrate the hole in Defendants’  
6 position. Consider a person who, check in hand, is walking to the bank to cash it. When they get  
7 to the bank, they expect to hand the check to a teller, who will negotiate the check and give them  
8 cash in return. The check, after all, has made that money available to them. But while they are en  
9 route, the payor—the person who wrote the check and from whose account the funds will be  
10 drawn—calls the bank and stops payment on the check. When the payee presents the check, will  
11 the teller cash it? If, after stopping payment, the payor calls the payee and advises that, upon  
12 request, they might issue another check on an unspecified future date, is the payee’s position the  
13 same as it would have been had the payor never stopped payment? Defendants’ answer to this  
14 question is yes, irrespective of the rent that the payee cannot now cover, or the gas bill they can  
15 no longer pay. That the payee now has a hole in their budget is not the payor’s problem—indeed,  
16 as far as Defendants are concerned, it is not even a problem at all.

17 Prior to Defendants’ action here, Plaintiffs’ FHWA-approved State Plans entitled them to  
18 NEVI Formula funding. This is evidenced by FHWA’s obligation and disbursement of funds in  
19 prior fiscal years, as well as by the plan-approval letters—each Plaintiff received three, one each  
20 for fiscal years 2022–23, 2024, and 2025—that FHWA sent, asserting that “funds [were] now  
21 available to [a state] for obligation.” *See, e.g.*, Dkt. 1-7 at 2; *see also* Dkt. No. 109 at 9:10–12.

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22  
23 <sup>6</sup> For this reason, Defendants’ reliance on *Texas v. United States*, 523 U.S. 296 (1998), and *Porter v. Jones*, 319 F.3d  
24 483 (9th Cir. 1996), falls short. *See* Dkt. No. 93 at 13. These cases address contingent future events, not harms  
already realized.

1 And the IJJA itself entitled the states to these funds. But after Defendants revoked Plaintiffs’  
 2 State Plans, Plaintiffs’ access to NEVI Formula funds evaporated. Under *City and County of San*  
 3 *Francisco*, this represents an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing and, therefore, ripeness.  
 4 *See* 897 F.3d at 1235.

5 ***b. Prudential Ripeness***

6 “To assess prudential ripeness, [the court] must ‘evaluate both the fitness of the issues for  
 7 judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’” *Irritated*  
 8 *Residents*, 10 F.4th at 944 (quoting *Abbott Labs. v. Gardner*, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). A  
 9 decision is prudentially ripe for review where the issue “is purely one of statutory interpretation  
 10 that would not ‘benefit from further factual development of the issues presented.’” *Whitman v.*  
 11 *Am. Trucking Assn’s*, 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001) (quoting *Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra*  
 12 *Club*, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998)). Here, the issues are fit for review because, as Plaintiffs assert,  
 13 “further factual development would not significantly advance the court’s ability to deal with the  
 14 legal issues presented.” Dkt. No. 99 at 7 (cleaned up); *see also Irritated Residents*, 10 F.4th at  
 15 944 (finding issue “fit for review because it is purely a legal question presented in [a] concrete  
 16 setting”); *California v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, 476 F. Supp. 3d 994, 1007 (N.D. Cal.  
 17 2020) (finding plaintiff’s challenge was “a purely legal one” because it concerned whether a  
 18 statute had been “properly construed and implemented by” the agency). Further, Plaintiffs will  
 19 suffer hardship if the Court delays its consideration of this case. Without clarity as to the legality  
 20 of Defendants’ actions, the fate of Plaintiffs’ EV programming remains uncertain, and “the delay  
 21 and uncertainty around NEVI funds exposes [Plaintiffs] to rising costs; loss of site hosts,  
 22 financing, and other critical partners; and similar opportunity costs.” Dkt. No. 5 at 22. Plaintiffs  
 23 assert that they face “budgetary confusion and uncertainty,” as well as “an increased burden in  
 24 administering the NEVI Formula Program . . . .” *Id.* at 23.

1 For their part, Defendants do not address prudential ripeness in their brief. At oral  
2 argument, however, Defendants cited *Colwell v. Department of Health and Human Services*, 558  
3 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2009), in which the plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement challenge to  
4 “Policy Guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.” See Dkt. No. 109 at  
5 25:8–26:6. The Ninth Circuit held that the *Colwell* plaintiffs’ claim was prudentially unripe  
6 because it was ambiguous whether the “Policy Guidance” that the plaintiffs had challenged  
7 comprised mandatory rules that the plaintiffs were compelled to follow, or whether the language  
8 of the “Policy Guidance” was merely suggestive and did not threaten enforcement consequences  
9 for plaintiffs should they fail to comply. *Id.* at 1127. The court determined that such “ambiguity  
10 [would likely] be reduced or resolved based on the enforcement activities HHS [might]  
11 undertake in the future,” so it deemed the plaintiffs’ claim “not now fit for decision.” *Id.* at 1128.  
12 But *Colwell* is inapposite here. Defendants have not issued any guidance, mandatory or  
13 otherwise, for Plaintiffs to challenge. As Plaintiffs assert, the real issue is Defendants’ revocation  
14 of state NEVI deployment plans and FHWA’s subsequent freeze on distribution of NEVI  
15 Formula Program funds. Put another way, Defendants’ issuance (or non-issuance) of updated  
16 NEVI Formula Program guidance has no bearing on the legality or illegality of their revocation  
17 of the State Plans and freezing of the funds. New guidance will not undo the revocation,  
18 irrespective of the substance of that guidance.<sup>7</sup>

19 Having considered the constitutional and prudential issues, the Court concludes that this  
20 case is ripe for consideration.

21  
22  
23 <sup>7</sup> Although Defendants refer to FHWA’s action on state deployment plans as a “suspension” (Dkt. No. 93 at 12), the  
24 Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ assertion that “FHWA’s so-called ‘suspension’ is . . . a revocation,” because the Biondi  
Letter “made clear [that FHWA] has no intention of reapproving any previously approved plan” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 110).

## 2. Final Agency Action

Under the APA, an agency action is not reviewable unless it is a “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Supreme Court has identified two conditions that must be satisfied for an agency action to be considered final: (1) “the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process”; and (2) “the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (cleaned up). Courts within the Ninth Circuit “look to factors such as whether the action amounts to a definitive statement of the agency’s position, whether it has a direct and immediate effect on the day-to-day operations of the subject party, and if immediate compliance is expected.” *Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian v. U.S. Dep’t of the Airforce*, 128 F.4th 1089 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting *Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Siren Retail Corp.*, 99 F.4th 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2024)) (cleaned up). Courts “also focus on the practical and legal effects of the agency action: The finality element must be interpreted in a pragmatic and flexible manner.” *Id.* (quoting *Saliba v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n*, 47 F.4th 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, as will be discussed below, Defendants’ action is properly considered a final agency action under the APA. “[A]n emerging consensus of district courts recently hearing cases about different aspects of federal funding freezes” have found such freezes to be final for the purposes of APA reviewability. *Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.*, No. C25-97, 2025 WL 1116157, at \*16 (D.R.I. Apr. 15, 2025); see *Louisiana v. Biden*, 622 F. Supp. 3d 267, 291–92 (W.D. La. 2022) (collecting cases).

### a. “Consummation” of the Decision Making Process

Defendants argue that they “have not taken ‘final agency action’ reviewable under the APA,” but have instead just begun the process that will eventually lead to a final action. Dkt.

1 No. 93 at 15; Dkt. No. 93 at 15–17. “FHWA has not asserted its ultimate administrative position  
2 with respect to NEVI guidance,” Defendants argue. *Id.* at 16. “[R]ather[,] it has merely stated  
3 that it is reviewing NEVI guidance and evaluating whether it accords with current policies.” *Id.*  
4 Defendants take the position that “FHWA’s interim decisions with respect to prior guidance will  
5 be subsumed by its ultimate consideration of State obligations submitted pursuant to updated  
6 guidance . . . .” *Id.* at 16–17.

7 But Defendants mischaracterize their conduct. FHWA’s “ultimate administrative position  
8 with respect to NEVI guidance” (*id.* at 16) is not the issue here, nor is the agency’s present and  
9 ongoing review of NEVI guidance. *See City & County of San Francisco v. Trump*, No. C25-  
10 1350, 2025 WL 1282637, at \*34 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2025). Rather, Defendants’ complained-of  
11 conduct is the rescission of the prior guidance and revocation of the State Deployment Plans, the  
12 practical result of which is a funding freeze—the “categorical withholding of NEVI funds from  
13 obligation.” Dkt. No. 99 at 8. In reviewing actions that various federal agencies have taken this  
14 year for the express purpose of aligning themselves with executive orders issued by the new  
15 administration, Courts have characterized decisions that have resulted in categorical funding  
16 freezes as the “consummation of [an] agency’s decisionmaking process to comply with the  
17 President’s executive order . . . .” *New York v. Trump*, 2025 WL 715621, at \*8 (quoting *Drs. For*  
18 *Am. v. Off. Of Pers. Mgmt.*, 766 F. Supp. 3d 39, 50 (D.D.C. 2025)). Moreover, from a practical  
19 standpoint, “there are no further steps [Defendants] need to take to determine whether they will  
20 freeze that funding,” thus indicating consummation of the decision making process.

