



project with the project's adverse effects, including economic and environmental impacts.<sup>4</sup> In addition, the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 *et seq.*, requires the Commission to take a "hard look" at the full range of environmental impacts associated with proposed pipeline infrastructure.<sup>5</sup> For jurisdictional projects, the Commission holds ultimate land use siting authority—a role played by states and local governments for many other energy production and energy transportation facilities.

Between 1999 and 2017, the Commission approved interstate natural gas pipeline capacity additions of 180 billion cubic-feet per day nationwide, a significant number that exceeds current national peak demand.<sup>6</sup> While these additions may increase the availability of natural gas to customers, they also come with long-duration costs, many ultimately paid by residents and small businesses in our states, and significant environmental impacts. Meanwhile, new pipeline infrastructure projects are entering a rapidly changing energy market, which raises major questions about the business and environmental case for new capacity built using traditional financing approaches and assumptions. It is in this context that the undersigned Attorneys General believe that the Commission's review of proposed gas pipeline projects under the Policy Statement does not fully satisfy its vital obligations under the NGA and NEPA to protect the public interest.

Despite its broad statutory authority and duty to consider the full range and scope of relevant factors related to pipeline projects, the Commission's current process is unduly segmented and narrow in scope. In assessing project need, the Commission generally fails to account for the extent of regional need for new gas capacity or the evolving market for gas demand and relies too heavily on precedent agreements as proof of need for isolated projects.

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<sup>4</sup> See *Sierra Club v. FERC*, 867 F.3d 1357, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

<sup>5</sup> *Kleppe v. Sierra Club*, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (citation omitted); *Coal. for Responsible Growth & Res. Conservation v. FERC*, 485 F. App'x 472, 474 (2d Cir. 2012).

<sup>6</sup> See SUSAN TIERNEY, ANALYSIS GROUP, NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CERTIFICATION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR A CHANGING INDUSTRY (2017), at 1–2, available at [http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/publishing/ag\\_ferc\\_natural\\_gas\\_pipeline\\_certification.pdf](http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/publishing/ag_ferc_natural_gas_pipeline_certification.pdf).

This practice does not permit the Commission to understand the broader context for the alleged benefits of a proposed project and risks approving more infrastructure and capacity (on potentially inefficient terms) than the public need requires or prospective market conditions can or should support. The Commission's single-minded reliance on precedent agreements is also contrary to the existing Policy Statement which directs the Commission to "consider all relevant factors reflecting on the need for the project," including studies of projected demand, the market to be served, and potential cost savings to consumers.

The Commission's current practice also fails to meet its statutory obligations under NEPA to assess the environmental impacts of proposed pipeline projects in a comprehensive and robust manner. By generally focusing on single projects in isolation, the Commission does not appropriately consider reasonable alternatives or account for cumulative environmental impacts on a regional basis. The Commission also fails to adequately assess non-gas energy alternatives and other project alternatives such as energy storage, demand response, and energy efficiency, and routinely fails to appropriately consider state policies, such as state choices regarding our energy resource portfolios. And by not consistently and thoroughly assessing and quantifying upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions using the best available measures, the Commission's approach to assessing climate impacts does not satisfy NEPA requirements. Relatedly, the Commission's inadequate implementation of NEPA hobbles its broader statutory obligation under the NGA to evaluate the public interest in Certificate decisions by balancing project benefits against a full accounting of adverse environmental and socioeconomic impacts.

The undersigned Attorneys General strongly urge the Commission to revise the Policy Statement in accordance with the recommendations discussed in detail below. Implementing these recommendations will assist the Commission in addressing the issues raised by the Commission in its Notice of Inquiry, including growing stakeholder concerns and legal challenges related to the adverse impacts of pipeline projects.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

*First*, regarding project need, we recommend that the Commission assess need on a comprehensive, regional basis, and expand its analysis beyond the current dependence on precedent agreements, employing heightened scrutiny of precedent agreements with affiliates of project proponents.

*Second*, we urge the Commission to conduct a more thorough and robust NEPA analysis, comprehensively assessing on a regional basis the impacts of, and alternatives to, a proposed project, considering clean energy and other non-pipeline alternatives, thoroughly analyzing upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions, and considering state greenhouse gas emission-reduction policies.

*Third*, we recommend that the Commission consider environmental harm, including climate impacts quantified using the best available measure—the Social Cost of Carbon—and more heavily weigh the harm from use of eminent domain takings in its public interest assessment when balancing project benefits and harm in making a Certificate decision.

*Fourth*, we urge the Commission to better incorporate and consider state environmental and land use policies, no longer issue Certificates conditioned on later receipt of state certifications and permits under federal statutes, and to condition Certificates on obtaining and complying with state and local permits that do not unreasonably conflict with or delay approved projects.

*Finally*, we recommend that the Commission no longer issue partial notices to proceed with construction when Certificate rehearing requests are pending and limit the use and time of tolling periods for rehearing requests.

The Commission should seize the opportunity presented by the Notice of Inquiry to make these important reforms, to bring its review of proposed pipeline projects into full compliance with the NGA and NEPA, and to fulfill its statutory role in protecting the public interest. In contrast to the Commission's current process, such an approach would promote efficiency, reduce the risks of litigation delay in project development, and improve the Commission's ability to promote orderly competition and innovation in the gas market.

**I. THE COMMISSION SHOULD ENGAGE IN A SEARCHING ASSESSMENT OF PIPELINE PROJECT NEED.**

Pursuant to the standard established in Section 7 of the NGA<sup>7</sup>, an applicant must show that its proposed pipeline project is consistent with the public convenience and necessity by demonstrating that the public benefits the proposed pipeline project would achieve are proportional to its adverse impacts (the “Public Benefits Assessment”).<sup>8</sup> Applicants must show that there is market demand in order to satisfy part of the public benefit requirement—that is, that the project is “needed” (the “Needs Assessment”).<sup>9</sup> The current Needs Assessment fails to take into account the regional need for, and impacts of, building new pipelines, and relies too heavily on the existence of precedent agreements, and affiliate precedent agreements in particular. The Attorneys General recommend that the Commission assess market need and impacts on a comprehensive regional basis, expand the assessment to include factors beyond precedent agreements, and employ a rebuttable presumption that affiliate contracts do not demonstrate pipeline need.

**A. Market need should be assessed on a comprehensive regional basis.**

The Commission should broaden its Needs Assessment from assessing the need for each individual pipeline project to considering each pipeline project within the broader context of regional need. Regional designations should be based upon the Commission’s natural gas market regions: Midwest, Northeast, Gulf, Southeast, and Western.<sup>10</sup> Changes in gas production, delivery, and consumption, as well as new sources of natural gas, have transformed the natural gas industry since the Policy Statement was issued, leading to a proliferation of natural gas pipelines and infrastructure whose impact on ratepayer and environmental interests necessitates a regional approach. Specifically, the Commission should develop a comprehensive

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<sup>7</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 717f.

<sup>8</sup> Policy Statement, *supra* note 2, at 25.

<sup>9</sup> See Pipeline NOI, *supra* note 1, at 32, 47 n.91.

<sup>10</sup> See *Natural Gas Markets: National Overview*, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, <https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-gas/overview.asp> (July 3, 2018).

analysis of each region’s need for natural gas, taking into account existing pipelines and the integration of gas and electric systems, and evaluating available alternatives to pipeline infrastructure, as well as the impacts of pipeline infrastructure and alternatives.<sup>11</sup> Regional assessments would allow the Commission to systematically assess current and future need for additional natural gas capacity (including use by natural gas-fired power plants) in regional markets, accounting for projected growth in renewables and energy efficiency. In addition, the Commission’s regional analyses would provide critical foundation for rational and regionally consistent project-specific Needs Assessments, which would build upon the regional assessments, incorporating more detailed analysis and information from project proponents.

The regional analyses should consider each region’s existing infrastructure and natural gas pipeline capacity as well as state policy goals and projections of the future demand for natural gas, including the types of services that will be needed in a changing energy market. Other regional considerations should include whether the capacity is needed for new or existing generators, whether the additional capacity promotes competitive markets, whether anticipated markets will materialize, and whether there is a reliability benefit.<sup>12,13</sup>

**B. The current market needs assessment is too narrow and should be expanded to consider multiple factors.**

Although the Policy Statement specifically rejected sole reliance on precedent agreements to demonstrate project benefits or need and recommends multiple factors the Commission should consider in the Needs Assessment, in practice, the Commission has relied heavily on proof of precedent agreements to find need.<sup>14</sup> This practice unduly restricts the

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<sup>11</sup> See *infra* Section II A and B for further discussion of alternatives analysis.

<sup>12</sup> *National Fuel Gas Supply Corp.*, 158 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2017) (statement of Commissioner Bay).

<sup>13</sup> See SUSAN TIERNEY, NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CERTIFICATION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR A CHANGING INDUSTRY, *supra* note 6.

