Via Federal eRulemaking Portal
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Office for Civil Rights
Attention: Conscience NPRM, RIN 0945-ZA03
Hubert H. Humphrey Building
200 Independence Avenue SW, Room 509F
Washington, DC 20201

Re: Proposed Rule: Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care; Delegations of Authority [Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights RIN 0945-ZA03]

The undersigned State Attorneys General submit these comments to urge the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to withdraw the proposed rule, “Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care; Delegations of Authority” (the “Proposed Rule”). HHS has proposed to codify a sweeping and overbroad right that would allow individuals and entire institutions to deny lawful and medically necessary care to patients for “religious, moral, ethical, or other reasons.” This Proposed Rule is unsupported by the federal health care conscience laws it purports to implement; conflicts with federal statutes regarding emergency health care, religious accommodations, and comprehensive family planning services; undermines the States’ health care policies and laws; would lead to status-based discrimination against patients; and would violate both the Spending Clause and the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. The Proposed Rule impermissibly seeks to coerce state compliance with its unlawful requirements by threatening to terminate billions of dollars in federal health care funding if at any point HHS determines that a state has failed—or even “threatened” to fail—to comply with the Proposed Rule’s extensive mandates.

If adopted, the Proposed Rule would effectuate a substantial change in the delivery of health care, and it would do so at the expense of not only employers and states, but also of patients whose access to medically necessary care would be seriously threatened by the Proposed Rule. At a time when many Americans are struggling to obtain affordable health care, the Proposed Rule would reduce access to health care by allowing a vast new set of individuals and institutions to opt out of providing that care. It would also unnecessarily decrease the information patients receive about their health care options, undermining their ability to choose the best options for their own health care. It would impose particularly onerous burdens on marginalized patients who already

confront discrimination in obtaining health care. It would do so needlessly because existing federal and state laws already provide a time-tested, established framework that balances respect for religious freedom with the rights and needs of patients, employers, and states.

The Proposed Rule prioritizes providers over patients. If implemented, the Proposed Rule will enable health care workers to refuse to provide life-saving care without notice to their employers—and to the detriment of patients—and impose massive burdens on both private and public institutions. As officials of States entrusted with the power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public, we urge that the Proposed Rule be withdrawn.

I. Background

The Proposed Rule purports to implement a litany of federal statutes concerning conscience objections in health care. Several of these statutes concern behavior by state governments. Generally speaking, the statutes concerning state behavior relate to the procedures of: abortion and sterilization; assisted suicide, euthanasia, and mercy killing; and counseling and referral.

(A) Three Long-standing Statutes Concern Objections to Abortion and Sterilization.

The Church Amendments, originally passed in the 1970s and now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7, provide in relevant part that:

1. the receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act does not obligate any individual “to perform or assist in the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion” if doing so would be contrary to the individual’s religious beliefs or moral convictions;
2. entities that receive a grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act cannot discriminate against physicians or health personnel because they assisted in a sterilization procedure or abortion, because they refused to participate in a sterilization procedure or abortion, because they refused to participate in a sterilization procedure or abortion on the grounds of religious beliefs or moral

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2 83 Fed. Reg. at 3881-86.

3 Additional statutes that may apply to states that are not discussed in this section include: 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(5)-1 (concerning occupational illness examinations and tests); 42 U.S.C. §§ 290bb-36(f), 5106i (concerning medical service or treatment, including suicide assessment, early intervention, and treatment services, for youth whose parents or guardians object based on religious beliefs or, in certain cases, moral objections); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-1, 1320c-11, 1395i-5, 1395x(e), 1395x(y)(1), 1396a(a), 1397j-1(b), 5106a(2)-1 (concerning certain exemptions from law and standards for religious nonmedical health care institutions and “an elder’s right to practice his or her religion through reliance on prayer alone for healing” in certain cases); and 42 U.S.C. § 1396s(c)(2)(B)(ii) (concerning pediatric vaccination).
convictions, or because of their religious beliefs or moral convictions regarding sterilization or abortion;

3. entities that receive a grant or contract for biomedical or behavioral research cannot discriminate against physicians or health personnel because they assisted in any lawful health service or research activity, because they refused to do so on the grounds of religious beliefs or moral convictions, or because of their religious beliefs or moral convictions regarding the service or activity;

4. HHS’s funding of a health service program or research activity does not obligate any individual to “perform or assist in the performance of” any part of that health service program or research activity if contrary to the individual’s religious beliefs or convictions; and

5. entities that receive a grant, contract, loan, loan guarantee, or interest subsidy under the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 cannot discriminate against applicants for training or study based on “the applicant’s reluctance, or willingness, to counsel, suggest, recommend, assist, or in any way participate in the performance of abortions or sterilizations contrary to or consistent with the applicant’s religious beliefs or moral convictions.”

The Coats-Snowe Amendment, passed in 1996 and codified at 42 U.S.C. § 238n, prohibits state governments that receive federal funds, among others, from discriminating against:

1. any health care entity that refuses to undergo training in the performance of induced abortions, to require or provide such training, to perform such abortions, or to provide referrals for such training or such abortions;

2. any health care entity that refuses to make arrangements for any of the activities specified in paragraph (1); or

3. any health care entity that attends (or attended) a post-graduate physician training program, or any other program of training in the health professions, that does not (or did not) perform induced abortions or require, provide or refer for training in the performance of induced abortions, or make arrangements for the provision of such training.