21 *Woonasquatucket River*, 2025 WL 1116157, at \*15.

22 Further, examined in light of the Ninth Circuit’s indicia of finality, the funding freeze  
23 amounts to a definitive statement of the agency’s position, and Plaintiff States have demonstrated  
24 that the freeze has had an immediate effect on the day-to-day operations of their respective

1 transportation agencies. The February 6, 2025, Biondi Letter asserts that “FHWA is updating the  
 2 NEVI Formula Program Guidance to align with current U.S. DOT policy and priorities,  
 3 including those set forth in DOT Order 2100.7, titled ‘Ensuring Reliance Upon Sound Economic  
 4 Analysis in Department of Transportation Policies, Programs, and Activities.’” Dkt. No. 1-9 at  
 5 2–3. Given the concrete policy and priorities described in DOT Order 2100.7, which contemplate  
 6 factors such as communities’ “marriage and birth rates” and “vaccine and mask mandates” (Dkt.  
 7 No. 1-10 (DOT Order No. 2100.7) at 4), the assertion in the Biondi Letter clearly “‘mark[s] the  
 8 consummation of’ the [FHWA’s] ‘decision-making process’” that funding not in line with DOT  
 9 Order 2100.7 will not be forthcoming. It is one thing for Defendants to commit to making  
 10 funding decisions that are generally aligned with the direction that a cabinet-level agency  
 11 envisions. It is quite another to determine that, when choosing the locations of electric vehicle  
 12 charging stations, states will need to consider specific, data-based criteria such as whether  
 13 communities have “marriage and birth rates higher than the national average”; or black-and-  
 14 white policy determinations such as whether a jurisdiction maintains mandates regarding  
 15 vaccines and masks. Such fully formed directives and attention to detail are far more indicative  
 16 of the end of the decision-making process, not the beginning.

17 As to the immediate effect on day-to-day operations that Defendants’ actions have had,  
 18 Plaintiffs provide multiple examples. For example:

- 19 • On March 28, 2025, California sought to submit to FHWA an “authorization  
 20 request for construction incurred for a NEVI-funded project . . . for \$310,302  
 21 incurred in constructing a Tesla charging station.” Dkt. No. 8 (Lam Decl.) ¶ 10.  
 22 But the employee who made the request “received the following message from  
 23 the online funding portal: ‘Request cannot be processed. One or more Program  
 24 Code balances has been exceeded.’” *Id.*; see Dkt. No. 8-1 (Lam Decl. Ex. 1) at 3.  
 Plaintiffs assert that “[s]ince FHWA issued the Notice, Plaintiff States have been  
 unable to obligate new NEVI funds, even for projects in previously approved  
 State Plans.” Dkt. No. 5 at 9. Defendants’ funding freeze has caused, among other  
 things, “disruptions to State NEVI implementation programs [and] delays in  
 construction of infrastructure.” *Id.* at 10.

1  
2 It is hard to conceive of a more exemplary effect on day-to-day operations than a shovel-ready  
3 construction project suddenly delayed because its funding has failed to materialize. Further:

- 4 • Washington avers that it “has had to transition the full-time employee it hired for  
5 NEVI work to another temporary assignment and has been unable to hire the  
6 other full-time employee for which [it] received hiring approval.” Dkt. No. 28  
7 ¶ 37.
- 8 • Rhode Island asserts that Defendants’ actions “forced the closure of an active  
9 grant opportunity that many applicants had already initiated or completed internal  
10 reviews for, delaying project pipelines.” Dkt. No. 24 ¶ 25.
- 11 • Oregon “cannot execute existing contracts without significant modification or  
12 fund the construction phases for . . . eight corridors.” Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 31.

13 *See also supra* Section IV.A.1.a. These are not representative instances of plans that might be  
14 canceled, or priorities that might need to be rearranged. Rather, these are contingencies that  
15 Plaintiffs presently face and are demonstrative of the immediate impact of Defendants’ actions.

16 ***b. Determination of Rights or Obligations/Legal Consequences***

17 It is also clear that “legal consequences will flow” from Defendants’ actions. Defendants  
18 argue that an inquiry into whether legal consequences will flow “turns on whether [Defendants’]  
19 actions result in ‘concrete consequences.’” Dkt. No. 93 at 17 (quoting *S. Cal. All. Of Publicly*  
20 *Owned Treatment Works v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency*, 8 F.4th 831, 836 (9th Cir. 2021)). “That  
21 threshold is not cleared if ‘subsequent agency decision making is necessary to create any  
22 practical consequences.’” *Id.* (quoting *S. Cal. All.*, 8 F.4th at 837). But if the budgetary  
23 reshuffling, cancelation and delay of construction projects, and scrapping of Plaintiffs’ State  
24 Plans do not constitute “practical consequences,” it is difficult to imagine what would. *See supra*  
Sections IV.A.1.a.

1 Further, it is disingenuous for Defendants to assert that there are no practical  
2 consequences to their actions because, “[t]o be sure, there are currently no approved State plans.”  
3 Dkt. No. 93 at 17. There are, of course, currently no approved State Plans because Defendants  
4 revoked the approved State Plans that already existed and had previously been approved. Indeed,  
5 Defendants’ arguments here ring hollow. Defendants assert that “Plaintiffs are unable to submit  
6 requests for new obligations.” *Id.* But before Defendants’ revocation of Plaintiffs’ State Plans,  
7 Plaintiffs absolutely were able to submit requests for new obligations. That Plaintiffs were  
8 entitled to federal funding before Defendants acted, and unentitled to it afterward, is a practical  
9 consequence. The IIJA itself creates a step-by-step process by which a state may secure NEVI  
10 Formula funds. After the crucial approval of a state’s plan, funds become “available . . . for  
11 obligation.” *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 1-7 at 2. Congress dictated that, under the law, FHWA could not  
12 consider a request for obligation made prior to the agency’s approval of a plan, but could  
13 consider such a request afterward. By statute, approval (and, by corollary, revocation) of a state  
14 plan creates (or destroys) a legal interest with respect to the availability of NEVI Formula funds  
15 to that state. When Defendants took steps to quash that Congressionally-conceived interest, they  
16 engendered legal consequences.

17 The Court thus finds that Plaintiffs have established both prongs of the *Bennett* test, and  
18 Defendants’ actions here are properly considered final agency action for the purposes of  
19 reviewability under the APA.

## 20 **B. Preliminary Injunction**

21 The Court now turns to the merits of Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. As  
22 discussed above,

23 [t]o obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish that:  
24 (1) it is likely to prevail on the merits of its substantive claims,  
(2) it is likely to suffer imminent, irreparable harm absent an

injunction, (3) the balance of equities favors an injunction, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.

*All. for the Wild Rockies*, 68 F.4th at 490. “Where the government is a party to a case in which a preliminary injunction is sought, the balance of the equities and public interest factors merge.” *Roman*, 977 F.3d at 940–41. The Court addresses each element in turn.

### **1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

Plaintiffs’ complaint comprises six causes of action—three violations of the APA (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 213–257); violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine (*id.* ¶¶ 258–269); violation of the Take Care Clause (*id.* ¶¶ 270–277); and common-law *ultra vires* action (*id.* ¶¶ 278–286). As noted by Defendants, Plaintiffs do not discuss their Take Care Clause and *ultra vires* claims in their motion and do not rely on these claims to support a preliminary injunction. *See* Dkt. No. 93 at 26 n.2. The Court will thus consider Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction on the basis of their first four claims.

#### ***a. First APA Claim: In Excess of Statutory Authority***

Under the APA, the Court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). Plaintiffs assert that “[b]y unilaterally revoking all State Plans and withholding congressionally appropriated funding, Defendants acted in excess of statutory authority and contrary to the IIJA.” Dkt. No. 5 at 12.