<sup>14</sup> Pipeline NOI, *supra* note 1, at 32, 47 n. 91. The Commission’s decision to consider “all relevant factors” amended its previous policy which relied primarily on the “contract test”—the percentage of capacity under long-term contracts—to establish market need. The Commission further stated that the amount of capacity under contract “is not a sufficient indicator by itself of the need for a project.” Policy Statement, *supra* note 2, at 5. However, the Commission has continued to find public need by relying solely upon long-term precedent agreements. See, e.g. Order on Rehearing, Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, Equitrans, L.P., 163 FERC ¶ 61,197

Commission’s inquiry and fails to account for the context of the alleged benefits of a proposed project and risks approving more infrastructure and capacity, on potentially inefficient terms, than the public need requires or prospective market conditions can support. Furthermore, the Policy Statement states that in evaluating market need, the Commission should “consider all relevant factors reflecting on the need for the project,” and provide a range of factors in addition to evidence of precedent agreements, including studies of projected demand, the market to be served, and potential cost savings to consumers.<sup>15</sup> We recommend that the Commission make a renewed commitment to considering these factors and all others relevant to determining whether a pipeline project is needed, including accounting for the integration of gas and electric systems in the region and the projected growth in the use of renewables and energy efficiency measures. Where appropriate, the Commission should conduct evidentiary hearings or utilize other methods to create a more complete record and transparent process to provide greater confidence in the Commission’s Public Benefits Assessments and Certificate decisions.

**C. The Commission should further scrutinize and limit the use of affiliate contracts in demonstrating pipeline project need.**

The Policy Statement notes that “[u]sing contracts as the primary indicator of market support for the proposed pipeline project also raises additional issues when the contracts are held by pipeline affiliates.”<sup>16</sup> Despite this recognition there are currently no restrictions on providing precedent agreements signed by affiliates to demonstrate project need. In practice, the Commission has stated repeatedly that it will not “look behind the precedent agreements to evaluate project need,” even when affiliates constitute a majority of the precedent agreement capacity.<sup>17</sup>

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at \*35–44 (June 15, 2018) [hereinafter “Mountain Valley Rehearing Order”]; Order Issuing Certificates, PennEast Pipeline Company, LLC, 162 FERC ¶ 61,053 at \*27–29, \*33, \*36 (January 19, 2018) [hereinafter “PennEast Order”].

<sup>15</sup> Policy Statement, *supra* note 2, at \*23; PennEast Order, *supra* note 14 (Glick, C., dissenting, at \*1–2).

<sup>16</sup> Policy Statement, *supra* note 2, at \*16.

<sup>17</sup> See, e.g., PennEast Order, *supra* note 14, at \*33; Mountain Valley Rehearing Order, *supra* note 14, at \*40.

Relying too heavily on affiliate contracts risks mischaracterizing the need for the proposed pipeline project. In his dissent in *PennEast*, Commissioner Glick found that “precedent agreements that are in significant part between the pipeline developer and its affiliates [are] insufficient to carry the developer’s burden to show that the pipeline is needed.”<sup>18</sup> Indeed, where a utility holding company invests in a pipeline development project and an affiliate utility contracts for long-term firm service on that project, the utility holding company may pass the risk and the cost of the development of the pipeline to captive customers of the affiliate utility.<sup>19</sup> Without having to bear the risk or cost of development, the pipeline holding company has an economic incentive to construct new pipelines (and receive a return on its investment) regardless whether they are needed.<sup>20</sup> A pipeline project that is based on precedent agreements with multiple new customers tends to show a greater indication of need than a pipeline project supported by precedent agreements with affiliates.<sup>21</sup>

To protect ratepayers from undue costs and ensure projects truly reflect market need, the Commission should employ a rebuttable presumption that affiliate contracts do not demonstrate need wherever a pipeline project would not proceed absent affiliate contracts. In such instances, the Commission should require independent supporting evidence of need, such as third-party market analysis or state-approved resource plans, to overcome the presumption. Even where they make up only a relatively small portion of precedent agreements, the Commission should implement a more stringent standard of review for affiliate contracts. This standard should give the Commission the authority to look behind the contracts, including where needed an independent review of state regulatory filings and analyses regarding those contracts. Additional scrutiny of affiliate contracts will enable the Commission to better

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<sup>18</sup> *PennEast* Order, *supra* note 14 (Glick, C., dissenting at \*1).

<sup>19</sup> *Art of the Self-Deal*, Oilchange International (2017), at 20.

<sup>20</sup> *Id.*

<sup>21</sup> Policy Statement, *supra* note 2, at 26.



evaluate the market need for the pipeline project and ensure that ratepayers are not burdened with unwarranted costs.

## **II. THE COMMISSION SHOULD MORE ROBUSTLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY ASSESS THE IMPACTS OF, AND ALTERNATIVES TO, PROPOSED PIPELINE PROJECTS.**

NEPA requires federal decision-makers, including the Commission, to prepare a “detailed statement” on the environmental impacts of certain actions prior to making decisions.<sup>22</sup> This environmental impact statement (“EIS”) must take a “hard look” at the impacts of the proposed action,<sup>23</sup> including direct and cumulative impacts, as well as any “reasonably foreseeable” indirect impacts.<sup>24</sup> Consideration of environmental and economic impacts is also part of the Commission’s Public Benefits Assessment under the NGA.<sup>25</sup> Yet, in practice, the Commission often fails to satisfy its duty to assess robustly and consistently the full range of impacts of, and alternatives to, proposed pipeline projects.<sup>26</sup> As discussed below, the Commission must take a more comprehensive approach to its impacts review—both to satisfy its legal obligations and to help forestall challenges to Commission decisions.

### **A. The Commission should holistically evaluate the need for, the impacts of, and alternatives to new pipeline projects in each U.S. region.**

As noted in Section I A above, the Commission’s piecemeal review of natural gas infrastructure risks approval of more capacity than is in the public interest. Moreover, as underscored by recent federal court decisions vacating Commission orders, the Commission’s

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<sup>22</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).

<sup>23</sup> *Kleppe*, 427 U.S. at 410 (citation omitted); *see also Coal. for Responsible Growth & Res. Conservation v. FERC*, 485 F. App’x 472, 474 (2d Cir. 2012) and *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 249 (1989).

<sup>24</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1508.8(a), (b); *see also* 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (a cumulative impact is “the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions”); *Sierra Club v. Marsh*, 976 F.2d 763, 767 (1st Cir. 1992) (a “reasonably foreseeable” impact or action is “sufficiently likely to occur that a person of ordinary prudence would take it into account in reaching a decision”).

<sup>25</sup> *See* Order Denying Rehearing, *Dominion Transmission, Inc.*, 163 FERC ¶ 61,128 (May 18, 2018) [hereinafter “Dominion Order”] (Glick, C., dissenting in part, at \*1–2, \*7).

<sup>26</sup> In recent years, federal courts have vacated orders based on deficiencies in the Commission’s environmental impacts review process. *See Sierra Club*, 867 F.3d at 1373–75; *Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC*, 753 F.3d 1304, 1308–09 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

segmented approach does not align with the requirements of NEPA and increases legal risks.<sup>27</sup> The Commission should instead undertake assessments of the impacts of and alternatives to new pipeline projects on a regional basis together with a regional assessment of need.<sup>28</sup> Regional analyses would offer an opportunity to standardize the Commission's impacts assessments approach across pipeline project review proceedings by setting forth data, metrics, projections, and other information that the Commission will use to evaluate pipeline projects in a particular region, including the cumulative and indirect impacts of pipeline projects, as discussed further below.<sup>29</sup>

**B. The Commission's alternatives assessment should include clean-energy and other non-pipeline alternatives.**

The alternatives analysis required by NEPA is “the heart of the environmental impact statement.”<sup>30</sup> Federal regulations require the Commission to explore all reasonable alternatives rigorously with an analysis that “present[s] the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis

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<sup>27</sup> See, e.g., *Sierra Club* 867 F.3d at 1373–75 (vacating a Commission decision due to the Commission's failure to properly consider the full range of pipeline project impacts under NEPA); *Del. Riverkeeper*, 753 F.3d at 1308–09, *supra* note 25 (holding that the Commission violated NEPA by failing to analyze the impacts of a project in conjunction with “three other connected, contemporaneous, closely related, and interdependent” pipeline certificate applications).

<sup>28</sup> Programmatic EISs (“PEISs”) and combined EISs offer models for such regional assessments. They may even be mandated in certain circumstances. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (agencies “shall” consider “closely related,” cumulative, and similar actions together in an EIS); *id.* § 1502.4(c)(1)–(2) (urging federal agencies to consider undertaking a PEIS when they are considering multiple projects in one region, or where projects share “relevant similarities, such as common timing, impacts, alternatives, [and] methods of implementation”); *Del. Riverkeeper*, 753 F.3d at 1308–09 (holding that the Commission must conduct a unified NEPA review of multiple connected gas pipeline segments); *Kleppe*, 427 U.S. at 409–10 (“A comprehensive impact statement may be necessary” where “several proposals for coal-related actions that will have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are pending concurrently before an agency.”); *Alpine Lakes Prot. Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 838 F. Supp. 478, 484 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (agency must consider seven access roads in the same region as “cumulative actions” under NEPA); *cf.* U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3338, DISCRETIONARY PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT TO MODERNIZE THE FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM (2016) (announcing the Department of Interior’s then intent to conduct a programmatic EIS for the federal coal-leasing program).

<sup>29</sup> *Cf.* U.S. Env’tl. Protection Agency, EPA Detailed Comments on FERC NOI for Policy Statement on New Natural Gas Transportation Facilities 1 (June 21, 2018) (recommending the Commission undertake regional analyses of the cumulative impacts associated with pipeline projects and mitigation opportunities).