The Weldon Amendment, an appropriations rider first passed in 2004 and that has been attached to the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act every year since, states in relevant part that none of the funds appropriated in the Act may be made available to any state government if it discriminates against any “institutional or individual health care entity” because it “does not provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.”

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(B) Two Statutes Concern Objections to Assisted Suicide, Euthanasia, and Mercy Killing.

Section 1553 of the Affordable Care Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18113, proscribes state governments that receive federal funding under the Affordable Care Act from discriminating against an “individual or institutional health care entity on the basis that the entity does not provide any health care item or service furnished for the purpose of causing, or for the purpose of assisting in causing, the death of any individual, such as by assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing.”

A statutory provision applying to state-administered Medicaid programs, 42 U.S.C. § 14406, clarifies that the advanced directives requirements applicable to those programs, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w), do not require a provider, organization, or employee of a provider or organization “to inform or counsel any individual regarding any right to obtain an item or service furnished for the purpose of causing, or the purpose of assisting in causing, the death of the individual, such as by assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing or to apply to or to affect any requirement with respect to a portion of an advance directive that directs the purposeful causing of, or the purposeful assisting in causing, the death of any individual, such as by assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing.”

(C) A Medicaid Managed Care Organization Statute Concerns Objections to Counseling or Referral.

A statutory provision related to state-administered Medicaid programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b)(3)(B), explains that a Medicaid managed care organization is not required “to provide, reimburse for, or provide coverage of, a counseling or referral service if the organization objects to the provision of such service on moral or religious grounds” and “makes available information on its policies regarding such service to prospective enrollees before or during enrollment and to enrollees within 90 days after the date that the organization adopts a change in policy regarding such a counseling or referral service.”

II. The Proposed Rule Exceeds HHS’s Authority under the Referenced Statutes by Adopting Excessively Broad Definitions of Statutory Text.

The Proposed Rule states that “the statutory provisions and the regulatory provisions contained in [the Proposed Rule] are to be interpreted and implemented broadly to effectuate their protective purposes.” In HHS’s attempt to broaden what it views as the referenced statutes’ purposes, however, it has ventured far beyond the text of those statutes and the bounds of the statutory authority Congress delegated to it. HHS has done this by proposing excessively broad definitions of statutory terms, at least one of which is already more narrowly defined by the statutes themselves.

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5 42 U.S.C. § 18113(a).
(A) The Proposed Rule’s Definition of “Assist in the Performance” Is Excessively Broad.

The Proposed Rule aims to enforce “[f]ederal health care conscience and associated anti-discrimination laws,” which allow certain individuals and entities to “refuse to perform, assist in the performance of, or undergo” health care services or research “to which they may object for religious, moral, ethical, or other reasons.” In implementing this aim, the Proposed Rule adopts a definition of “assist in the performance” that is untethered from and unsupported by the statutory text. HHS proposes that this common-sense phrase actually “means to participate in any program or activity with an articulable connection to a procedure, health service, health program, or research activity, so long as the individual involved is a part of the workforce of a Department-funded entity. This includes but is not limited to counseling, referral, training, and other arrangements for the procedure, health service, health program, or research activity.”

The Proposed Rule’s overly broad definition of “assist in the performance”—which requires only an “articulable connection” to a procedure, health service, health program, or research activity—is intended to capture acts with only a remote connection to a given medical procedure. Indeed, it expressly includes “counseling, referral, training, and other arrangements for the procedure, health service, health program, or research activity.” This strained definition is much broader than that contemplated by Congress, as evidenced by the text of the statutes the Proposed Rule purports to implement. Indeed, the statutory text when read as a whole demonstrates that Congress made clear textual distinctions when discussing the performance of a medical procedure and other services, such as counseling. This Proposed Rule blurs that Congressionally-adopted distinction. For example, the first four subsections of the Church Amendments refer to the performance or assistance in the performance of a particular activity or activities. The fifth and last, however, applies to “reluctance, or willingness, to counsel, suggest, recommend, assist, or in any way participate in the performance of abortions or sterilizations….” When Congress intended to include activities such as counseling in its mandates, it did so. Likewise, the Coats-Snowe Amendment extends to those who refuse “to undergo training in the performance of induced abortions, to require or provide such training, to perform such abortions, or to provide referrals for such training or such abortions,” among others, indicating that Congress again knew how to—and did—include training and referrals in its mandates when it desired to do so. The Weldon Amendment is yet another example of how Congress’s drafting decisions reflect its intent, as the Amendment reaches entities that do not “provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.” Congress mentions “referral” separate and apart from “assistance in the

7 83 Fed. Reg. at 3923.
8 Id. (emphasis added).
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-7(b)-(d).
10 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(e).
11 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 238n.
performance” in at least five other statutory provisions that the Proposed Rule claims to implement and to which HHS seeks to apply this definition.\textsuperscript{13} Such an application to these statutes would make the statutory text superfluous and flout the authority delegated to HHS by Congress.