When examining a statute, a court “start[s] with the plain meaning of the statute’s text.” *Hunsaker v. United States*, 902 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting *Father M. v. Various Tort Claimants (In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.)*, 661 F.3d 417, 432 (9th Cir. 2011)). The statute under review here, the IIJA, provides that: “\$5,000,000,000, to remain available until expended for amounts made available for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026,

1 shall be to carry out a National Electric Vehicle Formula Program.” 135 Stat. at 1421. “[F]or  
2 each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, the Secretary [of Transportation] shall distribute among  
3 the States the funds made available under this paragraph in this Act . . . .” *Id.* at 1422. The statute  
4 fixes each state’s share of the appropriated funds in accordance with the pre-existing statutory  
5 formula used for apportionment of funds in the Federal-Aid Highway Program. *See id.*; 23  
6 U.S.C. § 104. The language of the IIJA clearly defines the Secretary of Transportation’s duty to  
7 distribute funds under the law and provides the Secretary with no room to improvise. *See Serv.*  
8 *Emps. Int’l Union v. United States*, 598 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that Congress’s  
9 use of the word “shall” “does not confer on the agency discretion to decide how much ought to  
10 be paid”).

11 As Plaintiffs point out, the statute authorizes the Secretary to “withhold or withdraw”  
12 NEVI Formula funds under certain limited circumstances, in accordance with a prescribed  
13 procedure. *See* Dkt. No. 5 at 12. If a state does not submit to the Secretary a plan that  
14 “describ[es] how [it] intends to use [its NEVI Formula] funds . . . for each fiscal year in which  
15 funds are made available,” or if a state “has not taken actions to carry out its plan,” then the  
16 Secretary may withhold or withdraw that state’s share of the funds. 135 Stat. at 1422. But before  
17 doing so, the Secretary “shall provide notice to a State on the intent to withhold or withdraw  
18 funds not less than 60 days before withholding or withdrawing any funds, during which time the  
19 State shall have an opportunity to appeal a decision to withhold or withdraw funds directly to the  
20 Secretary.” *Id.* And if, after complying with these procedural requirements, the Secretary is still  
21 determined to withhold NEVI Formula funds from a state, the Secretary has clearly prescribed  
22 channels through which the funds may be redirected. Withheld or withdrawn funds may be  
23 awarded “on a competitive basis to local jurisdictions within the State [from which they were  
24 withheld or withdrawn] for use on projects that meet the eligibility requirements.” *Id.* If the

1 funds are not awarded to local jurisdictions within the state from which they were originally  
2 withheld or withdrawn, then they must be distributed among other states “in the same manner as  
3 funds distributed for that fiscal year”—that is, by the NEVI apportionment formula described  
4 above. *Id.* This is not ambiguous language; there is little, if any, room for interpretation of what  
5 the IJA commands Defendants to do. But the record indicates that Defendants have declined to  
6 follow their clear statutory instructions.

7 In freezing NEVI Formula funds, Defendants have “withheld or withdrawn” funds in a  
8 manner both procedurally and substantively different from that prescribed in the statute. The  
9 language of the statute, as described above, is straightforward. It obligates Defendants to  
10 distribute the NEVI Formula funds. It specifies how much, to whom, and for what purposes. It  
11 does not permit a categorical freeze premised on the Department of Transportation’s realignment  
12 with new executive policies, and it does not contemplate the Secretary’s revocation of State  
13 Plans that FHWA has already approved.

14 Defendants argue that their revocation of the State Plans was proper because,  
15 “[c]onsistent with statutory authority and established practice”: (1) FHWA has “the authority to  
16 revisit and reevaluate past guidance”; and (2) the State Plans are required to comply with FHWA  
17 guidance. *See* Dkt. No. 93 at 18–19. The first point is reasonable, and the Court agrees with  
18 Defendants that barring an agency from revising previously promulgated guidance “would mean  
19 that agencies could never correct past actions, and instead would be perpetually bound by  
20 policies with which they disagree.” *Id.* at 19; *see Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Reg.*  
21 *Comm’n*, 80 F.4th 956, 979 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The APA does not require ‘regulatory agencies [to]  
22 establish rules of conduct to last forever,’ [and] . . . [a]n agency may change its position for any  
23 number of reasons, such as a change in factual circumstances or a shift in its policy priorities.”  
24 (quoting *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29,

1 43 (1983)). But Defendants have not actually “corrected” past actions here, because they have  
2 not issued any new guidance with which the State Plans must comply. Defendants assert, without  
3 authority, that “[a]s an adjunct of its ability to update new NEVI Program guidance, FHWA has  
4 the authority to suspend state plans for unobligated funds pending the issuance of that guidance.”  
5 Dkt. No. 93 at 19–20. Because Congress “required the issuance of guidance for a program that  
6 necessarily extends across multiple administrations,” Defendants argue, “and delegated the  
7 issuance of that guidance to the agency tasked with administering the program,” they “must have  
8 the authority to briefly suspend State plans while the congressionally required guidance is  
9 updated.” *Id.* at 20.

10 Although the Court sees the logic in Defendants’ position that it may reconsider  
11 administrative guidance issued by the prior administration, it does not find authority for  
12 suspending State Plans in the statutory text (or caselaw), nor does it see the “established  
13 practice” to which Defendants refer. Moreover, at oral argument, Defendants appeared to take  
14 the rather extreme position that this administration could not be expected to abide by *any*  
15 regulatory guidance that had been installed or promulgated before January 20, 2025. *See* Dkt.  
16 No. 109 at 23:23–24:1. As discussed above, the IIJA contemplates FHWA’s withholding and  
17 withdrawing a state’s NEVI Formula funds under very limited circumstances, none of which has  
18 obtained here. Further, Defendants provide no authority for their presumption that guidance is  
19 necessarily revised on a “suspend, revoke, and replace” basis. In prior years, when FHWA  
20 updated its NEVI Formula Program Guidance, the revised and reissued guidance expressly  
21 superseded the guidance it replaced, resulting in a seamless transition from one regime to the  
22 next. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 93-1 (2024 NEVI Formula Program Guidance) at 81 (“The attached  
23 guidance supersedes the guidance that was issued on June 2, 2023.”). When FHWA previously  
24 updated its guidance, it required states “to submit an EV Infrastructure Deployment Plan (Plan)

1 on an annual basis that describe[d] how the State intend[ed] to use its apportioned NEVI  
2 Formula Program funds in accordance with [updated] guidance.” *Id.* But new guidance did not  
3 revoke or suspend plans approved under the old guidance and did not cancel projects conceived  
4 under the old guidance.

5 Moreover, even Defendants’ repeated assertion that their actions merely amount to a  
6 “temporary pause” (Dkt. No. 93 at 12, 28) and a “brief suspen[sion]” (*id.* at 20), are unavailing  
7 with respect to Defendants’ ultimate compliance with the law. The President issued the  
8 “Unleashing American Energy” Executive Order on his first day in office. Secretary Duffy  
9 issued DOT Order No. 2100.7 on his first full day in office. In contrast, the Biondi Letter advised  
10 on February 6, 2025, that new NEVI Formula Program guidance would be “published for public  
11 comment in the spring,” thereby giving FHWA a leisurely four-and-a-half-month timeframe to  
12 take its first step toward rebooting the program. Dkt. No. 1-8 at 3. But spring has come and gone,  
13 and FHWA has not published new guidance. Given FHWA’s pace, as well as its failure to meet  
14 its self-imposed spring deadline, it appears unlikely (if not impossible at this point) that new  
15 guidance will be issued, commented-upon, and then finalized before the end of fiscal year 2025  
16 on September 30, 2025, to say nothing of the fact that, upon the issuance of the new guidance,  
17 NEVI Formula funds will remain unavailable to states until they draft and submit—and FHWA  
18 approves—new state deployment plans.

19 The Court need only look at a calendar to spot the disingenuousness of Defendants’  
20 position. President Biden signed IIJA into law on November 15, 2021. It took FHWA 87 days,  
21 until February 10, 2022, to issue guidance. It then took Plaintiff Washington another 172 days,  
22 until August 1, 2022, to submit its state plan to FHWA. *See* Dkt. No. 28-1 at 5. FHWA took 45  
23 days, until September 14, 2022, to approve Washington’s plan, at which point fiscal year 2022  
24 funds became available to Washington for obligation. *See* Dkt. No. 1-7 at 2. All told, then, 304

1 days elapsed between the enactment of the IIJA and the availability of funds. Defendants  
2 rescinded FHWA’s NEVI Formula Program guidance and revoked the State Plans on February 6,  
3 2025. *See* Dkt. No. 1-9 at 2. The rescission left FHWA in the same position it was in on the date  
4 that the IIJA was enacted—that is, back at square one and statutorily obligated to provide  
5 guidance to the states on how to access the congressionally appropriated NEVI Formula funds.  
6 *See* 135 Stat. at 1421–22. If the Parties were to adhere to the same timeline that they followed in  
7 2021–22, then Washington could expect to again be eligible to obligate NEVI formula funds on  
8 or about December 7, 2025, more than two months *after* the end of fiscal year 2025. *See* 31  
9 U.S.C. § 1102 (“The fiscal year of the Treasury begins on October 1 of each year and ends on  
10 September 30 of the following year.”). Notwithstanding Defendants’ assertion that “FHWA will  
11 re-issue NEVI guidance, and pursuant to that guidance, States will be permitted to submit  
12 updated plans and requests for obligations,” the Court is skeptical that all of the paperwork—at a  
13 minimum, agency guidance, State Plans, and agency approvals, to say nothing of the individual  
14 projects that must then be approved by FHWA—will be signed, sealed, and delivered in time for  
15 the Secretary to fulfill the statutory requirement to distribute the fiscal year 2025 funds by the  
16 end of fiscal year 2025.