<sup>30</sup> 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14; see also *Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell*, 831 F.3d 564 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

for choice among options by the decisionmaker and the public.”<sup>31</sup> In addition to exploring the effect of not building the proposed project,<sup>32</sup> the analysis must thoroughly address non-pipeline alternatives outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction and the project applicant’s preferences or capabilities.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, the Commission’s own environmental review regulations and guidance require that the alternatives analysis address “the potential for accomplishing the proposed objectives through the use of other systems,”<sup>34</sup> including “non-gas energy alternatives, and/or energy conservation or efficiency, as applicable.”<sup>35</sup> More explicitly, the Commission has said that the alternatives analysis should “[d]escribe the effect of any state or regional energy conservation, load-management, and demand-side management programs on the long-term and short-term demand for the energy to be supplied by the project.”<sup>36</sup>

And yet, the Commission’s NEPA alternatives analyses consistently give short shrift to or ignore non-gas energy alternatives or other measures such as energy storage, demand response, and energy efficiency to meet the need addressed by the proposed project. When such alternatives are addressed, they are typically considered in isolation and rejected in cursory fashion as unsuitable or insufficient to meet the demand evidenced by the precedent agreements the pipeline project applicant submits as demonstration of need.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> *Id.*

<sup>32</sup> 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (d) (the analysis must “[i]nclude the alternative of no action”).

<sup>33</sup> 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (c) (the analysis must “[i]nclude reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency”); *see also* Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,033 (March 23, 1981) (“In determining the scope of alternatives to be considered, the emphasis is on what is ‘reasonable’ rather than on whether the proponent or applicant likes or is itself capable of carrying out a particular alternative.”)

<sup>34</sup> Environmental reports for NGA applications, 18 C.F.R. § 380.12(l)(1) (the alternatives analysis must “[d]iscuss the “no action” alternative and the potential for accomplishing the proposed objectives through the use of other systems and/or energy conservation.”).

<sup>35</sup> FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT PREPARATION FOR APPLICATIONS FILED UNDER THE NGA, Vol. I, 4–136 (2017).

<sup>36</sup> FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT PREPARATION, 3–6 (2002).

<sup>37</sup> *See, e.g.*, Order Issuing Certificates and Granting Abandonment Authority, Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, Equitrans, L.P., 161 FERC § 61,043 (October 13, 2017) [hereinafter “Mountain Valley Order”] (LaFleur dissenting at \*2–3) (discussing “environmentally superior alternatives” limited to consideration of single, merged pipeline right of ways as alternatives to two separate pipeline project proposals).

Natural gas is but one of many resources that can be utilized to meet customers' electric and thermal needs. Storage or electric system upgrades, for example, may be more cost-effective than pipeline expansion, particularly to satisfy peak demand. The Commission's alternatives analysis should analyze thoroughly and robustly all reasonable non-gas energy alternatives, including, where applicable, renewables and other clean-energy sources, the use of demand response and other market-based programs, and the impact of existing and projected increases in energy efficiency and energy conservation measures—accounting for state renewable portfolio standards and other programs and policies requiring or encouraging increased use of energy efficiency and conservation measures.

Not only should each individual alternative be thoroughly analyzed, but the combined effect of all non-gas pipeline alternatives also should be considered for its potential to meet the need to be addressed by the proposed project. NEPA requires no less.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the public and states have significant interest in such analysis, particularly where state law and policy requires expansion of renewable and clean energy alternatives, increased energy efficiency measures, and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, as discussed further below.

**C. The Commission must consistently analyze upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions associated with pipeline projects.**

A robust comparative analysis of the climate impacts of pipeline infrastructure and reasonable alternatives is essential to inform the Commission's decisionmaking about proposed projects. As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals "clearly signaled" in its 2017 opinion in *Sierra Club v. FERC*,<sup>39</sup> which vacated a Commission decision due to the Commission's failure to properly analyze greenhouse gas impacts,<sup>40</sup> "the Commission should be doing more as part of

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<sup>38</sup> *Cf. Davis v. Mineta*, 302 F.3d 1104, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Many [project] alternatives were improperly rejected because, standing alone, they did not meet the purpose and need of the Project. Cumulative options, however, were not given adequate study. Alternatives were dismissed in a cursory and perfunctory manner that do [*sic*] not support a conclusion that it was unreasonable to consider them as viable alternatives.").

<sup>39</sup> 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

<sup>40</sup> *Id.* at 1373–75.

its environmental reviews” to analyze the climate impacts of pipeline projects.<sup>41</sup> In *Sierra Club*, the court found that downstream combustion of gas transported by a pipeline project “is not just ‘reasonably foreseeable,’ it is the project’s entire purpose.”<sup>42</sup> There is relative certainty about the likely fate of the natural gas resources that will be transported by pipeline projects: combustion.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, if a pipeline project is *not* needed to transport additional quantities of gas for combustion, the Commission would have no basis to approve the pipeline project.<sup>44</sup> As well, it is foreseeable that an expansion in natural gas transportation capacity would impact production of natural gas upstream in the supply chain.<sup>45</sup>

Yet, in recent orders, the Commission has maintained that it is not required to consider the full range of greenhouse gas emissions associated with pipeline projects because the impacts of such emissions are too speculative or not causally related to approval of a proposed pipeline project.<sup>46</sup> For instance, in its recent Order Denying Rehearing in *Dominion*

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<sup>41</sup> *Dominion Order*, *supra* note 25 (LaFleur, C., dissenting in part, at \*3).

<sup>42</sup> *Sierra Club*, 867 F.3d at 1372; *cf. High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1196 (D. Colo. 2014) (finding that downstream greenhouse gas emissions related to constructing roads for coal mining are foreseeable).

<sup>43</sup> See Statement of Commissioner Cheryl A LaFleur on Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C., 2 n.3 (June 12, 2018), available at [https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/file\\_list.asp?accession\\_num=20180614-3074](https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/file_list.asp?accession_num=20180614-3074) [hereinafter “LaFleur June 12, 2018 Statement”] (“[I]t is reasonably foreseeable in the vast majority of cases that the gas being transported by a pipeline we authorize will be burned for electric generation or residential, commercial, or industrial end uses. . . . [T]here is a reasonably close causal relationship between the Commission’s action to authorize a pipeline project . . . and the downstream GHG emissions that result . . . .”); *cf. Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board*, 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th Cir. 2003) (agency unlawfully failed to consider downstream emissions from the burning of transported coal); *San Juan Citizens Alliance et al. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, Slip Op. at \*39 (D. N.M. 2018) (agency’s “failure to estimate the amount of greenhouse gas emissions which will result from consumption of the oil and gas produced as a result of development of wells on the leased areas was arbitrary” and a violation of NEPA’s requirement to analyze indirect and cumulative impacts).

<sup>44</sup> *Cf. N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd.*, 668 F.3d 1067, 1082 (9th Cir. 2011) (climate emissions were foreseeable where agency relied on mine development to justify investment in coal rail line proposal).

<sup>45</sup> *Cf. Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.*, 655 F.3d 1124, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that “a new runway has a unique potential to spur demand,” and agency therefore was required to analyze the impacts of such increased demand in EIS).

<sup>46</sup> See, e.g., Order Denying Rehearing and Dismissing Stay Request, Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC, 154 FERC ¶ 61,048, \*44–46 (Jan. 28, 2016); *Dominion Order*, *supra* note 25, at \*16–17; Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 153 FERC ¶ 61,064 at \*6 (Oct. 14, 2015).

*Transmission, Inc.* (“Dominion Order”),<sup>47</sup> the Commission stated that “where the Commission lacks meaningful information about potential future natural gas production” or “about future power plants, storage facilities, or distribution networks, within the geographic scope of a project-affected resource, then these impacts are not reasonably foreseeable.”<sup>48</sup> Consequently, according to the Commission, neither NEPA nor the NGA requires the Commission to quantify or even consider those greenhouse gas emissions.<sup>49</sup>

This interpretation is a plain misreading of the Commission’s legal authority and duties.<sup>50</sup> The NGA vests the Commission with broad authority to consider “all factors bearing on the public interest,”<sup>51</sup> which includes consideration of the full range of climate impacts<sup>52</sup> of proposed pipeline projects.<sup>53</sup> As Commissioner Glick noted in a recent dissenting opinion, a proposed project’s “contribution to the harm caused by climate change[ is] critical to determining whether the Project[ is] in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission’s failure to adequately address them is a sufficient basis for vacating [a] certificate.”<sup>54</sup> Moreover, NEPA’s requirement that the Commission take a “hard look” at the impacts of pipeline projects

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<sup>47</sup> See *Dominion Order*, *supra* note 25.

<sup>48</sup> *Id.* at \*14–15.

<sup>49</sup> *Id.* at \*19 & n.96.

<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, we find it concerning that the Commission pronounced a new, broadly applicable policy in the context of a proceeding for an individual pipeline project, and while the Commission is simultaneously soliciting stakeholder feedback on the same set of issues in the instant docket. We urge the Commission to seize its review of the Policy Statement as an opportunity to reconsider the positions set forth in the recent *Dominion Order* and to revise its policy in line with our recommendations.

<sup>51</sup> *Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n*, 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959); see also *NAACP v. FPC*, 425 U.S. 662, 670 n.6 (1976) (explaining the Commission’s broad authorities, including authority to consider “conservation” and “environmental” matters).