\textbf{(B) The Proposed Rule’s Definition of “Health Care Entity” Is Excessively Broad.}

The Proposed Rule would apply the protections of the referenced statutes not only to individual health care professionals, but also to other “health care entities” on the basis of their “religious, moral, ethical, or other” objections.\textsuperscript{14} The Proposed Rule’s definition of “\textit{health care entity}” extends far broader than the statutory text it professes to interpret, including “health care personnel” beyond health care professionals like doctors and nurses, laboratories, and health plan sponsors, issuers, and third-party administrators. The Coats-Snowe Amendment, the Weldon Amendment, and the Affordable Care Act each define “health care entity,” and none of the statutory definitions is as broad as the one contemplated by the Proposed Rule.\textsuperscript{15}

None of the statutory definitions, for example, include “health care personnel” as a category distinct from “an individual physician or other health care professional.” Including “health care personnel” in conjunction with the broad definition of “assist in the performance” could force an employer to plan its employee schedules around not only doctors and nurses who may be asked to perform or assist in the performance of a procedure, but also around a receptionist who may otherwise have to schedule an appointment for that procedure. This would not only impose significant burdens on employers, but it would also write out of the statutory texts altogether those specific activities and procedures to which the statutes apply. The definition of “health care professional,” on the other hand, is already appropriately defined under at least two of the statutes referenced by the Proposed Rule.\textsuperscript{16}

Moreover, none of the statutory definitions include “a laboratory” or “a plan sponsor, issuer, or third-party administrator.” The addition of laboratories is unrelated to the procedures targeted by any of the referenced statutes, and their inclusion could lead to the refusal of all manner of routine testing, including pregnancy testing, because of an “articulable connection” to an objected-to procedure. Most importantly, the addition of plan sponsors (typically employers), plan issuers (such as insurance companies), and third-party administrators (which perform claims processing and administrative tasks as opposed to actual health care services), enlarges the number of entities affected by the Proposed Rule in ways that are unnecessary, not contemplated by the

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\textsuperscript{14} 83 Fed. Reg. at 3923.

\textsuperscript{15} 42 U.S.C. § 238n(c)(2) (Coats-Snowe); 42 U.S.C. § 18113(b) (Affordable Care Act); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135, 562 (Weldon Amendment).

\end{footnotesize}
statutes, and not sensible. These new categories of “health care entity[ies],” particularly when combined with the excessively broad definition of “assist in the performance,” could lead to objections by human resources analysts, customer service representatives, data entry clerks, and numerous others who believe that analyzing benefits, answering a benefits-related question, or entering a pre-authorization for an objected-to procedure, for example, is assisting in the performance of that procedure. It is difficult to estimate the immense scope of administrative difficulty that this definition could cause at facilities nationwide, and the Proposed Rule offers no reasonable explanation for these new categories of “health care entity[ies].” In fact, there is no judicious interpretation of “health care entity” that includes every employer who offers a health care plan because 49% of Americans have employer-provided health insurance.17 This definition applied to the Weldon Amendment could also prohibit a state government from requiring an employer to provide insurance coverage for lawful abortions.

(C) The Proposed Rule’s Definition of “Referral or Refer For” Is Excessively Broad.

Finally, several of the federal health care conscience statutes prohibit discrimination against health care providers who elect not to provide “referrals” or “refer for” objected-to procedures. The Proposed Rule defines “referral or refer for” in an unjustified and unreasonable manner, allowing a health care provider to refuse to provide “any information” by “any method” that could provide “any assistance” to an individual when obtaining an objected-to procedure is a “possible outcome” of the information.18 Based on this definition, a health care professional would not be required to refer a woman to Planned Parenthood for prenatal care—even if it were the only option she could afford—because abortion is a “possible outcome of the referral.” Likewise, a health care professional would not be required to refer a woman for the treatment of an extensive ovarian or other reproductive system cancer because sterilization is a “possible outcome of the referral.” The Proposed Rule’s expansive definition would serve to drastically decrease access to information about health care services and access to those services themselves and to undermine the States’ interest in ensuring access to health care to their citizens.

III. The Proposed Rule is Contrary to Federal Law—Resulting in Harm to Patients.

(A) The Proposed Rule Conflicts with the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA).

While the Proposed Rule asserts the primacy of provider conscience, it contains no protections to ensure that patients have adequate access to necessary health care in emergencies. In fact, the Proposed Rule does not reference the treatment of patients in emergency situations at all. This places the Proposed Rule in direct conflict with the Emergency Medical Treatment and

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17 Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population (2016), Kaiser Family Foundation, https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).

18 83 Fed. Reg. at 3924.
Labor Act ("EMTALA"), a federal law requiring hospitals to provide for emergency care. The absence of an explicit recognition of the EMTALA requirements in the Proposed Rule could jeopardize patient lives. EMTALA defines the term "emergency medical condition" to include:

- a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy.

Yet, under the Proposed Rule, a woman suffering an ectopic pregnancy, for example, could be turned away from her nearest provider and forced to locate a doctor willing and available to provide her with an appropriate treatment before it is too late. The Proposed Rule’s impact on access to emergency care would likely be particularly dangerous in the rural areas of the States where an alternative provider may be difficult—or even impossible—to find in the necessary timeframe.