17 When the IIJA was enacted, the statute provided the Secretary of Transportation with 90  
18 days to issue agency guidance on NEVI Formula Program funds, a deadline the agency duly  
19 complied with. *See* Dkt. No. 93-1 at 11. Since Defendants committed themselves to re-issuing a  
20 new version of the guidance on February 6, 2025, more than four months—far in excess of 90  
21 days—have passed. Were Defendants serious about their obligation to distribute the NEVI  
22 Formula funds as mandated by Congress, they might have displayed more alacrity so as to ensure  
23 timely distribution of the funds. That Defendants have been content to do nothing more than  
24 assert an “aim[] to have undated draft NEVI Formula Guidance published for public comment in

the spring” belies their professed intention of timely bringing the NEVI Formula Program back online and in accordance with the statute. At oral argument, the Court asked Defendants’ counsel when FHWA would provide states with its updated guidance, but counsel was not able to provide the Court with a date, or even a rough timeframe. *See* Dkt. No. 109 at 21:12–15.

Finally, as explained in the Biondi Letter, FHWA actually intends to issue updated NEVI Formula Program guidance twice—first in a draft version “for public comment,” then as “final” guidance that “responds to the comments received.” Dkt. No. 1-9 at 3. FHWA will not permit states to submit new state deployment plans until the “final” version of the guidance has been issued, which will not happen until after the “public comment period has closed,” thereby extending the purportedly “brief” pause in the NEVI Formula Program even more. *Id.* Such foot-dragging strikes the Court as completely unnecessary. Congress did not mandate notice-and-comment rulemaking when directing DOT to issue NEVI Formula Program guidance. When FHWA developed and issued the first version of NEVI Formula Program guidance in 2021–22, it solicited public input just 15 days after the IIJA was enacted and, even then, committed to “issu[ing] guidance and begin[ning] other activities related to implementation” of the IIJA while still fielding suggestions from the public. IIJA Request for Information, 86 Fed. Reg. 68297, 68298 (Dec. 1, 2021). All told, what Defendants have done, and what they continue to do (or not do), truly renders their actions here a funding freeze, not a temporary pause or brief suspension.

Thus, the Court finds that Defendants have likely exceeded their statutory authority and Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their first cause of action.

***b. Second APA Claim: Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Action***

Under the APA, a court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, [a

1 court's] scope of review is narrow and deferential. *Arrington v. Daniels*, 516 F.3d 1106, 1112  
2 (9th Cir. 2008). "Agency action is valid 'if a reasonable basis exists for [the agency's]  
3 decision.'" *Id.* (quoting *Kern Cnty. Farm Bureau v. Allen*, 450 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006))  
4 (alteration in original). "A reasonable basis exists where the agency 'considered the relevant  
5 factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.'" *Id.*  
6 (quoting *Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.*, 415 F.3d 1078, 1093  
7 (9th Cir. 2005)). Where an agency has changed its policy, it must "show that there are good  
8 reasons for the new policy," and it must demonstrate that it has considered any "serious reliance  
9 interests" prior to changing course. *F.C.C. v. Fox Television Studios*, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).  
10 An agency must also demonstrate that it has considered "alternatives . . . within the ambit of the  
11 existing policy." *Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 30 (2020)  
12 (cleaned up). Further, an agency action is "arbitrary and capricious" where "the agency has relied  
13 on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider . . . ." *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43.

14 Here, Defendants' rescission of the NEVI Formula Program guidance and revocation of  
15 State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plans was arbitrary and capricious. Defendants  
16 attempt to rely on two paragraphs in the Biondi Letter to satisfy their burden under the APA but  
17 fall far short of adequately explaining their actions. *See* Dkt. No. 1-9 at 2–3. "The FHWA is  
18 updating the NEVI Formula Program Guidance to align with current U.S. DOT policy and  
19 priorities, including those set forth in DOT Order 2100.7, titled 'Ensuring Reliance Upon Sound  
20 Economic Analysis in Department of Transportation Policies, Programs, and Activities.'" *Id.*  
21 This sentence represents the entirety of Defendants' stated reasoning behind the decision.

22 It is not evident that FHWA considered relevant factors that informed its decision. The  
23 agency explained that it was "updating the NEVI Formula Program Guidance to align with  
24 current U.S. DOT policy and priorities, including those set forth in DOT Order 2100.7, titled

1 ‘Ensuring Reliance Upon Sound Economic Analysis in Department of Transportation Policies,  
2 Programs, and Activities.’” Dkt. No. 1-9 at 2–3. In directing the Secretary of Transportation to  
3 develop NEVI Formula Program guidance, Congress enumerated eight specific factors to  
4 consider, as well as “any other factors, as determined by the Secretary”:

5 (1) the distance between publicly available electric vehicle  
6 charging infrastructure;

7 (2) connections to the electric grid, including electric distribution  
8 upgrades; vehicle-to-grid integration, including smart charge  
9 management or other protocols that can minimize impacts to the  
10 grid; alignment with electric distribution interconnection  
11 processes, and plans for the use of renewable energy sources to  
12 power charging and energy storage;

13 (3) the proximity of existing off-highway travel centers, fuel  
14 retailers, and small businesses to electric vehicle charging  
15 infrastructure acquired or funded under this paragraph in this Act;

16 (4) the need for publicly available electric vehicle charging  
17 infrastructure in rural corridors and underserved or disadvantaged  
18 communities;

19 (5) the long-term operation and maintenance of publicly available  
20 electric vehicle charging infrastructure to avoid stranded assets and  
21 protect the investment of public funds in that infrastructure;

22 (6) existing private, national, State, local, Tribal, and territorial  
23 government electric vehicle charging infrastructure programs and  
24 incentives;

(7) fostering enhanced, coordinated, public-private or private  
investment in electric vehicle charging infrastructure; [and]

(8) meeting current and anticipated market demands for electric  
vehicle charging infrastructure, including with regard to power  
levels and charging speed, and minimizing the time to charge  
current and anticipated vehicles[.]

1 135 Stat. at 1423. But even given the broad discretion of this catch-all factor, the scope of which  
 2 is subject to interpretation,<sup>8</sup> the Biondi Letter does not “articulate[] a rational connection  
 3 between the facts found and the choices made.” *Arrington*, 516 F.3d at 1112. Indeed, the Biondi  
 4 Letter does not articulate any facts at all and instead provides only an implication that the current  
 5 NEVI Formula Program guidance does not “align with current U.S. DOT policy and priorities.”  
 6 Dkt. No. 1-9 at 2–3.<sup>9</sup> The Biondi Letter does not explain how the current guidance is out-of-step  
 7 with current policy and, therefore, does not explain why it needs to be rescinded. A court “may  
 8 not infer an agency’s reasoning from mere silence.” *Arrington*, 516 F.3d at 1112.

9 Further, the Biondi Letter does not demonstrate that FHWA considered the serious  
 10 reliance interests engendered by the old policy—namely, the administrative, economic, and  
 11 infrastructural arrangements that the states had made based on FHWA’s approval of prior State  
 12 Plans. Indeed, the Biondi Letter is again completely silent as to any reliance issues it considered  
 13 (if any). The Biondi Letter also does not demonstrate that FHWA considered any alternatives  
 14 beyond the wholesale rescission of the guidance and revocation of the State Plans. In their  
 15 opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion here, Defendants only conclusorily assert that “FHWA [has not]  
 16 acted arbitrarily and capriciously.” Dkt. No. 93 at 7. They ignore the substantive shortcomings of  
 17 the Biondi Letter as an instrument by which FHWA changed policy and instead focus on  
 18 FHWA’s authority to make the change in the first place—that is, Defendants ignore the *why* and  
 19

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20 <sup>8</sup> Plaintiffs assert that, because the IIJA’s reference to “‘other factors’ that can influence the Guidance follow[s]  
 21 more specific terms[, u]nder the principle of *ejusdem generis* [sic] . . . , the general term should be understood as a  
 22 reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration.” Dkt. No. 5 at 16 (quoting *Norfolk & Western Ry.*  
 23 *Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n*, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991)). Defendants do not address this argument in their  
 24 briefing. *See generally* Dkt. No. 93. Because the Court finds that Defendants’ action was arbitrary and capricious for  
 reasons aside from Defendants’ alleged consideration of improper factors, the Court does not take up the question of  
 how broad Congress intended the scope of these “other factors” to be.