<sup>52</sup> See discussion *infra* in Section III.

<sup>53</sup> *Accord* *Dominion Order*, *supra* note 25 (LaFleur, C., dissenting in part, at \*1); *id.* (Glick, C., dissenting in part, at \*7); see also *Mountain Valley Rehearing Order*, *supra* note 14 (Glick, C., dissenting, at \*1) (“In order to meet our obligations under both NEPA and the NGA, the Commission must adequately consider the environmental impact of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on climate change.”); see also *Sierra Club*, 867 F.3d at 1373.

<sup>54</sup> *Mountain Valley Rehearing Order*, *supra* note 14 (Glick, C., dissenting, at \*1–2); *accord* *Sierra Club*, 867 F.3d at 1373 (affirming that “FERC could deny a pipeline certificate on the ground that the pipeline would be too harmful to the environment”); *Dominion Order*, *supra* note 25 (Glick, C., dissenting, at \*7) (“[T]he NGA’s public interest standard requires the Commission to consider greenhouse gas emissions associated with the incremental production and consumption of natural gas caused by a new pipeline.”).

obligates the Commission to comprehensively and carefully consider the proposed project's contribution to climate change—an urgent environmental and public health crisis.<sup>55</sup> Federal caselaw makes clear that the Commission cannot evade this far-reaching requirement by claiming that climate impacts are characterized by some uncertainty.<sup>56</sup>

NEPA does not require a perfect forecast. Where there is uncertainty about project impacts, the Commission must provide a “summary of existing credible scientific evidence which is relevant” to those impacts.<sup>57</sup> There are many analytical tools and data available to help the Commission estimate upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions,<sup>58</sup> as demonstrated in part by the Commission's past use of studies from the Department of Energy and other entities to estimate “upper-bound” climate emissions.<sup>59</sup> Notably, the regional assessments recommended above would address the Commission's claims in prior orders that decision-analysis tools, lifecycle emissions estimates, and other available resources are too general for the purposes of estimating certain project-level climate impacts.<sup>60</sup> Regional need and impacts assessments would allow the Commission to assess the climate impacts of pipeline projects at a broader level, based on the best available data and modeling relevant to the impacted region.

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<sup>55</sup> *Cf. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (“NEPA . . . places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added)).

<sup>56</sup> *See, e.g., Scientists' Inst. For Pub. Info., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n*, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (courts must “reject any attempt by agencies to shirk their responsibility under NEPA by labeling any and all discussion of future environmental effects as ‘crystal ball inquiry’”); *Mid States Coal. For Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd.*, 345 F.3d 520, 549–50 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that coal rail project would affect national long-term demand for coal and have upstream impacts by making coal a “more attractive option”).

<sup>57</sup> 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(3).

<sup>58</sup> *See, e.g.,* U.S. Env'tl. Protection Agency, EPA Detailed Comments on FERC NOI for Policy Statement on New Natural Gas Transportation Facilities 2–4 (June 21, 2018) (listing existing tools and information available to the Commission to calculate the upstream and downstream climate emissions associated with pipeline infrastructure).

<sup>59</sup> *See* Dominion Order, *supra* note 25 (LaFleur, C., dissenting in part, at \*2); LaFleur June 12, 2018 Statement, *supra* note 53, at 2 n.7 (citing studies used in past Commission orders); Pipeline NOI, *supra* note 1, at 43–44.

<sup>60</sup> *See, e.g.,* Dominion Order, *supra* note 25, at \*14–18; Mountain Valley Rehearing Order, *supra* note 14, at \*150–53.

And, in general, where essential information is lacking, NEPA requires the Commission to conduct independent research or otherwise compile missing information.<sup>61</sup> Thus, where the Commission finds that existing data and resources are inappropriate for estimating upstream or downstream emissions from a particular proposed pipeline project, the Commission should take advantage of available opportunities during the pre-filing and formal application process to seek more detailed information from proponents about the source and end use of the gas to be transported by the proposed project, and use that data to conduct its own analysis.<sup>62</sup>

Where more specific modeling is not feasible, NEPA requires the Commission to use or produce the best comparable information based on reasonable forecasts and estimates.<sup>63</sup> In such cases, the Commission should consider using the best available general modeling system and describe in its NEPA documents how it expects that project-related emissions might differ from available estimates.<sup>64</sup> For instance, the Commission could produce a “full-burn” estimate (i.e., an estimate of lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from wellhead to point of consumption, taking into account leaks and losses in production, transmission, and distribution system, assuming total consumption of delivered gas) accompanied by a caveat that ultimately the pipeline project may result in fewer emissions.<sup>65</sup> We note that in past proceedings, the

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<sup>61</sup> 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a).

<sup>62</sup> *Accord* Dominion Order, *supra* note 25 (Glick, C., dissenting in part, at \*3).

<sup>63</sup> *Accord id.* (Glick, C., dissenting in part, at \*3–4).

<sup>64</sup> Notably, while some consumption-related impacts are dependent upon details regarding when and where the associated emissions while occur (such as impacts to local air or water quality), the climate-warming effects of greenhouse gas emissions are globalized. Therefore, even without more specific details, the Commission can produce decision-relevant information about the climate impacts of pipeline projects based on an estimate of the quantity of natural gas that will be transported by the proposed infrastructure over its lifetime.

<sup>65</sup> Methane emissions from leaks and other system releases must be accounted for, particularly because methane is a potent greenhouse gas that is over thirty times more powerful than carbon dioxide in its ability to trap heat in the atmosphere over a 100-year time frame, and eighty-six times more potent over a twenty-year timeframe. According to the EPA, methane emissions from the oil and gas sector are the largest industrial source of methane emissions in the United States, accounting for about 30 percent of total U.S. methane emissions. See <http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/ch4.html>. But a recent study found that methane emissions were sixty percent higher than the U.S. EPA inventory estimate, likely because existing inventory methods miss emissions released during abnormal operating conditions. See Ramón A. Alvarez, et al., *Assessment of Methane Emissions from the U.S. Oil and Gas Supply Chain*, SCIENCE, June 21, 2018.



Commission has made gross, net, and “full-burn” estimations of upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions, evidencing the feasibility of this approach.<sup>66</sup> At the very least, the Commission should require project proponents to provide specific information on the indirect and cumulative impacts of the proposed pipeline project in the context of existing, under-development, and reasonably foreseeable energy projects and market trends in the region, as well as state energy and environmental policies. In no event, however, is the Commission permitted to abdicate its responsibility to consider climate impacts altogether.<sup>67</sup> Consistently analyzing upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions—even at some level of generality, if that is all that is feasible—would better inform Commission decisionmaking and the public than no information at all, while also increasing certainty for project proponents.

**D. The Commission should consider state policies and the Social Cost of Carbon in determining whether greenhouse gas emissions are significant.**

The Commission has claimed that “no standard methodology exists to determine how a project’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions would translate into physical effects on the environment for the purposes of evaluating [a pipeline project’s] impacts on climate change.”<sup>68</sup> “Thus . . . any attempt by the Commission” to determine whether such emissions are significant for the purposes of NEPA review “would be arbitrary.”<sup>69</sup> On the contrary, it is arbitrary and unlawful for the Commission to monetize and compare other benefits and impacts of pipeline projects without taking a similar approach to greenhouse gas emissions.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> See Dominion Order, *supra* note 24 (LaFleur, C., dissenting in part, at \*2).

<sup>67</sup> *Accord Mid States Coal. For Progress*, 345 F.3d at 549–50 (where the “nature of the effect is reasonably foreseeable but its extent is not,” the “agency may not simply ignore the effect”) (emphasis in original); LaFleur June 12, 2018 Statement, *supra* note 43, at 2; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (requiring that agencies’ NEPA analysis must be based on “high quality” information and “accurate scientific analysis”).

<sup>68</sup> Dominion Order, *supra* note 25, \*34; *accord* Pipeline NOI, *supra* note 1, at 41.

<sup>69</sup> Pipeline NOI, *supra* note 1, at 41; see also Dominion Order, *supra* note 25, at \*28–29.

<sup>70</sup> See *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.*, 538 F.3d 1172, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (agency “cannot put a thumb on the scale by undervaluing the benefits and overvaluing the costs” in failing to analyze the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions). As a general matter, there can be no doubt that greenhouse gas emissions related to natural gas extraction, transportation, and consumption in the United States as a whole are significant. See, e.g., EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS 3–6, 3–79 (2018), available at <https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks-1990-2016> (reporting 2016 U.S. emissions associated with natural gas combustion (1,476.1 MMt CO<sub>2</sub>e) and

Despite the Commission’s claims, there is a variety of relevant information to inform the Commission’s determination of the significance of greenhouse gas emissions.<sup>71</sup> In particular, the Commission should use the best available data and methodologies to estimate the incremental societal impact of greenhouse emissions—also referred to as the Social Cost of Carbon. Though Executive Order 13,783 § 5 (2017) withdrew the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (“IWG”) technical support documents for a range of federal estimates of the social cost of carbon, the information and models underpinning these estimates remain credible and useful, and the IWG’s estimates continue to represent the best available science.<sup>72</sup> The Commission has claimed that “it is not useful or appropriate” to use the Social Cost of Carbon in NEPA documents,<sup>73</sup> yet the Commission routinely monetizes other types of impacts in its NEPA documents. The Commission cannot evade its legal obligation to quantify the climate impacts of pipeline infrastructure projects where a scientifically based, peer-reviewed method to do so is available.<sup>74</sup>

In addition, the consistency of a proposed pipeline project’s greenhouse gas emissions with relevant federal, regional, and state energy and climate policies and goals—which the

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natural gas transmission and storage systems (32.8 MMt CO<sub>2</sub>e of methane)). The Commission plays a key role in approving actions that cause and contribute to these emissions. *Cf. Coal. on Sensible Transp. v. Dole*, 826 F.2d 60, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (agency cannot avoid the requirements of NEPA by “artificially dividing” its combined contribution “into smaller components, each without a ‘significant’ impact”).