This reduction in access to emergency care is not supported by the statutes upon which the Proposed Rule purports to be based. Indeed, Representative Weldon stated shortly after his Amendment’s passage that the law was not intended to reach emergency abortions and that EMTALA requires critical-care health facilities to provide appropriate treatment to women in need of emergency abortions, the Weldon Amendment notwithstanding. Representative Weldon explained:

The Hyde-Weldon amendment is simple. It prevents Federal funding when courts and other government agencies force or require physicians, clinics and hospitals and health insurers to participate in elective abortions. …It simply prohibits coercion in nonlife-threatening situations. …It ensures that in situations where a mother’s life is in danger a health care provider must act to protect the mother’s life. In fact, Congress passed the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) forbidding critical-care health facilities to abandon patients in medical emergencies, and requires them to provide treatment to stabilize the medical condition of such patients—particularly pregnant women.

Moreover, at least one of the statutes referenced in the Proposed Rule is clear that it shall not be “construed to relieve any health care provider from providing emergency services as required by State or Federal law, including section 1395dd of this title (popularly known as “EMTALA”).”

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22 42 U.S.C. § 18023(d).
Any proper rule implementing this statute, as well as the others referenced, must explicitly ensure that patients receive emergency medical treatment.

(B) The Proposed Rule Conflicts with the Affordable Care Act.

The Affordable Care Act prohibits the Secretary of Health and Human Services from promulgating any regulation that:

1. creates any unreasonable barriers to the ability of individuals to obtain appropriate medical care;
2. impedes timely access to health care services;
3. interferes with communications regarding a full range of treatment options between the patient and the provider;
4. restricts the ability of health care providers to provide full disclosure of all relevant information to patients making health care decisions;
5. violates the principles of informed consent and the ethical standards of health care professionals; or
6. limits the availability of health care treatment for the full duration of a patient’s medical needs.

The Proposed Rule violates nearly every one of these proscriptions. First, by not clarifying that emergency medical care is mandatory under federal law, the Proposed Rule creates unreasonable barriers to timely access to appropriate medical care. Second, by disavowing principles of informed consent in its broad definitions of “assist in the performance” and “referral or refer for,” the Proposed Rule interferes with “communications regarding a full range of treatment options between the patient and the provider,” “restricts the ability of health care providers to provide full disclosure of all relevant information to patients making health care decisions,” and “violates the principles of informed consent and the ethical standards of health care professionals.” The Proposed Rule’s violation of these federal protections is unlawful. It is also unnecessary given that the States already have systems in place to protect religious freedom while ensuring access to health care and compliance with federal law.

(C) The Proposed Rule Does Not Properly Account for the Costs It Seeks to Impose on Patients.

The Proposed Rule also fails to comply with the requirement that federal agencies accurately assess the costs and benefits of their proposed regulations whenever possible. HHS

24 Id.
25 See infra Section V.
26 The Proposed Rule states that “The Department has examined the impacts of the proposed rule as required under Executive Order 12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review (September 30, 1993), Executive Order 13563 on Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review (January 18, 2011), Executive Order 13771 on Reducing Regulation
estimates that the first year of this rule would cost the economy, mostly in the already highly-regulated health care industry, $312.3 million, and years two through five would cost the economy $125.5 million annually. This estimate fails to include or account for, in any measure, the potentially substantial monetary costs of the health consequences resulting from the denials of care that would inevitably follow the Proposed Rule’s unlawful expansion of the referenced statutes. At least some of these costs would likely be borne by states. For example, for each pregnant teen who is not referred to affordable prenatal care for fear that abortion is a “possible outcome of the referral,” the subsequent health care for that teen and her child (if carried to term) could cost a state Medicaid program $2,369 to $3,242, depending on when the care was ultimately initiated.

Moreover, as “Non-quantified Costs” of the Proposed Rule, HHS lists only vaguely and briefly: “Any ancillary costs resulting from a protection of conscience rights,” while ignoring the impact on patient care. It does not list the loss of health or human dignity caused when a health care professional denies care to someone facing an emergency medical issue or with some other medical need. It does not list the emotional and other harm inherent in going forward with a medical procedure and later discovering that a better option was available—an option that a health care professional decided not to disclose at the time of treatment. It does not list the loss of the Constitutional right to abortion that will occur when women are denied information about termination of pregnancy before the procedure can no longer be lawfully performed.

IV. The Proposed Rule is Contrary to Federal Law and Unconstitutional—Resulting in Harm to Employers.


28 Table 1—Accounting Table of Benefits and Costs of All Proposed Changes, 83 Fed. Reg. at 3902.


religious views." Title VII, unlike the Proposed Rule, states that employers are not obligated to accommodate employees’ religious beliefs to the extent that such an accommodation would cause “undue hardship” on the employer. This carefully constructed balancing test, which is conducted on a case by case basis, recognizes that employers should not be forced to sacrifice their principal obligations—to their business, their patients, and their other employees—in order to accommodate the religious beliefs of one employee. Moreover, at least one of the statutes referenced in the Proposed Rule is clear that it shall not “alter the rights and obligations of employees and employers under [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Any proper rule implementing this statute, as well as the others referenced, must ensure that employers are not faced with undue hardships in accommodating employee beliefs.

By contrast, the Proposed Rule ignores the “undue hardship” test and instead contains a blanket prohibition on “discrimination.” This blanket prohibition could be interpreted to prevent the transfer of an employee to another area of a health care entity or a different shift even if the employee’s beliefs prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the initial position. When applied without any reference to employer or patient needs, this broad definition of discrimination could be interpreted to require a health care entity to hire someone who cannot deliver health care services that are critical to the health care entity’s mission or risk sanction. For example, even a small women’s health clinic could be in violation of the Proposed Rule for refusing to hire a doctor who would not perform, or a receptionist who would not schedule, a tubal ligation. Congress did not intend to so constrain health care providers as to force them to abandon patient care—or their missions and businesses altogether.