<sup>9</sup> It is true that the Biden-era guidance on EV infrastructure did not incorporate positions regarding vaccine and  
 mask mandates and federal immigration enforcement, two subjects of DOT’s new policy and priorities. *See* Dkt.  
 No. 93-1 at 34–35.

1 the *how* of their conduct and exclusively predicate their argument on the *what*. This is not  
2 sufficient to survive arbitrary-and-capricious review.

3 Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants’ action was likely arbitrary and capricious,  
4 and that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their second cause of action.

5 ***c. Third APA Claim: Not in Accordance with Law and Without***  
6 ***Observance of Procedure Required by Law***

7 Under the APA, a court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,  
8 and conclusions found to be— (A) . . . not in accordance with law” or “(D) without observance  
9 of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated the  
10 APA by failing to abide by the IIJA’s “specific procedures for the withholding or withdrawal of  
11 NEVI funds.” Dkt. No. 5 at 17. Defendants explain their conduct by characterizing it not as a  
12 withholding or withdrawal of funds, but rather as an exercise of FHWA’s authority to “guide  
13 precisely how apportioned funds are utilized.” Dkt. No. 93 at 18. But common sense counsels  
14 against this characterization.

15 Defendants admit that they have instituted “a temporary pause on the distribution of  
16 NEVI funds.” Dkt. No. 93 at 28. Irrespective of what Defendants are doing concurrently with the  
17 temporary pause—including “review[ing]” and “restructuring” NEVI Formula Program guidance  
18 (*id.*)—the Court cannot interpret a “temporary pause” as anything other than the withholding of  
19 funds. The faucet has been turned off. As discussed above, the IIJA prescribes specific  
20 circumstances where the Secretary of Transportation may withhold or withdraw NEVI Formula  
21 funds. *See supra* Section II.B.1.c. If a state has not submitted a plan, or if it has failed to take  
22 action to carry out its plan, then funds may be withheld or withdrawn. 135 Stat. at 1422. But  
23 Plaintiff States *have* submitted plans and *were* apportioned funds. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 1-8. There  
24 is no indication that the Secretary of Transportation has determined that any of the Plaintiff

1 States has failed to take action to carry out its plan. Regardless, FHWA instituted its “temporary  
2 pause.” And even if the Secretary of Transportation had properly determined that it might be  
3 appropriate under the statute to withhold or withdraw funds, the statute required that 60 days’  
4 notice be provided to the states prior to any withholding or withdrawal of funds, “during which  
5 the States shall have an opportunity to appeal a decision to withhold or withdraw funds directly  
6 to the Secretary.” 135 Stat. at 1422. There is no indication that, prior to the issuance of the  
7 Biondi Letter, any of this happened. Defendants’ actions were thus not in accordance with the  
8 IIJA.

9 Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants’ action was likely not in accordance with law  
10 and was performed without observance of procedure required by law. Plaintiffs are likely to  
11 succeed on their third cause of action.

12 ***d. Violation of Separation of Powers***

13 “The Constitution limits [the President’s] functions in the lawmaking process to the  
14 recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.” *Youngstown Sheet*  
15 *& Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). “Aside from the power of veto, the President is  
16 without authority to thwart congressional will by canceling appropriations passed by Congress.  
17 Simply put, ‘the President does not have unilateral authority to refuse to spend the funds.’” *City*  
18 *& County of San Francisco*, 897 F.3d at 1232 (quoting *In re Aiken County*, 725 F.3d 255, 261  
19 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants’ attempt to withhold NEVI funds from  
20 Plaintiff States [is a] violation of the clear language of the IIJA” and, therefore, violates the  
21 separation-of-powers doctrine. Dkt. No. 5 at 19. Quoting *City and County of San Francisco*,  
22 Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants ‘claimed for themselves Congress’s exclusive spending power,’  
23 while ‘also attempting to coopt Congress’s power to legislate.’” *Id.* (cleaned up) (quoting *City &*  
24 *County of San Francisco*, 897 F.3d at 1234)).

1 For Defendants’ part, beyond a general assertion that Plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers  
2 claim is meritless, their position here is somewhat confusing. Defendants direct most of their  
3 argument on the subject toward defending against a claim that they admit Plaintiffs have not  
4 actually alleged. *See* Dkt. No. 93 at 24 (“Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiffs have not  
5 explicitly pled an Impoundment Control Act claim.”); *id.* at 21–26. Though well-reasoned and  
6 forcefully argued, Defendants’ lengthy discussion on the inapplicability of Impoundment Control  
7 Act is irrelevant to the matter at hand.<sup>10</sup> What is more, Defendants’ counsel conceded at oral  
8 argument that the Executive here has not attempted to utilize the Impoundment Control Act to  
9 propose rescinding the funds allocated by Congress. *See* Dkt. No. 109 at 39:12–13.

10 Other courts faced with similar issues have resolved separation-of-powers questions  
11 without recourse to the Impoundment Control Act. For example, in finding that the President had  
12 overstepped his Constitutional authority when he refused to spend Congressionally appropriated  
13 funds, the Ninth Circuit in *City and County of San Francisco* mentioned the Impoundment  
14 Control Act only in passing, and even then merely to demonstrate that in enacting the statute,  
15 “Congress ha[d] affirmatively and authoritatively spoken” on “the President’s duty to execute  
16 appropriations laws.” *City & County of San Francisco*, 897 F.3d at 1234. And in a recent case in  
17 this District regarding the Executive Branch’s alleged interference with the distribution of  
18 Congressionally appropriated funds, the court no need to discuss the Impoundment Control Act.  
19 *See King County v. Turner*, No. C25-814, 2025 WL 1582368, at \*14–25 (W.D. Wash. June 3,  
20 2025).

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21  
22  
23 <sup>10</sup> Plaintiffs cite the Impoundment Control Act to draw attention to “the general procedure by which the Executive  
24 may propose to Congress to either rescind or cancel funds” and to point out that that procedure is not applicable to  
the facts of this case. *See* Dkt. No. 5 at 19.

1           “The [Appropriations] Clause has a ‘fundamental and comprehensive purpose . . . to  
2 assure that public funds will be spent according to the letter of the difficult judgments reached by  
3 Congress as to the common good and not according to the individual favor of Government  
4 agents.’” *United States v. McIntosh*, 833 F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting *Off. of Pers.*  
5 *Mgmt. v. Richmond*, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990)). Here, the complained-of funding freeze was  
6 conceived in Section 7(a) of the President’s “Unleashing American Energy” Executive Order,  
7 not the IJJA. In the Executive Order, the President directed “[a]ll agencies [to] immediately  
8 pause the disbursement of funds appropriated through the . . . Infrastructure Investment and Jobs  
9 Act (Public Law 117–58), including but not limited to funds for electric vehicle charging stations  
10 made available through the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Formula Program . . . .”  
11 “Unleashing Am. Energy,” 90 Fed. Reg. at 8357. As discussed above, Defendants gave effect to  
12 the President’s order through the issuance of the Biondi Letter, which instituted the “temporary  
13 pause” in the NEVI Formula Program. *See* Dkt. No. 1-9. Under *City and County of San*  
14 *Francisco*, implementing the pause was an inappropriate seizure of Congress’s budgetary  
15 authority: “Absent congressional authorization, the Administration may not redistribute or  
16 withhold properly appropriated funds in order to effectuate its own policy goals.” *City & County*  
17 *of San Francisco*, 897 F.3d at 1235. Observed from the other direction, “[t]here is sufficient  
18 evidence that, in implementing the funding freeze, the Agency Defendants withheld funding that  
19 Congress did *not* tie to compliance with the President’s policy priorities in the . . . the Unleashing  
20 EO.” *New York v. Trump*, 2025 WL 715621, at \*11.