<sup>71</sup> See, e.g., Comments of Columbia Law School Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change Law on Southeast Market Pipelines Project, Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, Docket Nos. CP14-554-002; CP15-16-003; CPS15-17-002, at 2–3 (Nov. 17, 2017) (arguing that greenhouse gas emissions are significant where: 1) they exceed the reporting threshold of 25,000 tons per year of CO<sub>2</sub>e used previously by EPA and CEQ to identify major emitters; 2) the monetized social cost of the emissions is large; 3) the net increase in emissions constitutes a large percentage of the affected state’s greenhouse gas emissions inventory; and 4) the emissions over the lifetime of the pipeline project would be viewed as significant in the context of state, local, and regional climate policies).

<sup>72</sup> Richard L. Revesz et al., *Best Cost Estimate of Greenhouse Gases*, 357 SCIENCE 6352 (2017).

<sup>73</sup> See Pipeline NOI, *supra* note 1, at 45 (citing *Fla. Se. Connection*, 162 FERC ¶ 61,233 at \*37–38 (LaFleur and Glick, Comm’rs dissenting)).

<sup>74</sup> See *High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1191 (D. Colo. 2014) (EIS was arbitrary and capricious where agency did not monetize climate impacts of coal mining activity “when such an analysis was in fact possible”).

Commission already analyzes in its NEPA documents<sup>75</sup>—can be used as a metric for evaluating whether emissions are “significant.”<sup>76</sup> Many of our states have adopted ambitious greenhouse gas reduction goals and mandates, the achievement of which would be threatened by rapid buildout of natural gas infrastructure in our regions. Massachusetts has adopted a broad portfolio of laws and regulations to reduce economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions by 25 percent by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050 from 1990 levels, including the Global Warming Solutions Act (2008), the Green Communities Act (2008), the Act to Promote Energy Diversity (2016), the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and programs to promote low and zero-emission vehicles, among others. The clean energy industry is a powerful and growing economic engine for Massachusetts.<sup>77</sup> Similarly, Washington State has adopted greenhouse gas reduction goals to reduce overall state emissions of greenhouse gasses to 1990 levels by 2020 and fifty percent below 1990 levels by 2050.<sup>78</sup> In addition, Washington law requires large utilities to obtain fifteen percent of their electricity from new renewable resources by 2020<sup>79</sup>; imposes a greenhouse gas emission standard on electric power<sup>80</sup>; requires new power plants to mitigate at least 20 percent of their greenhouse gas emissions<sup>81</sup>; and sets minimum efficiency

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<sup>75</sup> See Pipeline NOI, *supra* note 1, at 40.

<sup>76</sup> *Cf. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife*, 62 Cal.4th 204, 225–27 (2015) (rejecting agency’s approach to significance where agency failed to provide a reasoned explanation for how estimated project emissions compare to achieving statewide greenhouse gas reduction target).

<sup>77</sup> See Initial Comments of the Attorneys General of Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, And Washington, Connecticut Department of Energy And Environmental Protection, Rhode Island Division Of Public Utilities And Carriers, and New Hampshire Office of The Consumer Advocate, Grid Reliability and Resiliency Pricing, FERC Docket No. RM18-1-000, October 23, 2017, available at <https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/10/23/Multistate%20Comments%20RM18-1%20-%2010-23-17%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>. Furthermore, a study by the Analysis Group found that increasing natural gas capacity in Massachusetts and New England would result in a significant increase in greenhouse gas emissions and threaten compliance with Massachusetts’s state law emission reduction mandate. See Hibbard, P. and Aubuchon, C., POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY IN NEW ENGLAND: MEETING ELECTRIC RESOURCE NEEDS IN AN ERA OF GROWING DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL GAS, ANALYSIS GROUP, (2015), available at <http://www.mass.gov/ago/doing-business-in-massachusetts/energy-and-utilities/regional-electric-reliability-options-study.html>.

<sup>78</sup> Rev. Code of Wash. 70.235.020(1)(a).

<sup>79</sup> Rev. Code of Wash. 19.285.010.

<sup>80</sup> Rev. Code of Wash. 80.80.040

<sup>81</sup> Rev. Code of Wash. 80.70.020

standards for appliances.<sup>82</sup> The District of Columbia’s climate and energy plan, Clean Energy DC, proposes to reduce the District’s greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent below 2006 levels by 2032.<sup>83</sup> As part of its Public Benefits Analysis, the Commission should weigh the effect of project greenhouse gas emissions on our states’ abilities to comply with our climate and clean energy laws and policies.

**III. THE COMMISSION’S PUBLIC BENEFITS ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE INFORMED BY THE ECONOMIC HARM OF A PROJECT’S ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND MORE HEAVILY WEIGH HARM FROM EMINENT DOMAIN TAKINGS.**

The Commission should wait until NEPA review is complete before conducting a Public Benefits Assessment—an assessment that should be made at the final stage of the process in conjunction with a Certificate decision and consider together adverse environmental and economic impacts, including the exercise of eminent domain. The Commission’s current system of conducting the economic analyses first, followed by an assessment of environmental impacts which is wholly separate from the economic analyses, necessarily underestimates the value of avoiding the environmental impacts in the first place.

**A. The Commission’s Public Benefits Assessment should be informed by the economic harm of a project’s environmental impacts quantified using the Social Cost of Carbon.**

The Commission’s Public Benefits Assessment and Certificate decisions should fully and robustly incorporate consideration of environmental impacts identified during NEPA review—including climate impacts. Currently, the Public Benefits Assessment tends to occur prior to NEPA review and only considers adverse economic impacts on the project proponent’s customers, on other pipelines in the market, and on property owners affected by the proposed

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<sup>82</sup> Rev. Code of Wash. 19.260.040

<sup>83</sup> See *Clean Energy DC: The District of Columbia Climate and Energy Plan*, October 2016 Draft, available at [https://doee.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ddoe/publication/attachments/Clean\\_Energy\\_DC\\_2016\\_final\\_print\\_si\\_ngle\\_pages\\_102616\\_print.pdf](https://doee.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ddoe/publication/attachments/Clean_Energy_DC_2016_final_print_si_ngle_pages_102616_print.pdf).

route.<sup>84</sup> This assessment does not consider adverse environmental impacts and comes before NEPA review is complete.<sup>85</sup>

By determining public benefit without regard to adverse environmental impacts and without consideration of the climate harm caused by a project, the Commission is failing to meet its obligations under both the NGA and NEPA. With the NGA, Congress broadly instructed the Commission to consider the public interest<sup>86</sup> by balancing a proposed project's public benefits against its adverse effects—including *environmental impacts*—when deciding if the public convenience and necessity requires granting a Certificate.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, “climate change bears on the public interest in terms of adverse effects” of a proposed pipeline, just as the need for system reliability bears on public benefit.<sup>88</sup> And, as discussed above, NEPA requires the

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<sup>84</sup> See Policy Statement, *supra* note 2, at 18–19.

<sup>85</sup> See *id.*

<sup>86</sup> See *id.* at 23 (“In deciding whether a proposal is required by the public convenience and necessity, the Commission will consider the effects of the project on all the affected interests; this means more than the interests of the applicant, the potential new customers, and the general societal interests”); see also, *Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n*, 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959) (holding that § 7 of NGA requires the Commission to consider “all factors bearing on the public interest”); *FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co.*, 365 U.S. 1, 7 (1961) (“The Commission is the guardian of the public interest in determining whether certificates of convenience and necessity shall be granted. For the performance of that function, the Commission has been entrusted with a wide range of discretionary authority.”).

<sup>87</sup> See *Sierra Club*, 867 F.3d at 1373 (citing *Minisink Residents for Env’tl. Pres. & Safety v. FERC*, 762 F.3d 97, 101–02 (D.C. Cir. 2014) and *Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v. FERC*, 783 F.3d 1301, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also *Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC*, 900 F.2d 269, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (The public interest standard under the NGA includes factors such as the environment and conservation, particularly as decisions concerning the construction, operation, and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce “necessarily and typically have dramatic natural resource impacts.”).

<sup>88</sup> Order on Remand Reinstating Certificate and Abandonment Authorization, Florida Southeast Connection LLC, Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co., LLC, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC, 162 FERC 61,233 (March 14, 2018) [hereinafter “Sabal Trail Remand Order”] (Glick, C., dissenting at \*3); see also Dominion Order, *supra* note 25 (LaFleur, C., dissenting in part, at \*1) (“deciding whether a project is in the public interest requires a careful balancing of the economic need for a project and all of its environmental impacts. Climate change impacts of GHG emissions are environmental effects of a project and are part of [the] public interest determination.”); Dominion Order, *supra* note 25 (Glick, C., dissenting in part, at \*2) (“[c]limate change poses an existential threat to our security, economy, environment, and, ultimately, the health of individual citizens. [ . . . ] Accordingly, it is critical that the Commission carefully consider [projects’] contributions to climate change, both to fulfill NEPA’s requirements and to determine whether the Projects are in the public interest”) (emphasis added).