(B) The Proposed Rule Conflicts with Title X of the Public Health Service Act of 1970.

Family planning projects funded through Title X are required to counsel pregnant patients about all health care options, including abortion, and provide referrals for those options if requested. The Proposed Rule ignores Title X and, in fact, conflicts with its requirements. Specifically, the Proposed Rule defines discrimination to include the utilization of:

31 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1.
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The New York State Human Rights Law also requires the accommodation of religious beliefs “unless, after engaging in a bona fide effort, the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee’s or prospective employee’s sincerely held religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” N.Y. Human Rights L. § 296(10).
33 42 U.S.C. § 18023(c)(3).
35 See Title X, Public Health Service Act of 1970 § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300; Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135, 521 (2017) (“all pregnancy counseling shall be nondirective”); 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(5) (requiring that a family planning project offer pregnant women the opportunity to be provided information and counseling regarding prenatal care and delivery; infant care, foster care, or adoption; and pregnancy termination). Id. (dictating that a family planning project, “[i]f requested to provide such information and counseling, provide
any criterion, method of administration, or site selection, including the enactment,
application, or enforcement of laws, regulations, policies, or procedures directly or
through contractual or other arrangements, that tends to subject individuals or
entities protected under this part to any adverse effect described in this
definition…. 36

An “adverse effect” as referenced in this definition includes the denial of grants or contracts or
any other benefits or privileges. 37 Thus, a state could be unable to select Title X sub-recipients on
the basis of their willingness to counsel about and refer for abortions. Application of the definition
of “discriminate or discrimination” without any reference to states’ Title X obligations leaves
states with a Hobbesian choice: they can either withhold federal family planning dollars from
organizations unwilling to provide “non-directive” pregnancy counseling about (and potential
referral to) all of the health care options—in direct contravention of the Proposed Rule—or provide
such funding—in direct contravention of Title X. Like the Weldon Amendment, Congress passes
the non-directive pregnancy counseling requirement applicable to Title X in appropriations
measures each year and did so as recently as last year. 38 Congress surely did not intend in 2017
that the non-directive pregnancy counseling requirement be nullified by a new agency
interpretation of statutes predating this Congressional action.

(C) The Proposed Rule Violates the Establishment Clause.

The Proposed Rule’s failure to consider the needs of patients or employers, including those
governed by Title X, in its mandates implies that health care professionals have an unprecedented
absolute right to religious accommodation, which is incompatible with the United States
Constitution. Indeed, the Proposed Rule does not include any provision for balancing or
accounting for a patient’s right to care or an employer’s commitment to deliver that care. Laws
that compel employers to “conform their business practices to the particular religious practices of
. . . employees” violate the Establishment Clause. 39 In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, the Supreme
Court invalidated a law providing employees with the absolute right not to work on their chosen
Sabbath in part because the law unfairly and significantly burdened the employers and fellow
employees who did not share the employee’s Sabbath. “The First Amendment ... gives no one the
right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own
religious necessities.” 40 The Court found the law “unyielding[ly] weight[ed]” the interests of
Sabbatarians “over all other interests” and was invalid under the Establishment Clause. 41 To the
extent that the Proposed Rule requires businesses to accommodate their employees’ religious
neutral, factual information and nondirective counseling on each of the options, and referral upon request, except with
respect to any option(s) about which the pregnant woman indicates she does not wish to receive such information and
counseling.”).

37 Id.
40 Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (1953)).
41 Id.
beliefs at all costs, it is directly analogous to the law successfully challenged in *Caldor* and thus contravenes the First Amendment.

V. **The Proposed Rule Undermines State Policies Regarding Health Care and Would Require States to Violate Their Own Laws.**

HHS states that while the Proposed Rule “is expected to affect State and local governments, the anticipated effect is not substantial.”42 The States disagree. In order to ensure access to care for their citizens, the States have enacted laws to guarantee emergency and medically necessary care as well as informed consent. State laws also protect the religious freedom of employees while respecting the business necessities of their employers. These important, sometimes competing needs have been carefully balanced in various ways in each of the States. The Proposed Rule upsets these delicate and long-standing balances and ignores the needs of patients and employers.

First, as noted above, the Proposed Rule does not so much as mention the provision of emergency health care, which can require abortions or other procedures to which a health care professional may object. In addition to conflicting with federal law requiring emergency medical care,43 the Proposed Rule is at odds with state law that requires the provision of emergency medical care.44 In many states, mandatory emergency care includes the provision of emergency contraception to survivors of sexual assault.45 In addition to mandating emergency care, several state regulations also prohibit health care professionals from abandoning a patient in medical need without first arranging for the patient’s care.46 The Proposed Rule ignores the requirement of emergency or medically necessary care under federal or state law,47 seemingly leaving the provision of this care solely to chance.