21           Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants’ action likely violated the separation-of-  
22 powers doctrine, and that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their fourth cause of action.  
23  
24

## 2. Imminent/Irreparable Harm

Plaintiffs must establish that they will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 20. “Irreparable harm is traditionally defined as harm for which there is no adequate legal remedy, such as an award of damages.” *Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer*, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing *Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc.*, 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Plaintiffs allege two kinds of irreparable harm:

First, Defendants’ actions interrupt and impede Plaintiff States’ ongoing programs to deploy EV charging infrastructure, thwart policies these States adopted to combat climate change, reduce harmful pollution, broaden access to EVs, and create jobs. Second, Defendants’ . . . actions increase Plaintiff States’ administrative burdens in implementing the NEVI Formula Program and interfere with their ability to budget, plan ,and serve their residents.

Dkt. No. 5 at 20. Plaintiffs assert that “[n]either type of harm is compensable with money damages,” and that these harms “already have occurred and, absent entry of an injunction, will continue.” *Id.* Defendants present three arguments in opposition. First, Defendants assert that “Plaintiffs waited too long to seek preliminary relief,” which “implies a lack of urgency and irreparable harm.” Dkt. No. 93 at 26–27 (quoting *Miller ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr.*, 991 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1993)). Second, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs’ claimed economic injuries are not irreparable,” because “monetary injury is not normally considered irreparable.” *Id.* at 27 (quoting *L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League*, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980)). Third, Defendants argue that the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs “depend[] on an attenuated chain of possibilities.” *Id.* at 28. Defendants further question the likelihood that these “potential” injuries will actually befall Plaintiffs. *Id.* at 28–29.

1                    **a.        *Lack of Urgency***

2            The Court rejects Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs are ineligible for relief here  
 3 because they waited 12 weeks after the February 6, 2025, issuance of the Biondi Letter to request  
 4 an injunction. *See* Dkt. No. 93 at 26–27. For one thing, courts are “loath to withhold relief solely  
 5 on that ground.” *Lydo Enters., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas*, 745 F.2d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 1984).  
 6 For another, Defendants baldly presume that the 12-week period between Defendants’ letter and  
 7 Plaintiffs’ motion is, in fact, a “delay.” But is the 12 weeks between the Biondi Letter and  
 8 Plaintiffs’ motion the appropriate time period to consider here and, if so, is it really too long?  
 9 Defendants do not provide any authority indicating that it is, only a collection of caselaw that  
 10 shows courts’ general disfavor of “delays” when considering motions for preliminary injunctive  
 11 relief that involved plaintiffs who moved for injunctions *years* after the challenged action. *See id.*  
 12 at 27.<sup>11</sup>

13            Furthermore, Defendants provide no basis on which to conclude that 12 weeks is, in fact,  
 14 properly considered a delay in the first place. Given this hole in Defendants’ argument, the Court  
 15 credits Plaintiffs’ explanation of their timeline. First, even though the Biondi Letter issued  
 16 February 6, 2025, “the magnitude of the potential harm” from the letter only became apparent  
 17 later, on or about March 31, 2025, when FHWA confirmed to California that, “As a result of the  
 18 [Biondi Letter] . . . , the NEVI formula program codes have been placed in ‘expired’ status.  
 19 Thus, no funds are available for obligation.” Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 11. Thus, “Plaintiffs filed suit—and  
 20 immediately sought injunctive relief—only 37 days after FHWA confirmed it had rejected  
 21

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22            <sup>11</sup> Defendants cite *Benisek v. Lamone*, 585 U.S. 155, 159 (2018) (plaintiffs waited six years prior to moving for  
 23 preliminary injunction); *Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co.*, 762 F.2d 1374, 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985)  
 24 (“many years”); *Lydo Enters.*, 745 F.2d at 1211, 1213 (five years). Further, Defendants cite *Arc of California*, where  
 the Ninth Circuit found that a three-month period between the passage of a statute and plaintiffs’ moving for a  
 preliminary injunction was not indicative of a lack of urgency on the plaintiffs’ part. 757 F.3d at 990.

California’s construction authorization request based on the FHWA Letter.” Dkt. No. 99 at 17.  
 “Under such circumstances, waiting to file for preliminary relief until a credible case for  
 irreparable harm can be made is prudent rather than dilatory.” *Arc of Cal.*, 757 F.3d at 991.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ purported “delay” does not negate a showing of irreparable harm.  
 The Court turns now to Plaintiffs’ substantive allegations of harm.

***b. Harm to EV Infrastructure Programs***

First, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants’ actions will cause significant irreparable harm by  
 arresting Plaintiff States’ programs created to further their sovereign interests in protecting  
 residents’ welfare, their economies, and the environment.” Dkt. No. 5 at 20. Plaintiffs identify  
 concrete actions that they have taken “in reliance on [Congressional] support”: “Plaintiff States  
 developed deployment plans, sought out private partnerships, conducted public outreach,  
 committed state tax dollars, and hired or redirected existing staff resources to carry out the NEVI  
 Formula Program.” *Id.* at 21. Plaintiffs have awarded contracts, signed contracts, and  
 commenced—or are about to commence—construction on infrastructure projects. *Id.* Plaintiffs  
 argue that “Defendants’ actions have halted these processes and threaten to scuttle projects—or  
 even entire state programs—altogether.” *Id.* at 22.

In arguing that Plaintiffs’ alleged harms are purely economic, and therefore redressable  
 with monetary damages, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs “have not established that a temporary  
 pause on the distribution of NEVI funds threatens the very existence of their projects.” Dkt.  
 No. 93 at 28. The evidence submitted by Plaintiffs belies this assertion. For example:

- “As of February 6, 2025, 15 grant awards under the Wisconsin Department of Transportation’s first RFP, representing \$7.3 million, remain unobligated. Wisconsin is unable to continue work implementing these grant awards.” Dkt. No. 26 ¶ 19. Wisconsin issued a second RFP in Spring 2025 but “does not have access to approximately \$62.65 million of its remaining apportionment of NEVI Formula Program funding and cannot issue awards under the [second] RFP.” *Id.*

- In Rhode Island,

The suspension of the NEVI Program caused immediate disruption by causing the halt of the open application period, preventing Rhode Island from awarding funds to communities and public entities that had already invested time and resources preparing proposals. It forced the closure of an active grant opportunity that many applicants had already initiated or completed internal reviews for, delaying project pipelines. In addition, it created uncertainty for future programming, as staffing resources and strategic partnerships had been mobilized under the assumption of continued funding and plan stability.

Dkt. No. 24 ¶ 25.

- In California, an awardee of NEVI projects has lost site hosts with whom it “had letters of intent or memorandums of understanding,” leaving the awardee with projects to build but, suddenly, no place to build them and resulting in “significant[] delay[s] or abandon[ment].” Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 20; *see* Dkt. No. 100 ¶ 6.

These are but three instances of harms alleged by Plaintiffs that cannot be rectified by Defendants simply disbursing funds on an indeterminate date in the future. Nor do they represent scenarios where Defendants’ as-yet unscheduled resumption of the NEVI Formula Program will leave Plaintiffs where they were prior to its suspension.

In *AmeriCorps*, the court found irreparable harm where the federal government’s funding freeze “directed an AmeriCorps-funded program to ‘pause all activities.’” *AmeriCorps*, 2025 WL 1585051, at \*34. “[O]rganizations that depend heavily on AmeriCorps funding to deliver essential services now face an immediate and critical threat to their operations, with many forced to significantly scale back or, in some cases, cease operations entirely.” *Id.* (cleaned up). The cessation or termination of social programs, combined with the loss of personnel who have developed connections with the communities they serve, will lead to an “erosion of trust”; relationships “cannot simply be replaced or restarted without significant damage to the progress made . . . .” *Id.*

1 Similarly, the court in *Washington v. Trump* found “immediate and irreparable injuries”  
2 where a funding freeze threatened “grants that are currently underway.” 768 F. Supp. 3d at 1279.  
3 Indeed, as Plaintiffs here assert, “[e]ven if Defendants eventually return to distributing funds as  
4 required, that will not cure the delay and loss of industry confidence in States’ NEVI  
5 implementation programs.” Dkt. No. 5 at 22. These harms are not, as Defendants insist,  
6 “squarely economic in nature.” Dkt. No. 93 at 28.