Commission to quantify a project’s climate-related and other reasonably ascertainable environmental costs.<sup>89</sup>

The Commission therefore should expand its evaluation of economic impacts in its Public Benefits Assessment to consider the costs of environmental harms, including climate impacts monetized utilizing the Social Cost of Carbon, as required by NEPA and the NGA.

**B. The Commission’s Public Benefits Assessment should weigh more heavily the adverse effect of eminent domain takings.**

In the Policy Statement, the Commission recognized that if the exercise of eminent domain will likely be required for a substantial portion of a pipeline right of way and other facility siting locations, the economic harm caused by the project may outweigh its public benefit.<sup>90</sup> And yet, the Commission has continued to issue Certificates without requiring a heightened showing of public benefit as disputes over pipeline siting and approvals have intensified in recent years and private property owners have increasingly resisted entering into voluntary easement agreements.<sup>91</sup> The Commission should require an enhanced showing of public benefit to offset the economic harm caused by the exercise of eminent domain where a pipeline project applicant fails to acquire voluntary easements for a significant portion of the project.

The use of eminent domain should be a last resort.<sup>92</sup> Indeed, the NGA requires no less<sup>93</sup> and the Commission should require project applicants to negotiate in good faith with property

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<sup>89</sup> See discussion *supra* in Section II C and D.

<sup>90</sup> See Policy Statement, *supra* note 2, at 27 (“The strength of the benefit showing will need to be proportional to the applicant’s proposed exercise of eminent domain.”).

<sup>91</sup> See, e.g., Mountain Valley Order, *supra* note 37 (LaFleur, C. dissenting at \*2–3 (concluding that because of the projects’ environmental impacts and adverse impacts to property owners, the project, on balance is not in the public interest); Mountain Valley Rehearing Order, *supra* note 14 (LaFleur dissenting at \*3) (noting the significant impact to landowners); *id.* (Glick dissenting at \*2–3) (applicant failed to demonstrate sufficient need for the project to support a finding that the project’s benefits outweigh its harms, especially where need was established solely through the existence of precedent agreements with the applicant’s affiliates).

<sup>92</sup> See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (requiring federal agencies undertaking condemnation in furtherance of federal programs “to encourage and expedite the acquisition of real property by agreements with owners, to avoid litigation and relieve congestion in the courts” by following federal condemnation policies).

<sup>93</sup> See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (requiring as a precondition of condemnation litigation that the Certificate holder demonstrate that it “cannot acquire by contract” the real property rights needed); see also *USG Pipeline Co. v.*

owners for voluntary easement agreements as a Certificate condition. Furthermore, as discussed below, the Commission should help facilitate increased use of voluntary easement agreements by making the currently voluntary pre-filing process mandatory, and by requiring that pipeline project proponents engage extensively with local property owners and state and local officials prior to filing an application with a preferred pipeline route and facility sites.

#### **IV. THE COMMISSION SHOULD BETTER COORDINATE ITS REVIEW WITH THAT OF STATE AND LOCAL PERMITTING AGENCIES.**

The Commission seeks recommendations on how it may work more effectively with other agencies and on ways to change its review procedures to increase efficiency.<sup>94</sup> For the reasons discussed below, the Commission should make mandatory the current pre-filing process and require more thorough review and incorporation of state and local environmental and land use requirements during pre-filing and NEPA review. Pipeline project proponents should be required to promptly apply for required state certifications and approvals under the federal Clean Water Act<sup>95</sup> (“CWA”), Clean Air Act<sup>96</sup> (“CAA”), and the Coastal Zone Management Act<sup>97</sup> (“CZMA”) upon filing an application with the Commission, to the extent consistent with the application process established by the relevant state agencies. The Commission should, strive to issue Certificates for pipeline projects only after completion of required state review under the CWA, CAA, and CZMA. The Commission should also expressly condition Certificates

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*1.74 Acres in Marion Cty., Tenn.*, 1 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822 (E.D. Tenn. 1998) (“Courts also have imposed a requirement that the holder of the FERC Certificate negotiate in good faith with the owners to acquire the property.”); *Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. 118 Acres of Land*, 745 F. Supp. 366, 369 (E.D. La. 1990) (“In addition to satisfying the requirements of § 717f(h), federal law requires the condemnor to have conducted good faith negotiations with the landowners in order to acquire the property.”). *But cf. Maritimes & Ne. Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Decoulos*, 146 F. App’x 495, 498 (1st Cir. 2005) (declining to find that the NGA requires that a pipeline project Certificate holder establish good faith negotiations with a property owner a requirement precedent to a condemnation action); *Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. Simmons*, 307 F. Supp. 3d 506, 511 (N.D.W. Va. 2018) (“MVP is not required by the Natural Gas Act or Rule 71.1 to engage in good faith negotiations with the landowner.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

<sup>94</sup> See Pipeline NOI, *supra* note 1, at 53–54.

<sup>95</sup> 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388.

<sup>96</sup> 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.

<sup>97</sup> 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466.

on compliance with state and local land use requirements and environmental permits (not required by federal law) when the Commission relies on them to minimize environmental impacts or when such permits do not unreasonably conflict with or delay Commission-approved pipeline projects. These reforms would increase efficiency, transparency, and predictability while reducing the likelihood of post-Certificate litigation.

**A. Pre-filing should be mandatory and better incorporate state review.**

Now voluntary, the Commission's pre-filing process encourages pipeline project proponents to engage with property owners, stakeholders, and federal, state, and local agencies prior to filing an application with a preferred pipeline route and siting locations for compressor stations and other facilities. The pre-filing process thus provides stakeholders and agencies an opportunity become involved early in the project development process by providing information about the extent and nature of pipeline project impacts and environmental permitting and land use requirements. Through this process, applicants may alter pipeline project design, scale, and route to minimize impacts and siting controversies.

The Commission should not only make this pre-filing process mandatory but also require that pipeline project proponents engage with state and local officials and thoroughly examine all required state and local environmental permitting and land use requirements prior to filing an application with a preferred pipeline route and facility sites.<sup>98</sup> To help facilitate increased site access for ground surveys and encourage use of voluntary easement agreements to limit the exercise of eminent domain takings, the Commission should require that project proponents engage extensively with local property owners during pre-filing.<sup>99</sup> Pipeline project proponents should be required to prepare resource reports that comprehensively review

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<sup>98</sup> This should require applicants to not merely meet with state and local officials, but listen, and to respect local requirements, then incorporate such requirements into the ultimate project siting and design as discussed *infra* in Section IV D.

<sup>99</sup> See discussion *supra* in Section III B, and *infra* in Section V. Property owner refusal to grant site access for ground surveys may hinder NEPA review as well as states' abilities to complete review of applications for state water quality certifications under CWA Section 401. Even when private property owners resist entering into voluntary easement agreements for pipeline construction right of ways, early landowner engagement may facilitate site access for performance of environmental and ground condition surveys.



pipeline project impacts and all permitting requirements—including what must be submitted for state review under the CWA, CAA, and CZMA<sup>100</sup>—based on consultation with state and local agencies.

Immediately following the filing of an application, and concurrent with NEPA review, the Commission should require applicants to expeditiously file for all required state certifications and approvals under the federal CWA, CAA, and CZMA, seeking provisional approvals for the preferred route. The Commission should also encourage applicants to simultaneously work with state and local regulators to prepare for and begin filing all required permit applications.

**B. The Commission should not issue certificates before states have issued permits and certifications under federal statutes.**

The NGA expressly preserves the rights of states under the CWA, CAA, and CZMA.<sup>101</sup> Under Section 401(a) of the CWA<sup>102</sup>, an applicant must present the Commission with state certification that pipeline project discharges will not violate state water quality standards and requirements, and any conditions imposed by a state water quality certification became conditions of the Commission's Certificate.<sup>103</sup> Pipeline project applicants must also present the Commission with state-issued permits under the CAA, and with certification that the pipeline project and its impacts are consistent with state Coastal Zone Management Plans approved under the CZMA.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> See discussion *infra* in Section IV B.

<sup>101</sup> See 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d); *Meyersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty, Inc. v. FERC*, 783 F.3d 1301, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (the NGA “savings clause”, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d), saves from preemption the rights of states under the CWA, CAA, and CZMA); see also *Islander E. Pipeline Co., LLC v. Conn. Dep’t of Env’tl. Prot.*, 482 F.3d 72, 89 (2d Cir. 2006) (*Islander I*); *Islander E. Pipeline Co., LLC v. Conn. Dep’t of Env’tl. Prot.*, 525 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (*Islander II*).

<sup>102</sup> In addition to CWA Section 401, where States have assumed federal authority over freshwater wetlands pursuant to CWA Section 404, the State's requirements become federal law and must be treated as a federal permit. *Delaware Riverkeeper v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Env’tl. Prot.*, 833 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2016).

<sup>103</sup> 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a), (d).