Second, the Proposed Rule does not allow for state laws that already facilitate the accommodation of religious or moral objections, balancing conscience protection with patients’ rights to access care. For example, several states have laws allowing an individual to refuse to

42 83 Fed. Reg. at 3918.
43 See *supra* Section III.
45 *See, e.g.*, MGL c. 111, s. 70E (requiring the provision of information about emergency contraception and emergency contraception to survivors of sexual assault); N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.6c (same); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-p (same); Wash. Rev. Code § 70.41.350 (same). *See also* 410 ILCS 70/2.2(b) (similar).
46 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-580a (“An attending physician or health care provider who is unwilling to comply with the wishes of the patient …, shall, as promptly as practicable, take all reasonable steps to transfer care of the patient to a physician or health care provider who is willing to comply with the wishes of the patient…”); 8 NYCRR § 29.2 (noting unprofessional conduct includes “abandoning or neglecting a patient or client under and in need of immediate professional care, without making arrangements for the continuation of such care…”); Wash. Admin. Code § 246-840-700; Wash. Admin. Code § 246-817-380; Wash. Admin. Code § 246-808-330. *See also* N.J.S.A. 45:14-67.1 (requiring a pharmacy to fill lawful prescriptions without undue delays despite employee objections); Wash. Admin. Code § 246-869-010 (same).
47 States are required to define medically necessary care for their Medicaid plans. 42 C.F.R. § 438.210(a)(5). The Proposed Rule, however, would undermine the ability of states to use these federally-mandated definitions of medically necessary care to select Medicaid providers.
assist in a non-emergency abortion as long as the individual notifies the employer in advance. This type of state law facilitates accommodations such as “staffing or scheduling practices that respect an exercise of conscience rights under Federal law.” The Proposed Rule, however, states that “OCR will regard as presumptively discriminatory any law, regulation, policy, or other such exercise of authority that has as its purpose, or explicit or otherwise clear application, the targeting of religious or conscience-motivated conduct.” Thus, HHS would regard these laws, which are targeted at religious or conscience-motivated conduct—but only to accommodate it—as presumptively discriminatory. Given that all federal health care funding could be terminated for any “threatened failure to comply” with the Proposed Rule, states are faced with either having no such laws (or even policies for their own hospital systems), which would threaten efficient health care administration and the provision of care, or losing all federal funding to provide that care.

Third, the Proposed Rule does not acknowledge or recognize the import of patient informed consent, which is protected by the Affordable Care Act and state law. The Proposed Rule does not require that a patient be informed that a health care provider is refusing to counsel them about, or refer them to, certain health care services. States such as New York and Massachusetts mandate informed consent for patients to ensure that patients can make their own informed medical decisions. In other states, the failure to inform patients of possible alternative treatments increases the risk of malpractice liability for the health care providers involved in the patients’ care and the health care facility at which the care is performed. The complexity of identifying which members of a large health care team have objections to providing full informed consent—and about which topics—not only risks delay in necessary care, but increases the risk of liability for health care providers and facilities. The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which consisted of leading experts in research, law, medicine, and medical ethics, issued a seminal 1982 report on the ethical and legal implications of informed consent that concluded that patients must be provided with “all relevant information regarding their condition and alternative treatments.” Other federal laws recognize the importance of informed consent, including two of the statutes that the Proposed Rule professes to implement. These statutes require plans that refuse “to provide, reimburse for, or provide coverage of a counseling or referral service” on the basis of a moral or religious objection to “make[] available information on its policies regarding such service to prospective enrollees before

48 See, e.g., Conn. Regs. § 19–13–D54(f); 720 ILCS 510/13; MGL c. 112 s. 12l; N.Y. Civ. Rights L. § 79-1. See also Wash. Rev. Code § 48.43.065 (protecting right of provider, carrier, or facility to refrain from participating in provision or payment for specific service they find objectionable, but requiring advanced notice); Wash. Rev. Code § 70.47.160 (same); Wash. Admin. Code § 284-43-5020 (requiring carriers to file plan ensuring timely access to services).
50 MGL c. 111, s. 70E; N.Y. Pub. Health L. § 2805-d. See also 720 ILCS 510/13 (“If any request for an abortion is denied [because of a conscience objection], the patient shall be promptly notified.”)
51 See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70.050.
or during enrollment and to enrollees within 90 days after the date that the organization or plan adopts a change in policy regarding such a counseling or referral service.”53 Both laws also provide that they shall not “be construed to affect disclosure requirements under State law.”54 The Proposed Rule seeks not only to write the disclosure requirement out of these two statutes but also to take power from the states that Congress has expressly reserved to them. An agency action that seeks to preempt state laws without the proper Congressionally delegated authority is unlawful.55

VI. The Proposed Rule’s Funding Termination Scheme Exceeds HHS’s Statutory Authority and Is Unconstitutional.

(A) The Proposed Rule Exceeds HHS’s Statutory Authority by Threatening to Terminate All Federal Health Care Funding to Recipients for Any “Failure or Threatened Failure” to Comply.