7 Defendants insisted at oral argument that, because the only action that the IJIA  
8 contemplates is the distribution of money, any harm caused by Defendants’ nondistribution will  
9 be cured when (and if) money begins to flow. *See* Dkt. No. 109 at 36:11–13. But IJIA does not  
10 merely distribute funds; money appropriated by the statute is apportioned, obligated, and  
11 disbursed to pay for particular things, at particular times, in particular places. As California’s  
12 testimony makes clear, when an EV infrastructure project predicated on NEVI Formula funding  
13 loses that funding—even, as Defendants insist, temporarily—that program runs the risk of dying  
14 on the vine. Where a site host “decided not to enter into final agreements [with the state] once  
15 they learned that NEVI funding was paused” and “instead pursued EV charging partners that  
16 would be able to proceed without NEVI funding,” the project can no longer be built in its  
17 planned location. Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 20. “If the NEVI awardee cannot find a site host, its project will  
18 be significantly delayed or abandoned,” potentially “result[ing] in failure to achieve NEVI  
19 requirements such as NEVI-compliant EV chargers every 50 miles along federally-approved  
20 corridors.” *Id.*

21 Consider a hypothetical situation where a government program seeks to encourage  
22 farmers to cultivate a particular crop—say, wheat. In the winter, the government promises to pay  
23 a farmer \$1,000 for each acre of wheat under cultivation. Encouraged by the subsidy, a farmer  
24 prepares a field for wheat, purchases fertilizer optimized for wheat cultivation, and contracts to

1 sell the crop to a local miller. But with planting season looming, the government advises that it  
2 has “temporarily paused” the wheat subsidy: The \$1,000-per-acre subsidy will not be distributed.  
3 The farmer cannot afford to have a field lie fallow and, therefore, abandons wheat for a different  
4 crop, albeit one not incentivized by a government subsidy—say, corn. The farmer purchases new  
5 fertilizer and seeds, searches for a buyer for the old fertilizer, prepares the land for corn  
6 cultivation, and pleads with the miller to modify the contract from wheat to corn. Then, after all  
7 of this, the government restarts the wheat program and re-offers the subsidy. But even if the  
8 farmer wants to go back to Plan A, it is too late. The farmer has purchased new fertilizer and new  
9 seeds and has lost the contract with the miller. Perhaps most importantly, the field has been  
10 committed to, fertilized, and sown with another crop; it cannot suddenly be switched back to  
11 wheat simply because the government has pulled out its checkbook. So, too, with an EV  
12 charging station originally sited in a prime location, then forced to relocate after its site host pulls  
13 out of its NEVI-funded deal with the state. Just as the farmer cannot plant the wheat in the same  
14 field as the corn, a state cannot have the original site back that has been recommitted to a  
15 different entity. A new location must be found, administrative time and resources expended, and  
16 a new arrangement with a new host worked out. This is not mere economic harm; it affects  
17 “permit[ing] and rights-of-way,” as well as the availability of “subcontractors and/or other  
18 project partners.” Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 21; *see* Dkt. No. 109 at 13:21–15:5 (describing various examples  
19 of non-economic harm sustained by Plaintiff States); *see also AmeriCorps*, 2025 WL 1585051, at  
20 \*36 (finding irreparable harm where funding freeze forced organizations “to come up with  
21 alternative programs to address gaps left by the withdrawal of funds and programs”).

22 *c. Increased Administrative Burden*

23 Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he budgetary confusion and uncertainty” caused by Defendants’  
24 actions constitute further irreparable harm. Dkt. No. 5 at 23. Defendants attack this allegation

1 through a strawman argument, focusing exclusively on the “increased administrative costs” and  
2 “cost increases from delayed construction” that Plaintiffs include underneath the administrative-  
3 burden umbrella. Dkt. No. 93 at 28. The Court *conditionally* agrees with Defendants that the  
4 decrease in NEVI Formula funding available for actual EV infrastructure—a decrease caused by  
5 Plaintiffs’ being forced to spend NEVI Formula funds on their respective administrative  
6 responses to the funding freeze—is an economic injury that could be addressed through  
7 monetary damages. *See* Dkt. No. 93 at 28. But the full extent of this injury could only be truly  
8 and fully redressed by the disbursement of funds above and beyond what Congress originally  
9 promised. After all, if a state solicits a request for proposals for an EV infrastructure project, then  
10 withdraws it, then—upon the re-availability of the funds—re-solicits it, the administrative cost  
11 has been doubled without any commensurate increase to the benefit: two solicitations  
12 undertaken, but only one project realized. That is to say, it is unfortunate and wasteful that, if and  
13 when the NEVI Formula Program resumes, Plaintiffs will find themselves with less money for  
14 construction, having been forced to draw down funds by taking actions necessary to respond to  
15 the loss of funds in the first place.

16 In identifying their respective injuries further, Plaintiffs also cite “operational harms,”  
17 such as “increased staff time spent fielding industry inquiries, redesigning paused solicitations,  
18 or reconfiguring budgets.” Dkt. No. 5 at 23. Plaintiffs assert further that “the interference with  
19 Plaintiff States’ ability to budget, plan for the future, and properly serve their residents is itself an  
20 intangible, uncompensable harm.” *Id.* at 24. The Court agrees. The “mitigating steps” that  
21 Plaintiffs have taken in response to the funding freeze—such as Washington’s reassignment of  
22 its full-time NEVI employee and its cancelation of a second NEVI hire—constitute irreparable  
23 harm. *County of Santa Clara v. Trump*, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (finding  
24

1 irreparable harm where uncertainty caused by executive action “interfere[d] with [plaintiffs’]  
2 ability to budget, plan for the future, and properly serve their residents”).

3 Finally, the Court notes Defendants’ disingenuous assertion that Plaintiffs have  
4 “recognize[d] that once Defendants resume NEVI Program fund distribution, their alleged injury  
5 will be ameliorated.” Dkt. No. 93 at 29. Plaintiffs have made no such recognition and have in  
6 fact argued—and demonstrated—quite the opposite through their briefing, oral argument, and  
7 submission of testimony from state transportation officials. *See* Dkt. No. 109 at 43:10–44:1. It is  
8 telling that Defendants’ opposition brief fails to address a single concrete instance of harm  
9 alleged by any one of the Plaintiffs and instead relies on the categorical argument that all of  
10 Plaintiffs’ alleged harms are economic. Put another way, Defendants do not deny that their  
11 actions have substantially harmed Plaintiffs. Rather, they simply assume that the costs will be the  
12 same and insist that the Court can simply put a price tag on everything and send them a bill.

13 The Court disagrees and finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently established the likelihood  
14 that they will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief.

### 15 **3. Balance of Equities/Public Interest**

16 When deciding whether to grant an injunction, “courts must balance the competing  
17 claims of injury and must consider the effect of each party of the granting or withholding of the  
18 requested relief.” *Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.*, 869 F.3d 848, 866 (9th Cir. 2017)  
19 (quoting *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 24). The Court must also consider whether granting an injunction is  
20 in the public interest. *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 20. These two factors merge when the federal  
21 government is a party. *Roman*, 977 F.3d at 940–41. “The rule of law is secured by a strong  
22 public interest that the laws ‘enacted by their representatives are not imperiled by executive  
23 fiat.’” *Washington*, 768 F. Supp. 3d at 1280 (quoting *E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant*, 932 F.3d at  
24 779).

1 The balance of equities clearly tips in favor of Plaintiffs. In passing the IIJA, Congress  
2 made it the policy of the federal government to spend \$5 billion in public funds on the  
3 “acquisition and installation of electric vehicle charging infrastructure.” 135 Stat. at 1421. This  
4 statute has not been repealed, and thus Plaintiffs’ argument that “[s]o long as Defendants  
5 continue to withhold NEVI funds, Plaintiff States will be unable to proceed with—and the public  
6 will not benefit from—full implementation of their plans to deploy EV charging infrastructure,”  
7 carries substantial weight. Dkt. No. 5 at 26. As demonstrated in their imposition of a  
8 “temporary”—yet indefinite—“pause” on the NEVI Formula Program, Defendants’ ongoing  
9 actions run counter to the expressed will of Congress. Moreover, as discussed above, the Court  
10 agrees that Defendants’ actions have caused, and continue to cause, immediate and irreparable  
11 harm to Plaintiffs.

12 For their part, “Defendants do not have a legitimate interest in ensuring that funds are  
13 spent”—or, in this case, not spent—“pursuant to conditions that were likely imposed in violation  
14 of the APA and/or the Constitution.” *King County*, 2025 WL 1582368, at \*20 (citing *Valle del*  
15 *Sol Inc. v. Whiting*, 732 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 2013) (there is no legitimate government  
16 interest in violating federal law)). Moreover, the Court is unmoved by Defendants’ argument that  
17 “granting the preliminary injunction that Plaintiffs seek would disrupt Defendants’ efforts to  
18 finalize and promulgate NEVI guidance in accordance with current policies and priorities.” Dkt.  
19 No. 93 at 29. This self-deprecating assertion is unreasonable. After issuing NEVI Formula  
20 Program guidance in 2022, FHWA managed to update it and reissue it in 2023, and again in  
21 2024, without suspending the program altogether. Defendants argue, essentially, that under this  
22 administration, FHWA cannot walk and chew gum at the same time: The only way that the  
23 agency can properly re-examine, then re-issue, the guidance is if it is relieved of its  
24 responsibilities to administer the program. Given that FHWA had no problem doing this

1 simultaneously under the prior administration, and given the inefficiency of such a stop-start  
2 approach to the administration of the agency's affairs, the Court is confident that the agency can  
3 continue this feat of multitasking under the current administration.