<sup>104</sup> See *Islander I*, 482 F.3d at 84, 86; *Dominion Transmission v. Summers*, 723 F.3d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

The Commission should end its practice of issuing Certificates conditioned on later receipt of state certifications, permits, and approvals under the CWA, CAA, and CZMA.<sup>105</sup> Following NEPA review, but prior to completion of required state review under the CWA, CAA, and CZMA, the Commission typically issues a Certificate approving a pipeline project conditioned on the applicant obtaining state-issued certifications and approvals under these federal statutes.<sup>106</sup> Requiring completion of state reviews prior to Certificate issuance would allow the Commission to better evaluate pipeline routing and facility siting alternatives informed by expert review by state agency regulators applying state standards that are applicable under federal law. This would also allow state regulators to review the preferred pipeline project route in the application, as well as alternative routes and facility siting locations, either denying or provisionally approving preferred and alternate routes and siting, pending the Commission's final review and siting approval in its Certificate. Additionally, it would prevent landowners' unnecessary loss of property via eminent domain for pipeline projects that may never be constructed.<sup>107</sup>

Notably, ending the routine issuance of Certificates conditioned on later receipt of state approvals under the CWA, CAA, and CZMA would most likely reduce post-Certificate litigation by precluding situations where the Commission approves a pipeline project only to have it blocked in whole or in part by one or more states denying federally-required permits.<sup>108</sup> Under

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<sup>105</sup> The Commission typically issues conditional Certificates if state review will take more than six months. *See* Policy Statement, *supra* note 2, at 19. State CWA water quality certifications may take up to one year to complete. *See* 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) and discussion *infra* in note 98 (state waives its right to issue a CWA Section 401 water quality certification if it fails to act on a certification request within a reasonable time, not to exceed one year).

<sup>106</sup> *See, e.g.*, PennEast Pipeline Order, *supra* note 14 (issuing a Certificate conditioned upon the completion of unfinished surveys and documentation of unobtained permits).

<sup>107</sup> *See* discussion *infra* at note 108.

<sup>108</sup> *See, e.g.*, *Constitution Pipeline Co., LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Env'tl. Conservation*, 868 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2017), rehearing denied (2017), cert. denied (2018) (upholding the New York Department of Conservation's denial of Constitution's application for a CWA Section 401 water quality certification where the company failed to provide adequate information regarding a large number of stream crossings to demonstrate that project impacts would not violate state water quality standards); *Islander II*, 525 F.3d at 151–53 (upholding as supported by the record following remand the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection's

such circumstances, the Commission's conditional Certificate decision is subject to reconsideration and judicial review. After initiating such challenge, stakeholders or an applicant may subsequently file petitions in Circuit Courts of Appeals challenging state-issued certifications and permits under federal law.<sup>109</sup> Issuing Certificates after completion of all federally required state permitting would not only prevent staggered judicial review, but also provide a more complete record supporting the Commission's ultimate Certificate decision.

Waiting to issue a Certificate until all federally required state approvals have been obtained will also prevent irreparable harm that may result from the Commission's current practice of granting partial notices to proceed with construction for portions of a project. In the Constitution Pipeline project, the Commission's issuance of a partial notice to proceed with construction resulted in acres of mature trees being cut in Pennsylvania before the completion of the project was stopped by New York's denial of a CWA Section 401 water quality certification.<sup>110</sup>

As recommended above, the Commission should require that pipeline project applicants promptly file for state approvals under CWA, CAA, and CZMA after fully assessing state requirements and procedures under these federal statutes by working with state regulators during pre-filing. This will facilitate review by state regulators and reduce the instances of

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denial of Islander's application for a CWA Section 401 water quality certification because of the project's adverse effects on shellfish habitat and other water quality impacts).

<sup>109</sup> Section 19(d)(1) of the NGA vests Circuit Courts of Appeals with original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions seeking judicial review of state certifications and permits issued under the CWA, CAA, or CZMA. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1). To be clear, we are not recommending that the Commission hold off issuing a Certificate during the pendency of judicial review following the filing of a petition under NGA Section 19(d)(1), although petitioners may seek a stay of the Commission's Certificate from the Court.

<sup>110</sup> *See Constitution Pipeline*, 868 F.3d at 90, 92–93 and discussion *supra*, note 108.

project proponents filing incomplete applications that delay review by state regulators under these federal statutes.<sup>111, 112</sup>

**C. State water quality certification under the CWA should not be subject to new time limitations or otherwise constrained.**

The Commission also seeks comments on whether there are “classes of projects that should appropriately be subject to a shortened [Certificate review] process.”<sup>113</sup> Recent or contemplated federal legislative proposals would amend the CWA to shorten the time allowed states to review applications for CWA Section 401 water quality certifications.<sup>114</sup>

The undersigned state Attorneys General strongly oppose any legislative change or regulatory effort to limit the time allowed for state review of water quality applications under CWA Section 401. For projects with large numbers of discharges, state water quality review can be a complex and lengthy process. For instance, the Constitution Pipeline project proposal

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<sup>111</sup> See, e.g., *N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’tl. Conservation v. FERC*, 884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018) (*Millennium Pipeline*). In *Millennium Pipeline*, the company took more than nine months to complete its application for state water quality certification. The Court held that the “reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one year)” for states to act on a request for CWA Section 401 water quality certification begins to run on the date the state receives the initial application, not when the application is deemed complete. *Id.* at 455–56. The Court noted that states may assist applicants in completing applications and, if necessary, request that incomplete applications be withdrawn and resubmitted. *Id.* at 456. *But cf. Berkshire Env’tl. Action Team, Inc. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, LLC*, 851 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that Massachusetts’ initial approval of a water quality certification made within one year of application was not final for purposes of NGA Section 19(d)(1) and that judicial review must wait for a final agency decision upon completion of a timely made administrative appeal).

<sup>112</sup> Section 19(d)(2) of the NGA provides a remedy for proponents faced with unreasonable delay or failure to act by a state agency on an application for a certification or permit under the CWA or CAA, in the form of seeking injunctive relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(2), EPCA, 2005. Section 19(d)(2) of the NGA grants the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state permitting agencies for undue delay or failure to act on federally-required permits. See discussion *infra* in Section III C.

<sup>113</sup> See Pipeline NOI, *supra* note 1, at 54.

<sup>114</sup> See, e.g., H.R. 2910, Promoting Interagency Coordination for Review of Natural Gas Pipelines Act, 2017 (specifying limited timeframes and procedural requirements for the Commission and other agencies to follow in conducting environmental reviews related to proposed natural gas facility projects); see also Saqib Rahim and Nick Sobczk, “Legislative ‘Reform’ to Narrow States’ Power,” ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS, February 2, 2018, <https://eenew.net/energywire/stores/1060072719> (discussion contemplated amendments to the CWA that would allow states up to 90 days to determine if an application for a Section 401 water quality certification was complete, after which states would have 90 days to complete application review and issue or deny the requested water quality certification).

involved discharges to 251 different streams and a variety of different water quality impacts, including habitat loss or degradations (87 impacted streams supported trout or trout spawning), changes in thermal conditions, increased erosion, and increases in stream instability and turbidity.<sup>115</sup> Any effort to shorten the one-year period Congress has deemed reasonable would be unlawful and arbitrary and capricious and, especially for large or complex projects, severely constrain states' rights to uphold and protect the quality of their waters under the cooperative federalism approach mandated by the CWA. Congress has already provided a remedy for pipeline project proponents faced with unreasonable delay or state agency obstruction on an application for certifications or permits under the CWA or CAA.<sup>116</sup>

It bears emphasizing that imposing arbitrary timeframes on CWA water quality certification review will not appreciably speed up pipeline project review. The Director of the Commission's Office of Energy Projects recently testified that, on average, eighty-eight percent of projects are issued Certificates within one year, and the single greatest factor slowing down review is the failure of the project applicant to provide the Commission and other agencies with "timely and complete information necessary to perform Congressionally-mandated project reviews."<sup>117</sup> Thus, the Commission should not entertain recommendations to curtail or expedite state review under CWA Section 401 (or other state approvals under federal statutes). Any such effort would contravene Congressional intent and do little to expedite state review.

**D. The Commission's Certificates should be conditioned on compliance with all state and local environmental permits and land use requirements that do not unreasonably conflict with or delay approved pipeline projects.**

Beyond federally required, state-issued certifications and approvals under the CWA, CAA, and CZMA, it is "the Commission[s] goal to include state and local authorities to the extent

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<sup>115</sup> See *Constitution Pipeline*, 868 F.3d at 90, 92–93 and discussion *supra* note 108.

<sup>116</sup> See *supra* note 112, (referencing 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(2)) EAct, 2005.

<sup>117</sup> House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Hearing on "Legislation Addressing Pipeline and Hydropower Infrastructure Modernization," Testimony of Terry Turpin, Director, Office of Energy Projects, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 115th Cong. (May 3, 2017).

possible” in pipeline project planning and construction.<sup>118</sup> As FERC routinely asserts in Certificate decisions, a “rule of reason must govern both state and local authorities’ exercise of their power and an applicant’s bona fide attempts to comply with state and local requirements.”<sup>119</sup> The mere fact that “a state or local authority requires something more or different than the Commission does not necessarily make it unreasonable for an applicant to comply with both the Commission’s and state and local agency’s requirements,” even if state and local compliance would add additional cost and potentially threaten the facility’s in-service date.<sup>120</sup>

Despite its goal to include state and municipal agencies in pipeline project planning and to strongly encourage compliance with their requirements, the Commission does not typically condition its Certificates on receipt of reasonable state and local permits.<sup>121</sup> This often leads to confusion about and litigation over whether an applicant has reasonably attempted to comply with state and local requirements that do not block or unduly delay a pipeline project. And rather than continue to work with state and local regulators as the Commission intends, applicants often assert preemption once armed with the Commission’s Certificate.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> See, e.g., Order on Rehearing and Approving Agreements, Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C., 81 FERC ¶ 61,166, 17 (1997).