The Proposed Rule seeks to impose new and unnecessary conditions on billions of federal health care dollars that states rely on to ensure access to care for patients. The Proposed Rule emphasizes its intention to terminate a “variety of financing streams” for any failure—or threatened failure—to comply with any of the statutes referenced, and it does so without so much as defining the term “threatened failure.”56 HHS does provide a non-exclusive list of “examples” of financing streams that it proposes should be dependent on the states’ ability to avoid a vague and non-defined “threatened failure” to comply with the Proposed Rule. This list expressly includes reimbursement for health-related activities provided by programs including: Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program; public health and prevention programs; HIV/AIDS and STD prevention and education; substance abuse screening; biomedical and behavioral research at state institutions of higher education; services for older Americans; medical assistance to refugees; and adult protection services to combat elder justice abuse.57

HHS states that “Congress has exercised the broad authority afforded to it under the Spending Clause to attach conditions on Federal funds for respect of conscience…..”58 Indeed, the relevant statutes condition funding from specific sources to specific requirements and prohibitions. For example, the first two of the five requirements of the Church Amendments condition only grants, contracts, loans, or loan guarantees under the Public Health Service Act, the Community

55 See Texas v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 3d 965, 980-81 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (enjoining a U.S. Department of Labor rule implementing the Family and Medical Leave Act on the ground that compliance with the rule would require the plaintiff states to violate their own state laws and that the rule exceeded the agency’s congressionally delegated authority).
56 83 Fed. Reg. at 3905, 3931.
57 83 Fed. Reg. at 3905.
Mental Health Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act.\textsuperscript{59} The third Church Amendment requirement conditions only grants or contracts “for biomedical or behavioral research,” the fourth applies to HHS’s funding of a particular health service program or research activity, and the fifth conditions funds similar to those conditioned by the first two.\textsuperscript{60} Many of the referenced statutes have a similar framework.\textsuperscript{61} The Proposed Rule ignores the sources of funds Congress has conditioned upon obedience to each statute, instead threatening to terminate all federal health care funding to recipients for any failure—or threatened failure—to comply with any of the statutes referenced.\textsuperscript{62} These sanctions far exceed HHS’s statutory authority,\textsuperscript{63} and if acted upon, would unjustifiably terminate sources of funding that states rely on to provide critical, and sometimes life-saving, health services to their citizens.

Moreover, the Proposed Rule’s funding termination provisions require no administrative process before HHS terminates all federal health care funding for a state or other entity. Under the Proposed Rule, HHS can terminate all federal health care funding solely upon its determination that “there appears to be a failure or threatened failure to comply” with either the referenced statutes or the Proposed Rule itself.\textsuperscript{64} It can do so even if only a state’s sub-recipient—not the state itself—is accused of wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{65} It can also do so while a state or other entity is attempting to resolve the matter informally.\textsuperscript{66}

\textit{(B) The Proposed Rule Violates the Spending Clause.}

As noted in Section VI(A), supra, there is no statutory authority for HHS’s assertion of a vast new power to terminate broad swaths of federal health care funding that are unrelated to the program funds that Congress has expressly conditioned. If, however, Congress did delegate to HHS the authority to terminate all federal health care funding to the states on the basis of a failure or threatened failure to comply with any of the referenced statutes, such an action would violate the Spending Clause.

Congress may use the Spending Clause power to condition grants of federal funds upon the states taking certain actions that Congress could not otherwise require them to take, but this

\textsuperscript{59} 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-7(b)-(c)(1).

\textsuperscript{60} 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-7(c)(2)-(e).


\textsuperscript{62} 83 Fed. Reg. at 3931.

\textsuperscript{63} See County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp.3d 497, 530-532 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (enjoining executive order regarding sanctuary cities in part because order violated separation of powers by attempting to exercise Congress’s spending power in its enforcement).

\textsuperscript{64} Id.

\textsuperscript{65} 83 Fed. Reg. at 3929.

\textsuperscript{66} 83 Fed. Reg. at 3931.
power is not without limit. Importantly, if Congress seeks to condition the states’ receipt of federal funds, it “must do so unambiguously.” Conditions on federal grants can also be barred if they are unrelated “to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.” Additionally, “the financial inducement offered by Congress” cannot be “so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.” The Proposed Rule would violate each of these limits on Congress’s exercise of the Spending Clause power.

In the first instance, the vague notion of a “threatened failure to comply” offends the requirement that Congress must unambiguously state the prohibited conduct that will trigger the loss of funding under its Spending Clause power. Additionally, because the Proposed Rule conflicts with other federal laws, the states risk all of their federal health care funding by merely complying with (other) federal law—leaving them no unambiguously compliant course of action. For example, if a pregnancy counselor at a public health department that receives Title X funds objects to providing counseling about or referral to abortion services, the facility will have to decide whether to 1) transfer that employee in violation of the Proposed Rule or 2) allow that employee not to counsel about or refer to these services in violation of Title X. Should it choose the first option, it could lose all of its federal health care funding; should it choose the second option, it could lose all of its federal Title X funding.

Next, the funding that HHS proposes it should be allowed to terminate, on the basis of a “threatened failure to comply” with the Proposed Rule, includes programs, like the Children’s Health Insurance Plan, that are entirely unrelated to the federal interest in protecting conscience objections to a narrow category of procedures, such as abortion and sterilization.

Last, the Supreme Court has already held that Congress’s imposition of new, unrelated conditions on an amount less than the amount of funding at stake under the Proposed Rule was so coercive as to be likened to a “gun to the head.” In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court reasoned that a Congressional threat to a state’s Medicaid funding was unconstitutional because it was so coercive as to deprive states of any meaningful choice whether to accept the condition attached to receipt of federal funds. The Proposed Rule would eliminate not only states’ Medicaid funding, but a host of other federal health care funding as well.

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68 Id. at 576.
70 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 580 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
71 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
72 83 Fed. Reg. at 3905.
73 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 581.
74 Id. at 579-585.
VII. The Proposed Rule Will Increase Discrimination, Limit Health Care Providers, and Harm Patients.