4 Therefore, the balance of equities and public-interest factors tip in favor of Plaintiffs.

5 \* \* \*

6 Having considered the applicable factors, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART  
7 Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction as follows.

8 **C. Scope of Injunction**

9 As a general rule, injunctions "should be limited to apply only to named plaintiffs where  
10 there is no class certification . . . ." *Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan*, 92 F.3d 1486,  
11 1501 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiffs ask the Court to enjoin Defendants from: (1) suspending or  
12 revoking approvals of Plaintiff States' State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plans;  
13 (2) improperly withholding or withdrawing—i.e., not in accordance with the IIJA—NEVI  
14 Formula Program funds from Plaintiff States; and (3) "effectuating" a categorical suspension or  
15 termination of the NEVI Formula Program for Plaintiff States. Dkt. No. 5-2 at 2. Plaintiffs do not  
16 seek nationwide relief or to enjoin Defendants from continuing their actions vis-à-vis non-  
17 Plaintiff states. For their part, Defendants do not address the scope of Plaintiffs' requested  
18 injunction.

19 It is, however, Plaintiffs' burden to establish irreparable harm as to *all* Plaintiffs who seek  
20 injunctive relief. *See Allied Concrete & Supply Co. v. Brown*, No. C16-4830, 2016 WL 9275783,  
21 at \*4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2016). Here, three Plaintiffs—the District of Columbia, Minnesota, and  
22 Vermont—did not proffer any evidence—such as a declaration from a state (or District)  
23 official—that demonstrates the irreparable harm that would befall them absent injunctive relief.  
24 Although these three Plaintiffs, like the others, established sufficient *injury* to satisfy the ripeness

1 requirement, *see supra* Section IV.A.1, they have not provided any testimony, beyond what is  
2 alleged in the complaint, that demonstrates, say, a delayed or canceled project, a budget thrown  
3 into chaos, or a withdrawn request for proposals. Therefore, these Plaintiffs have not satisfied all  
4 four *Winter* elements, and the Court cannot grant them the requested relief.

5       Given that the injunctive relief here will likely be rendered moot once Defendants follow  
6 through on their stated intention to issue new NEVI Formula Program guidance that comports  
7 with the current administration’s policies, and states submit their new state deployment plans, the  
8 Court is not overly concerned that certain Plaintiff States’ deployment plans will for the near-  
9 term future be active, while other states’ deployment plans will remain revoked.<sup>12</sup> Presumably,  
10 Defendants will issue new NEVI Formula Program guidance, at which point all states, plus the  
11 District of Columbia, will be required to submit updated State Plans, just as they were required to  
12 do under the former administration. *See* Dkt. No. 93 at 19.

#### 13 **D. Bond Requirement**

14       Defendants argue that, “should the Court be inclined to order any injunctive relief, the  
15 Court should also order Plaintiffs to post security.” Dkt. No. 93 at 30. Under Federal Rule of  
16 Civil Procedure 65(c), “[t]he court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining  
17 order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the  
18 costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”  
19 But “[d]espite the seemingly mandatory language, ‘Rule 65(c) invests the district court with  
20 discretion as to the amount of security required, *if any*.’” *Johnson v. Couturier*, 572 F.3d 1067,  
21 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Jorgensen v. Cassidy*, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003)). In  
22 public-interest litigation where the court enjoins unlawful agency action, a “nominal” bond is  
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24 <sup>12</sup> In any event, the Court is not in a position to make any determination as to whether any non-Plaintiff states may suffer or have suffered immediate or irreparable harm, as that information is not before the Court.

1 appropriate, especially where, as here, the government-defendant fails to provide any evidence  
2 that an injunction would impose a substantial cost. *Barahona-Gomez v. Reno*, 167 F.3d 1228,  
3 1237 (9th Cir. 1999); see *U.S. Mission Corp. v. City of Mercer Island*, No. C14-1844, 2015 WL  
4 540182, at \*9 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2015) (setting “nominal” bond of \$100.00). In  
5 environmental cases, a nominal bond or bond waiver has been found to be appropriate in light of  
6 “the important public interest in the enforcement of [federal environmental law].”  
7 *Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs*, 826 F.3d 1030, 1043 (8th Cir.  
8 2016) (collecting cases). In recent cases where courts have enjoined federal-agency defendants,  
9 bonds have been waived altogether. See *King County*, 2025 WL 1582368, at \*20 (denying  
10 enjoined federal-government defendants’ request for bond); *AmeriCorps*, 2025 WL 1585051, at  
11 \*39 (same); *California*, 2025 WL 1711531, at \*4 (waiving bond).

12 Here, the Court waives the imposition of any bond on Plaintiffs. The harm Defendants  
13 seek to hedge against is “premature disbursement of funds.” Dkt. No. 93 at 30. But given that  
14 Defendants are obligated to distribute these funds under the IIJA to *someone*, the only harm  
15 attendant to a “premature disbursement” does not redound to Defendants. Rather, at worst,  
16 Defendants might someday, upon complying with the IIJA’s procedural prerequisites for  
17 withdrawing or withholding NEVI Formula funds, potentially divert such withdrawn or withheld  
18 funds to other recipients as prescribed in the statute. The “harm” that Defendants actually  
19 identify, then, is the nondistribution of withdrawn or withheld NEVI Formula funds to alternate  
20 recipients. Such harm is speculative and attenuated and, moreover, only sustained, if at all, by  
21 parties that cannot be identified at this time. In enjoining Defendants, the Court merely  
22 “require[s] Defendants to adhere to the formula fund process contemplated by Congress, while  
23 maintaining FHWA’s normal, proper oversight role prior to any actual obligation or  
24 disbursement.” Dkt. No. 99 at 18 (citing *Rodriguez v. Robbins*, 715 F.3d 1127, 1145 (9th Cir.

2013) (holding that federal government “cannot suffer harm from an injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice”)).

### E. Stay

Defendants request that “if this Court does enter injunctive relief, that [such] relief be stayed for a period of seven days to allow the Solicitor General to determine whether to appeal and seek a stay pending appeal.” Dkt. No. 93 at 30–31. Although the Court is mindful that, as Plaintiffs point out, Defendants’ request is “cursory” (Dkt. No. 99 at 18), seven days is a short period of time. The Court thus STAYS the injunction for **seven (7) days, until July 1, 2025**, or until Defendants appeal this Order to the Ninth Circuit, whichever comes first.

### V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 5) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. As to Plaintiffs Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawai‘i, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. As to Plaintiffs District of Columbia, Minnesota, and Vermont, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED. It is further ORDERED:

- (1) Defendants and all their respective officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and any person in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order are hereby fully ENJOINED from the following:
  - (a) Suspending or revoking—or maintaining any current suspension or revocation of—previously-approved State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plans of Plaintiffs Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawai‘i, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. These States’ State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plans SHALL be restored to the legal status they were in prior to the February 6, 2025, issuance of the Biondi Letter; and
  - (b) Withholding or withdrawing NEVI Formula Program funds for any such previously approved State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plans for any reason not set forth in the IIJA or

1 applicable FHWA regulations; or withholding or withdrawing  
2 NEVI Formula Program funds from a state without following the  
3 IIJA's substantive and procedural requirements, including by  
4 refusing to review and/or process requests for authorization to  
5 obligate funds for specific EV charging infrastructure development  
6 activities.

7 (2) This injunction is STAYED for **seven (7) days, until July 1, 2025**. If  
8 Defendants do not appeal this Order, the injunction SHALL go into effect  
9 on **July 2, 2025**.

10 (3) **Within five (5) days** of the lifting of the stay, Defendants' attorneys  
11 SHALL provide written notice of this Order to all Defendants and agencies  
12 and their employees or contractors with responsibility for administering  
13 the NEVI Formula Program. Defendants SHALL file a copy of the notice  
14 on the docket at the same time.

15 (4) Upon the lifting of the stay, this preliminary injunction SHALL remain in  
16 effect pending further orders from this Court.

17 Dated this 24th day of June 2025.

18 

19 Tana Lin  
20 United States District Judge  
21  
22  
23  
24