<sup>119</sup> See Pac. Connector Gas Pipeline LP, 134 FERC ¶ 61,102 at \*1, \*4, \*11–12 (2011); Order Issuing Certificate, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C., 154 FERC ¶ 61,191, at \*30 (2016) (same).

<sup>120</sup> Order Issuing Certificate, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C., 154 FERC ¶ 61,191, \*30 (2016); see also Order on Rehearing and Approving Agreements, Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C., 81 FERC ¶ 61,166, 19–22 (1997) (ruling that several additional state conditions, including state review and approval requirements for pipeline route surveys and additional endangered species surveys, would not unreasonably delay the project where there was only a possibility that the conditions would conflict with the pipeline’s in-service date).

<sup>121</sup> See, e.g., Order Issuing Certificate, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C., 154 FERC ¶ 61,191, \*29–30 (2016) (noting and encouraging compliance with substantive land use restrictions and procedural requirements for allowing easement through conservation land protected by Article 97 of the Massachusetts Constitution, but declining to expressly condition Certificate on compliance with these requirements as requested by the Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation and the Massachusetts Attorney General); see also discussion *infra* in note 122.

<sup>122</sup> See, e.g., *Millennium Pipeline Co., LLC v. Seggos*, 288 F. Supp. 3d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (granting preliminary injunction barring state from using state permitting requirements to delay construction of pipeline); Memorandum of Decision and Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Confirm Authority To Condemn Easements and Motion For Injunctive Relief Authorizing Immediate Entry, *Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts*, Berkshire Superior Court, Civ. No. 16-0083, May 9, 2016 at \*2–4, \*11–16 (On motion for

To avoid these disputes and unnecessary litigation, and to address jurisdictional public interest and environmental considerations identified under the NGA and NEPA, the Commission should, first, require that applicants consult with state and local permitting agencies during pre-filing. This step would help identify potentially applicable state and local permitting and other requirements that should be considered as potential Certificate conditions. Then, in lieu of the Commission's much vaguer conditions, the Commission should expressly condition its Certificates on applicants complying with state and local environmental permits and land use requirements the Commission has identified during pre-filing and NEPA review and on which it relies for mitigation of environmental harm, or on permits that do not unreasonably conflict with or delay the approved pipeline project. This step would avoid confusion about the precise regulatory requirements applicable to a pipeline project and permit the Commission to utilize its federal authorities, in partnership with states and local governments, to responsibly manage the development of natural gas infrastructure in a manner more responsive to local requirements and concerns.

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Because state practice varies, and coordinating federal, state, and local regulatory authority has presented challenges for the Commission, states, local governments, project developers, and other stakeholders alike, the Commission should consider convening a technical conference on procedural requirements, review timelines, and other practical coordination issues in this area, and how to best alter the Commission's process.

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condemnation of easements asserting preemption of Massachusetts Constitution Article 97 (discussed *supra* in note 121), the Court noted that “[d]espite the preemption of Article 97, the Certificate does not give Tennessee unrestrained right to ignore the Commonwealth. Instead, the Certificate expressly requires Tennessee to make a good faith effort to cooperate with state and local authorities.”); Request for Reconsideration and Clarification, *National Fuel Gas Supply Corp.*, Docket No. CP15-115 (March 3, 2017) (seeking “clarification” from FERC that all state and local environmental permits were preempted by the Natural Gas Act).

**V. PARTIAL NOTICES TO PROCEED WITH CONSTRUCTION SHOULD NOT BE ISSUED PRIOR TO REHEARING REQUEST DECISIONS, AND THE USE AND TIME OF TOLLING ORDERS SHOULD BE LIMITED.**

The Commission's practice of allowing construction to proceed while delaying rehearing decisions through tolling orders inflicts irreparable harm while effectively foreclosing remedies on judicial review, denying injured parties due process. Though the NGA and the Commission's regulations require it to issue a decision within thirty days of a request for a Certificate rehearing,<sup>123</sup> the Commission routinely issues orders tolling this thirty-day period to allow it additional time to evaluate the merits of a rehearing request. These tolling orders routinely delay rehearing decisions for a year or more.<sup>124</sup>

Moreover, the Commission often grants requests for partial notices to proceed with construction after a Certificate issues—even when a tolled decision on a rehearing request is pending—so long as the Certificate holder has received all state-issued permits under the federal CWA, CAA, and CZMA (where construction activity could impact resources covered by those federally required permits). This practice results in significant and irreparable harm from project construction. For instance, as a rehearing request was tolled for more than thirteen months, the Commission granted the Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company's Leidy Southeast Project a total of twenty partial notices to proceed resulting more than one hundred acres of tree clearing.<sup>125</sup> And while parties seeking rehearing of Commission Certificate Orders may request that FERC stay project construction during the pendency of the tolling period and

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<sup>123</sup> See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b); 18 C.F.R. § 157.20(a).

<sup>124</sup> While a few recent egregious tolling periods were attributable *in part* to an extended period in 2017 when the Commission lacked a quorum, tolling periods of a year or more are common even when there are no quorum issues. See, e.g., Order Denying Rehearing, Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company, LLC, 154 FERC ¶ 61,166 (March 3, 2016) (the Commission denied a rehearing request more than one year after timely rehearing requests made in January 2015 and a tolling order issued in February 2015).

<sup>125</sup> See Transcontinental Gas Pipeline, *supra* note 124. Similarly, a Commission tolling order delayed a rehearing decision regarding the Connecticut Expansion Project for over sixteen months, authorizing tree clearing and construction for the project, including through a two-mile stretch of conservation land protected under the Massachusetts Constitution in Otis State Forest. See Order on Rehearing, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, 160 FERC ¶ 61,027 (August 25, 2017) (denying timely rehearing requests made in April 2016).



rehearing request, the Commission rarely, if ever, grants such stay requests, even when rehearing requests raise serious issues of merit.<sup>126</sup>

Because petitioners may not seek judicial review until the Commission rules on the merits of their request for rehearing,<sup>127</sup> the Commission's routine practice of delaying rehearing decisions raises serious due process concerns.<sup>128</sup> In addition to denying affected parties judicial review before construction begins, tolling orders deny landowners judicial review before their land is taken through eminent domain.<sup>129</sup> Because the power of eminent domain attaches regardless whether a rehearing has been requested, developers are free to take land while the Commission has not yet ruled on the rehearing request and while landowners have no judicial recourse.<sup>130</sup> To minimize the number of landowners whose land is taken without opportunity for judicial review, the Commission should end its practice of issuing tolling orders except in rare cases where the additional time is absolutely necessary, in which case tolling orders should be for as brief a period as practicable.

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<sup>126</sup> See *Del. Riverkeeper*, 753 F.3d at 1308–09 (Commission issued rehearing request tolling order, delaying judicial review, where the Court ultimately held that Commission's review violated NEPA).

<sup>127</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b); see also *Kokajko v. F.E.R.C.*, 837 F.2d 524, 525 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[B]ecause FERC has not yet issued a ruling on the merits of the petition, this court is without jurisdiction.”).

<sup>128</sup> See, e.g., *MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. F.C.C.*, 627 F.2d 322, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[D]elay in the resolution of administrative proceedings can . . . deprive regulated entities, their competitors or the public of rights and economic opportunities without the due process the Constitution requires.”); *Kokajko*, 837 F.2d at 526 (“[A] claim which is virtually tied up in interminable successive rounds of administrative review may present due process concerns.”); cf. *Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin.*, 740 F.2d 21, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“When the public health may be at stake, the agency must move expeditiously to consider and resolve the issues before it.”).

<sup>129</sup> This is particularly true where, as is increasingly the practice, the pipeline seeks immediate entry onto and possession of the property rights it is condemning through the use of preliminary injunctions. See, e.g. *East Tennessee Natural Gas Company v. Sage*, 361 F.3d 808 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004) (granting a preliminary injunction to a pipeline company in a condemnation matter prior to the payment of just compensation); *Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, More or Less, In Penn Twp*, 768 F.3d 300, 315–16 (3<sup>d</sup> Cir. 2014) (discussing *Sage* and granting a preliminary injunction to the pipeline company prior to the payment of just compensation). Since a District Court's reviewing role is limited, see *Columbia Gas Transmission* at 304, tolling orders issued by FERC can, when combined with preliminary injunctions granted by District Courts, deprive a property owner of any real judicial review until the pipeline has already taken full possession of the property.

<sup>130</sup> While the eminent domain proceeding occurs in a court, landowners cannot collaterally attack the Certificate, and therefore cannot challenge the developer's right to use eminent domain. See, e.g., *Williams Natural Gas Co. v. City of Oklahoma City*, 890 F.2d 255, 262, 264 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989).

## CONCLUSION

The undersigned Attorneys General strongly urge the Commission to revise the Policy Statement in accordance with all the above recommendations. Thank you for your consideration of these comments.

Respectfully submitted,

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
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
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