The States maintain a quintessential interest in the civil rights and health of their residents, an interest alternately described as quasi-sovereign and within those police powers reserved to them. The States have considered the Proposed Rule in light of their twin duties to protect civil rights and the public health, and believe that it harms both patients and health care providers. Despite HHS’s stated interest in “a society free from discrimination,” the Proposed Rule substantially increases the risk of discrimination against patients on the basis of, inter alia, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity. The Proposed Rule also risks having a chilling effect upon health care providers in a manner that will likely harm patients and vulnerable populations. Both of these anticipated harms arise from the unnecessary and unsupported breadth and scope of the Proposed Rule.

(A) The Proposed Rule Will Increase Status-Based Discrimination Against Patients.

The statutes referenced in the Proposed Rule in no way permit entities or health care personnel to deny care to a patient based on his or her status, e.g., a patient’s status as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. Rather, those statutes set forth narrowly tailored exemptions to the provision of specific procedures, irrespective of a patient’s status. Against this backdrop of narrow statutory protections allowing health care workers to opt out of certain procedures and services, HHS seeks to expand the scope of the referenced statutes, its regulatory footprint, and its own power. As set forth in Section II, supra, the Proposed Rule defines the terms “assist in the performance” and “health care entity” in ways that broaden the scope of the referenced statutes, vastly expand the number of individuals potentially eligible to assert a “religious, moral, ethical, or other” objection, and dramatically increase the types of services to which they may object. This expanded universe of individuals who can refuse to provide patient care or perform activities with an “articulable connection” to patient care, combined with the enormous sanctions faced by states and other entities if they do not allow for these exemptions, raises the specter of heightening status-based discrimination against existing patient populations.

The States have serious concerns, for example, that an expanded universe of potential conscience objectors may seek to use the statutory tether of a “sterilization procedure” to deny care to transgender patients. Transgender people regularly experience discrimination within the health care industry, resulting in substantial health disparities with the non-transgender


76 83 Fed. Reg. at 3903.

77 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(1) (Church Amendment) (referring to “performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion” (emphasis added)).
population. 78 This discrimination includes both denials of care related to gender transition as well as denials of care for routine medical issues—e.g., physicals, treatment for the flu, or care for diabetes—completely unrelated to their transgender status. 78 In some instances, this discrimination has occurred in emergency medical settings in which prompt and effective care for patients is urgent and its absence could be life-threatening. 79 Similarly, the States also have concerns that an expanded universe of conscience objectors could seek to use the Proposed Rule to deny medical care to male patients who seek pre- or post-exposure prophylactic medications to prevent HIV infection based upon those men’s actual or perceived sexual orientation. 80 Any regulatory expansion of statutory conscience exceptions that results in status-based discrimination would fundamentally undermine patient health and the interest of the States in preserving that health within their borders.

(B) The Proposed Rule Will Have a Chilling Effect Upon Health Care Providers, Further Harming Patients.

The Proposed Rule would also inhibit the provision of health care in a manner that harms public health and likely falls more heavily on the shoulders of vulnerable populations. Not only does the Proposed Rule vastly expand the scope of individuals who may lodge conscience-based objections to the provision of medical procedures and other services with an “articulable connection” to those procedures, 82 it also exceeds its statutory authority in intending to cut off all federal health care funding for any failure or threatened failure to comply with the Proposed Rule. 83 This regulatory combination is an especially dangerous one that is likely to have a chilling effect upon health care providers. Health care providers faced with a potentially limitless universe of conscience objections from any employee, including members of the janitorial or secretarial staff, have strong incentives to cease offering procedures like abortion or gender transition-related


79 See 2011 Report, at 6 (noting that 19% of survey respondents reported being refused medical care due to their transgender or gender non-conforming status); 2016 Report, at 96-97 (noting that 15% of survey respondents reported a health care provider asking unnecessary or invasive questions about their transgender status unrelated to the reason for their visit; 8% of respondents reported a provider’s denial of transition-related care; and 3% of respondents reported a denial of care unrelated to gender transition).


82 See supra Section II.

83 See supra Section VI(A).
therapies or surgeries in order to avoid any possibility of the loss of all federal health care funding, including Medicaid funding, which could literally close a health care provider’s doors.

Such a net reduction in the medical care offered by health care providers would harm the public health in each of the States. Additionally, because the Proposed Rule generally targets health care services supported by federal funds, its impact would be felt most by low-income patients who are far less likely to have alternative health care services available after a provider ceases to provide certain medical care or procedures. Further, patients reliant upon federal funding for the provision of health care are disproportionately non-white: 21% black and 25% Hispanic, as compared to those communities’ respective proportions of 13.3% and 17.8% in the United States population. Consequently, any chilling effect the Proposed Rule has upon health care providers’ decisions to offer abortion or other procedures will be borne disproportionately by minority populations.84

VIII. Conclusion

If adopted, the Proposed Rule will harm patients by increasing discrimination and decreasing the provision of health care and information about health care. It will harm the Constitutional rights of the States and their residents. It will needlessly and carelessly upset the balance that has long been struck in federal and state law to protect the religious freedom of providers, the business needs of employers, and the health care needs of patients. Accordingly, we urge HHS to withdraw the Proposed Rule.

Respectfully submitted,

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